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PREFACE 
After the beginning of Reforms, after Mao’s death, China embraced a transition pro-
cess which led to epochal institutional, legal, economic and social transformation.  
The centrally-planned system was gradually dismantled, with the rise of a dynamic 
private economy system accompanied by the equalization of State Owned Enterprises, 
while the Country got out from its previous autarchic isolationism, with the opening 
up to foreign direct investment. All of this, was pursued gradually, with an empirical 
and pragmatic approach, without questioning about the leading role of the Communist 
Party, which essentially retained the monopoly of the political authority and the ove-
rarching responsibility to coordinate the whole reform process, which was mainly 
centered on economic development, with functional institutional reshaping, in line 
with the tradition of the so-called “confucian” or “developmental” state, that characte-
rized the developmental experience of many countries in Eastern Asia during the XX 
century.  
The result was a four decade of unceasing economic growth, that lead the country to 
the status of second world economic power in early 2010s, but at the same time to se-
rious environmental deterioration and social imbalances, whereas industrialization 
was pursued with little if none attention to social and environmental negative externa-
lities, which nevertheless are mining the country economic and political stability. 
While the global economy turned to one of its worst crisis since the 1929 collapse, 
with extensive impact on China’s macroeconomic stability, which reflected into a 
slowdown in the economic growth rate, China’s government acknowledged that the 
double-digit economic growth obtained by the so-called “world factory” model that 
characterized the developmental path after the reform was not possible anymore and 
that the adoption of a new model urged, in order to avoid the risk of falling into a 
middle-income trap.  
This new awareness took the name of “New Normal” ($3) in the public narra-
tion: a new phase of reform where a qualitative approach to growth would replace the 
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“growth by any means” approach, with major attention on environment protection and 
social stability, to be achieved by the promotion of less capital-intensive and value-
added industries, advanced services and a new public welfare.  
Such a new awareness is shaping a big number of medium and long term plans, at any 
level. This is opening many opportunities for foreign companies, that have not being 
looking for long at China as only a sourcing and manufacturing market, but also as an 
increasingly important market for their products and services.  
The purpose of this work is to understand the implications brought by this transition 
for foreign companies, in the belief that a correct and integrated understanding of the 
many institutional, juridical and socio-economical facets of China transition to “New 
Normal” is crucial for effective entry and business strategies, in a fast developing -but 
still to a wide extent immature- market like China.  
The work adopts a multi-disciplinary approach, where juridical and institutional ana-
lysis is conducted with reference to its historical, cultural and economic background, 
in the assumption that transition is a highly path-dependent, rather than a theological 
process.  
The work consists of four papers.  
The first paper represents a framework of the whole study, where the nature of Chi-
na’s transition to New Normal is explicated in its institutional, legal and cultural 
background, resorting to a wide literature review. The further three papers explore, 
with a sectorial cut, three of the main pillars of the New Normal: the reform of health-
care (Paper 2), the food safety reforms (Paper 3) and the environmental protection re-
form (Paper 4).  
In Paper 2, the Reform of healthcare is analyzed, with special focus on the bilateral 
investment opportunities and obstacles. Healthcare reform in China on the one hand is 
opening the market on the side of the demand for more and better quality products 
and services, with the progressive extension of basic insurance coverage to the 98% of 
the population to be achieved by 2020. On the other hand, the reform of public hospi-
tals and the general lifting down of direct barriers to investment increase the degree of 
transparence and competition on the side of the supply. Foreign investors are thus 
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more attracted by a general climate of opportunities. However, the reform of healthca-
re is pursued also by means of industrial policy tools that aims at building up national 
champion firms, which are then pushed to “go out” and acquire market share, techno-
logies and resources, leveraging the institutional support and the growing domestic 
market as their competitive advantages. The Reform of healthcare is then promoting 
the international integration between China and the world in such a key sector, with a 
general growth of bilateral investment amount and double-fold effect on the sides of 
technology, economy and culture. An emblematic case is represented by the Traditio-
nal Chinese Medicine sub-sector, which is actively supported by national policies in 
its technological enhancement, for its integration with western medicine solutions and 
scientific approaches in the domestic market, and its promotion and expansion on the 
international stage.        
In Paper 3, we trace the emergence of a food security law, remarking the progressive 
integration of China’s food safety management system with international standards 
and practices, in a process which started forty years ago and had in China’s accession 
to WTO in 2001 its turning point. Since the introduction of a socialist market econo-
my, which replaced the previous soviet-style centrally planned arrangement, food sa-
fety has arisen as one of the most urgent issues, with a legal framework not capable to 
keep in step with the expansion of the food industry and the emergence of many re-
ported cases of failure, amongst which the melamine crisis in 2008 is the most tragical 
one. Stricter normative provisions and a more effective management system introdu-
ced by the 2009 and the 2015 safety food laws, along with increased attention by the 
public opinion, have opened important opportunities for foreign business operating in 
the food&beverage sector, driven by a growing demand of quality products. Neverthe-
less, market and regulatory obstacles limit foreign operators at different stages of di-
stribution. In the paper, organic food certification and e-commerce retail regulation 
are taken into account as two of the most interesting cases seizing the opportunities 
and the obstacles that foreign exporters and investors might find in approaching the 
Chinese food&beverage market. 
In Paper 4, the legal framework for environmental protection is investigated. The 
“world-factory” development model, which characterized China economy since late 
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‘70s, has led to enormous environmental damage. One of the main pillars of the New 
Normal phase is the so-called “Green Revolution”, which is making of China one of 
the most active players and contributors to the XXI century environmental protection 
global challenge, with massive investment in green technologies and environmental 
restoration, supported by a deep revisitation of the related legal framework, policies 
and institutional patterns. The demand for high-end technologies represents thus a big 
opportunity for western companies, which can leverage their higher capability in the 
sector. Anyway, normative provisions disciplining the import of machinery and the 
changing administrative mechanisms regulating public-private partnerships (PPP) re-
quire foreign investors and exporters to give up any episodic approach, whereas fac-
tors such as certification and compliancy tests costs, as well as unpredictable time 
frame for technology transfer, need for relevant investment and a long-termed finan-
cial strategy.                
All of these reforms converge to the same horizon: increase the quality of life for the 
widest portion of Chinese citizen, opening and stimulating at the same time a deep 
reshaping of the country industrial landscape, with evident business opportunities for 
foreign firms, that can leverage their advanced know-how and technologies as a deci-
sive competitive advantage.  
However, legal and institutional reform present also challenges and barriers, for both 
authorities and foreign firms. Lack of financial and technical capability, along with 
institutional imperfections and imbalances, often undermine the actual enforcement of 
regulations and policies on the local level.  Fast legal development and in institutional 
transformation, on the other hand, where international integration often coexists with 
mercantilistic purposes and protectionism, represent a barrier for foreign company, 
which overlays the already existing cultural and linguistic obstacles. In each paper 
challenges and barriers are highlighted as a counterweight of the business opportuni-
ties presented.              
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PAPER 1 
  
CHINA’S “NEW NORMAL”: TRANSITION TO WHERE? 
IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DE-
VELOPMENT STRATEGIES TO CHINA 
Jonathan Francesco Marano 
University of Macerata, Italy 
jona85j@hotmail.it 
ABSTRACT 
• Purpose: The paper aims at giving an overarching picture of China’s institutional 
and economic landscape in a transitional perspective at the stage of the so-called 
“New Normal”, with main focus on the policies designed to drive the country to a 
new developmental paradigm, which is likely to greatly affect both opportunities 
and challenges for foreign companies wishing to enter and develop their business 
in the local market. 
• Design: the study is conducted in a multi-disciplinary approach, where institutio-
nal, juridical and economical analysis are conducted with attention to the relevant 
historical background.  
• Findings: the transition towards a market economy is often criticized by observers 
as being incomplete. Nevertheless, such a representation implies a teleological in-
tent that could be misleading, in the case of Chinese reform process, which appears 
to follow a logic which cannot be simplified as a mere (albeit gradual) convergen-
ce towards western-like models and best practices, but rather as a selective and ex-
perimental process in finding a Chinese way to the transition to a market economy 
and to international integration. Such a premise can have great implications for fo-
reign business development strategies in the Chinese market for the years to come.        
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• Research limitation/implication: due to its multidisciplinary approach and to the 
number of different facets reviewed, the study may lack of a thorough insight of 
specific and important issues, so that further and more in-depth research is needed.    
• Practical implications: a correct and in-depth understanding of the specific transi-
tional trajectory of China’s institutional and economic system is the best premise 
for a long-termed and winning business development strategy for foreign firms in 
the Chinese market.  
• Keywords: China, new normal, industrial policy, institutions, business development 
Deng’s reforms and opening up in late ‘70s gave start to a four decade period in which 
China’s economy grew at an average 10% growth rate, along with an increasingly 
deeper integration within the international system. After almost forty years, China is 
currently keeping growing, but at a lower pace. More than a transitory situation, the 
slowing down of economic growth is recognized by observers and Chinese authorities 
themselves as a structural trend, which reveals a danger and an opportunity for the 
future of the Country: on the one hand, it can warn about the risk for China to fall into 
the so-called middle-income trap, on the other hand it is the occasion for reshaping its 
economical, industrial and institutional scenario.  
The New Normal concept is the government’s narration of such a turning point of 
China’s reform history, the umbrella under which fall all the policies that the govern-
ment is carrying on in the effort to change the country developmental model and 
avoid the middle-income trap.  
Investment-intensive and double-digit growth should leave the place to a sustainable 
growth model, which should be more inclusive and driven by internal consumptions 
rather than export, with improved quality of life for larger strata of the population. 
Beyond such a narration, what are the policy measures that the government is desi-
gning and implementing for supporting this process? What are the main challenges 
and obstacles to be faced by this new stage of reform? And which kind of institutional 
and economic environment such a transition will leave, once completed?  
China embraced in late ‘70s a new model, which culminated into the proclamation of 
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a market-socialism system with Chinese characteristics in early ‘90s and led to the 
integration of China into the world economy with its accession to WTO in 2001. Ne-
vertheless, this huge reform process has been carried out gradually, according to an 
empirical and incremental approach, and with a certain degree of innovation, to the 
extent that it is not possible to track a mere convergence towards a western-like mar-
ket economy model. The gradualism of reform is not only in the pace of change, but 
also in its nature: the reform does not disrupt the institutional landscape but gives old 
institutions new roles and interpretations, describing a path-dependent trajectory. We 
are probably not in front of an incomplete transition of China to modernity/capitalism/
market economy but rather we have been assisting to the emergence of an original 
one, as if the attempt to give shape to a modernity with Chinese characteristics. Due 
to the huge and growing importance of this country in the international system, it goes 
without saying that the understanding of the direction of the New Normal course is 
would be an important premise for the understanding of the next future global busi-
ness environment.   
 
1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
China current policies are tracking a roadmap for leading China towards a new model 
which is likely to reshape its institutions, industry and society over the next decades; 
this would be achieved by a series of policies which aspire to further the transforma-
tion of the economy and the institutional landscape. The academic fields that can pro-
vide us with the most appropriate framework for a deep understanding of this change 
are the studies on transition and the studies on economic development in East Asia. 
Transition appears as a rather uncertain notion, as far as it used in many cases that 
range from former USSR transition to capitalism, to African countries transition to 
market economy, up to China transition from market planned to market socialist eco-
nomy, without clearly stating about which kind of transition are we talking about and 
“where” such a transition is supposed to lead to (Papava, 2005).  
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China in late ‘70s embraced a large programme of reforms which started a deep tran-
sformation of its economy with the progressive dismantle of the central-planned eco-
nomy and the opening-up towards the outer world. In 1978, in occasion of the third 
plenum of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Deng Xiaoping officially started his 
programme of reform and opening up. In 1982, during the XII Congress of the CCP, 
the idea of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” was enunciated for the first time, 
while on 1992, during the XIII Congress, the President Jiang Zemin introduced the 
notion of Socialist Market Economy , introduced into the Constitution, providing the 1
theoretical basis for any further development in the reform process.  
The XVII Congress of Chinese Communist Party, in 2007, defined the market-sociali-
sm with Chinese Characteristics as “a multi-ownership-oriented basic market econo-
mic system, with the public ownership in the dominance” . 2
According to Arrighi (2008), although most of Western scholar claimed Deng’s re-
forms and opening-up as a clear evidence of the dismissing of any kind of socialism, 
the nature of transition remains controversial for many observers who believe that 
China’s transition direction is not necessarily pointing towards a full implementation 
of a western-like capitalism: as far as basic assets like the property of lands remain 
controlled by the public, a market economy is not necessarily a capitalist economy 
and a market-socialist economy does not appear as an oxymoron. The result of transi-
tion is thus open to many options (Amin, 2005; Harvey, 2005).       
The quarrel on the nature of China’s transition links to the debate about the theory of 
convergence, firstly introduced by the sociologist Kerr in 1960, who stated that every 
society, once reached the industrialization stage, would converge towards the same 
model, independently from their previous political and institutional system (Kerr et 
al., 1960). This idea has been adopted by many economists who believe that economic 
determinants prevail on national political systems in shaping a convergence pattern 
towards globalization (Dumez and Jeunemaitre, 1994; Berger and Dore, 1996; 
Streeten, 2001). However, this point of view received many criticisms from a large 
 http://www.bjreview.com.cn/document/txt/2011-03/29/content_363504_3.htm1
 http://en.people.cn/90002/92169/92211/6275043.html2
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group of scholars, who argue that national state policies and institutions have a great 
impact on the transition trajectory towards different models (Boyer, 1996; Wade, 
1990; Gourevitch 2008).  
In particular, Robert Boyer’s theory of convergence can be seen as a bridge between 
the two poles of the debate, as he admits that technologies and market globalization 
push national systems and their institutions towards homologation –convergence- but 
such mechanisms are not perfect and it is unrealistic to identify one-fit-all best practi-
ces, which would apply for any country in the world. The most realistic outcome is a 
reciprocal influence by each national model, with a strong local characterisation. 
If not all cases, Boyer’s theory perfectly fits the case of China, where the gradualism 
that characterized the whole reform and opening-up process over its four decade hi-
story, has never been given up in favour of the “shock therapy” advocated by major 
neo-liberal think-tanks and the so-called Washington Consensus (Stiglitz, 2002).    
Focussing on East-Asia region, the debate specializes in the understanding of the dy-
namics that led to the development of a regional economic integration and industriali-
zation pattern amongst the emerging economies of the area over the 20th century. The 
reference model here is Akamatsu’s Flying Geese model (1962), which proposed an 
explanation of the industrial development in East Asia as the result of an emerging 
regional labour division pattern, led by Japan. According to the Flying Geese para-
digm, industrial development in Asia started with the previous commercial exchange 
between Europe and Asian markets. The penetration by European goods in Asia gave 
birth to a local demand for European goods. The Industrial Revolution initially de-
stroyed the Asian local industry, with the delocalization of European capitals and 
technologies to Asia, in order to exploit lower production costs, but a new industrial 
base emerged throughout a process of imitation and technology absorption. A similar 
pattern, made by the sequence over time of cycles of importation, production and ex-
portation led to the regional diffusion of industrialization, with technology flowing 
from previously industrialized areas towards new areas, with an overarching techno-
logical progression by the region as a whole, in a pattern recalling the V shaped for-
mation that usually wild geese use to take on during flight.  
Further interpretations of such a pattern essentially split into who believes that Aka-
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matsu model is the ultimate demonstration that economic factors, whenever leaved 
free to exercise their power (Kojima, 2000), are preponderant in regional (internatio-
nal) convergence, finding in export and FDIs the fundamental vectors for industrial 
and technological diffusion in an essentially conflict-less scheme, and who consider 
the role played by the institutions as crucial in the emergence of an Asian regional in-
tegration (Wade, 1990; Amsden, 2001).     
A wide literature testifies how a crucial role in the industrialization of Asian countries 
has been played by the active role of institutions, and markedly by the so-called Deve-
lopmental State (Johnson, 1982; Wade, 1990; Amsden, 2001; Rodrik, 1995; Woo-
Cumings, 1999).  
Nonetheless, the diverse historical and geographical declinations of the developmental 
state make difficult to provide an analytical definition of such a concept, which can be 
deduced only ex post (Masina, 2002:26).  
The fundamental idea of the Developmental State theory is that the stunning industria-
lization in East Asia can be attributed to the proactive role by the State, which levera-
ged the potential of international integration by means of many invasive and market-
distorting actions, such as high level of national investment, subsidies, public enter-
prises, negative-tax credit selective allowance, allocation of payment balance surplus 
to the acquisition of technology. According to this view, as Rodrik (1995) puts it, the 
non-perfect tradability of inputs and technologies, as well as the importance of eco-
nomies of scale within the modern industries, would have worked as a brake to indu-
strialization without the massive intervention of the State.  
A World Bank Report (1993) recognized the important role played by institutions in 
the East-Asian industrialization process, even though it underlined how the new indu-
strializing countries of the area (Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia) were successfully 
embracing a more market-friendly approach.  
Japanese economist Ohno (2009), with reference to the new Asian industrializing 
countries substantial failure in catching-up with the previously industrialized coun-
tries of the area, argued that their market-friendly approach was the main reason for 
low performance: the lack of policies which would promote the industrial upgrade 
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transformed those countries in assembly platforms, with low and stagnant value-ad-
ded, trapping their economy in a middle-income trap. 
The case of China reveals participation to the Flying Geese pattern in the sectors in 
which unskilled labour force is a critical competitive advantage (Widodo, 2008; Ruan 
and Zhang, 2014). However, it is hardly deniable the great influence that the State po-
licies, with high level on national investment, have exercised on the economic growth 
and industrialization performance, up to the extent that growing FDIs inflow could 
actually be seen as the consequence rather the cause of economic growth (Prestowitz, 
2005). Openness to foreign capitals has always been selective and subordinated to the 
national interest: the cases of Toshiba, Honda and Toyota whose entrance to the mar-
ket was conditioned by the Chinese government with strict technology transfer and 
equity sharing requirements, are paradigmatic (Shenkar, 2006).  
The same logic applies for the growing amount of outflow FDI, where specific indu-
strial policies are likely to affect emerging multinationals in their going-abroad deci-
sions, promoting their international expansion through financial, fiscal, managerial 
measures (Wang et al., 2012; Lv and Spigarelli, 2016). 
Despite all of that, China’s transition is still ongoing, with many challenges to be fa-
ced, and the middle-income trap is still there to be avoided. As the report by OECD 
(2013) highlights, Chinese authorities are aware that the growth model which charac-
terized the first decades of reforms has been losing its efficacy in the latter years and 
needs to be changed towards a more broaden-base and demand-led model, which pas-
ses by further reform of key country sectors such as social welfare, healthcare supply, 
environmental protection, urbanisation and sustainable development. In particular, 
economic inequality is seen as one of the possible bottlenecks of the Chinese econo-
my that would drive, if not addressed, towards the middle-income trap (Islam, 2015).        
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2. CHINA’S REFORMS AND INTEGRATION WITHIN THE WORLD 
ECONOMY 
2.1 The Comprehensive Economic Reform towards a market-socialist 
economy: a chronology 
No one would have expected China to undertake a four decade extreme dynamism 
period when on 1978 Deng Xiaoping started up the reform era. Still in 1994, top level 
economists like Krugman considered “current projections of Asian supremacy extra-
polated from recent trends” as “almost as silly as 1960s-vintage forecasts of Soviet 
industrial supremacy” (Krugman, 1994:78). Indeed, as Zhang and Chang (2015) ob-
serve, in 1978 no written script was available for the reform programme to come and 
the actual mood by which the Chinese government was entering the new stage was a 
careful “crossing the river by feeling the stones” aptitude. The overall strategy was 
nevertheless clear: transform an agrarian country intro an industrialized power and 
shift the national strategy from class struggle to economic growth (Zhang and Chang, 
ibidem). The reform process, that cannot be considered as concluded (and maybe 
should not at all, by its nature, be considered as a cycle, at least as far as the transition 
is not intended in a teleological sense), was characterized by two major phases (de 
Rambures, 2015): an initial “reform without losers” phase (1978-1989), in which the 
reform was carried on carefully by paying much attention to not compromise the so-
cial stability, and a second “reform with losers” phase (1989-2002), in which transi-
tion towards market economy speeded-up, with major social impact, preparing the 
ground to the final accession of China to WTO and official integration in the world 
economy.  
After this important turning point, reforms kept improving and furthering on the basis 
of the achievements of the preceding phases. Because of its agrarian economic struc-
ture, the reform started from the countryside with the experiment in 1978 in the Pro-
vince of Anhui of two areas in which farmers were allotted usage rights of the land, 
with reduced production quotas: it was the pilot project for the introduction of the 
Household Responsibility System, officially launched in 1982, with the formal di-
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smantle of Maoist communes. The farmers were now allowed to place on the market 
the production exceeding quotas, starting the so-called “dual track” system. The result 
was a huge increase of productivity (Hou, 2011). At the same time, on 1979, coastal 
cities Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen were designated as trial areas, prefigu-
ring their formal recognition in 1980 as Special Economic Zones (SEZs). These areas 
received special permission to maintain flexible relations with foreign countries. Ini-
tially devoted as a landing platform for Hong Kong and Taiwan FDIs, the SEZs be-
came the laboratory for the gradual opening-up of the country economy. As Jaggi et 
al. (1996) reports, the 1984 was a crucial turning point, with the reform shifting from 
the countryside to urban industrial areas, where SOEs were progressively encouraged 
to outsource their management and to adhere to managerial responsibility systems and 
the double-price system was transferred from agriculture to industry.  
At the same time, the Company Law (1984) highlighted a perspective competition 
environment in which the same SOEs would compete within a multi-ownership envi-
ronment. In this phase, the reform of SOEs was still preserving the “iron bowl” sy-
stem. In nineties, however, the SOEs were strongly resized: from 1992 to 2005 SOEs 
employees felt from 35 to 6 million, with those who were left behind losing all the 
benefits related to their status, such as pension scheme, housing, a  canteen, health 
care and schools (de Rambures, 2015). With the law “on Reform on the Economic 
Structure”, adopted by the Third Plenum of the 12th Central Committee of CCP, the 
progress made in the past six years were recognized and the concept of “a coordinated 
commercial economy”, a prelude to the Third Plenum of 14th Central Committee whi-
ch proclaimed that the fundamental role of the reforms was establishing a “socialist 
market economy with Chinese characteristics”, in which the State should have the 
role of making fundamental resource distribution decisions on the macroeconomic 
level. In the end of 1993, the State Council launched the “Decision on Implementation 
of Management System of Taxes”, with the first implementation of a tax responsibili-
ty system and setting the revenue sharing criteria between central and local govern-
ments, perfected in 1995. In 2002, the income tax revenue sharing reform completed 
this public finance architecture transition process.  
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Contextually to the start up of the tax reform, the State Council declared the intention 
to separate the central and commercial bank functions. On 2004 the equitization of 
Commercial Banks was completed, confirming the State as the reference shareholder. 
On 1996, China began the current account convertibility of CNY to USD. That was an 
important milestone towards the integration within the world economy: while the Sta-
te Council declared in early 1994 the intention to establish a platform for equal com-
petition as a condition for the integration of China with the global economy, it was 
with the recognition, in 2001, of China’s WTO full membership status that the process 
reached its not-return point, although –as we will see afterwards- the relating internal 
measures were agreed to be implemented according to a gradual schedule. In 1998 the 
State Council formally recognized the market as the main regulatory instrument for 
the real estate and housing, whereas the ownership remained a prerogative of State 
and collective ownership (the latter applies the case of rural areas), while the usage of 
land, based on lease agreement, is intended to be a marketable value. In 1997, with 
the 15th CCP National Meeting, the non-State sector was formally recognized as a 
fundamental economic structure of the Socialist transformation, in 1999 this recogni-
tion was included into the Constitution, where the private sector was shifted from a 
“supplement” to a “major component” of the socialist market economy. It was with 
the 16th and 17th CCP National Meeting that the private sector was recognized as 
“equal partner” of the State sector. In July 1999, China implemented the first set of 
laws governing the issuance and trading of securities.  
This formally established the juridical base of China’s Capital market which began 
with the 1990 establishment of the Shenzhen and Shanghai exchange, and was further 
enhanced with the Securities Exchange Act in November 2005. During the 10th Na-
tional People’s Congress, the 4th Constitutional Amendment was adopted, in which it 
was explicitly stated that “the legal private property rights of citizens cannot be viola-
ted” and that “the State must respect and protect the rights of its citizens”. The formal 
recognition of private property was then perfected with the “Real Right Law of the 
People’s Republic of China” on 2007. 
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2.2 The integration of China within the international economy  
Economic reform was accompanied and to some extent embedded into a gradual inte-
gration process with the international economics. Nowadays, China has 13 active FTA 
agreements, while further 16 are under negotiation.   
Exhibit 1. China FTAs (2003-2016) 
Source: China FTA Network, MOFCOM 
The FTA (Free Trade Area) agreements furthered the integration of China within the 
international economy since early 2000’s, along with the 110 BITs (Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaties) that are currently in force and have being signed since earliest phases 
of reforms  (UNCTAD). The BIT number is likely to change very soon as China is 3
Country Year
Australia 2015
South Korea 2015
Switzerland 2014
Iceland 2014
Costa Rica 2011
Peru 2010
Singapore 2008
New Zealand 2008
Pakistan 2007
Chile 2006
Asean 2005
Hong Kong 2003
Macau 2003
 The first BIT was signed on 29/03/1982 with Sweden.3
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negotiating a new BIT with EU that will replace, as effect of the Art. 26 of the Lisbon 
Treaty, all the current BITs that China signed with virtually each of the EU state 
members in the past years (Shan, 2015). A similar negotiation is ongoing also with 
USA .     4
In spite of such a variety of international agreements, the milestone of China’s inte-
gration into the world economy is the accession to WTO. China’s accession to WTO 
was on the basis of a Protocol signed on 10 November 2001, by which China undersi-
gned a programme of liberalizing commitments in order to “better integrate in the 
world economy and offer a more predictable environment for trade and foreign in-
vestment in accordance with WTO rules” . The major changes introduced by the 5
WTO accession are as follows (IMF, 2004:11) : 6
- Trade in Goods: reducing by 2004 all tariffs on imported goods down to an 
average of 8.9% for industrial goods and 15% for agriculture products, with an 
allowed range respectively of 0-47% and0-65%. Removal of import quotas by 
2005.  
- Trade in Services: by 2003 foreign firms will be permitted to retail every kind 
of product; by 2004 foreign firms will have the right to engage in import and 
export of virtually any kind of good; by 2006 distribution will be liberalized for 
foreign firms. Foreign Banking sector will be enabled to operate by 2006 tho-
roughly with Chinese clients, Foreign Insurance providers will be allowed  to 
entry the non-life market upon accession with a 50% equity and with a fully-
owned enterprise by 2003.  
 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-07/12/content_16765513.htm4
 https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr252_e.htm5
 Data have been integrated by the description available at https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/6
pres01_e/pr243_e.htm
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- MFN status and National treatment: China recognizes the Most Favoured 
Nation status to all the others members of WTO, whose goods will not be di-
scriminated by any measure against local ones.  
- TRIMs: no mandatory requirements for inflowing FDI will be admitted (e.g. 
technology content, etc.)  
- TRIPs: China will enact measure in order to protect intellectual property rights  
- Agricultural subsidies:  China accepted upon accession to reduce down to 8.5 
every internal subsidy to agriculture and to remove every export subsidy mea-
sure to the same sector  
- Trading Partner Safeguard: other WTO members can impose product speci-
fic restrictions on imports if they can demonstrate that they cause threaten to 
their national industry. They can moreover invoke, for 15 years from accession 
to come, “nonmarket economy” (NME) provisions as an antidumping preven-
tion measure.      
After 15 years from China’s accession to WTO regime, it is undeniable that many 
progresses have been made in the application of the provisions of the accession proto-
col. However, there are many points that still raise frictions between China and the 
international community, markedly with USA and EU. According to Zeng (2013), in 
2012 were 29 the disputes that have been rose by WTO members against China.  
Most of the cases point out the Chinese government support of domestic firms throu-
gh tariffs, subsidies, grants, refunds, and tax exemptions finalized either to advantage 
their export performance or to restrict the domestic market to foreign operators.  
  
On the other side, the dispute rose by China, at the same time, accounted for 11 cases 
and mostly reflected the concern about antidumping investigation coming from the 
NME status that can be invoked by WTO members. Even though since 2013 many 
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world countries granted China with the Market Economy status, USA and EU still re-
jects it, despite of China’s pressures . The reason is that whenever a WTO member is 7
classified to be invoked as a NME (just like China currently still can be) antidumping 
investigation can be carried on taking similar country prices as reference: being China 
production costs likely to be lower than the most of other countries, such investiga-
tions are perceived to be detrimental from the Chinese perspective. 
Nonetheless, although the 15 year transition is come to its end on 11th December 
2016, so that China status is supposed to have switched, de jure, to the Market Eco-
nomy Status (Urdinez and Masiero, 2015) , major WTO partners USA, EU and Japan 8
have claimed that they will not take any initiative to change their antidumping inve-
stigation procedures as they find that the price distortion is still evident, despite of the 
commitments of the Protocol signed in 2001 by China . The quarrel is thus far from 9
being settled and is more likely to assume a political rather than a juridical nature.  
3. CHINA’S INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM AND THE REFORM 
China institutional system as it appears now can be considered as a fast changing 
landscape in which modern (and diverse) western influences overlap an ancient tradi-
tion, which mainly refers to Confucianism and Legalism, in a context characterized by 
several contradictions, uncertainty and a general distance between formal provisions 
and actual implementation.       
 http://en.ce.cn/main/latest/201607/20/t20160720_13997298.shtml7
 Section 15(a) of China's WTO Accession Protocol8
 http://www.aegiseurope.eu/news/press-release-china-wto-market-economy-status-what-changes-after-9
11-december-nothing
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3.1 Political power structure and sources of law 
China’s current constitution is dated back 1982 and was amended four times, with the 
last revision occurred in 2004 . According to the Chapter 3 of the Constitution, the 10
highest organ of the State is the National People Congress, a unicameral organ enti-
tled as the main legislative body, composed by 3000 members, who meet once a year 
for a 10 days plenary session, during which various types of law are adopted (Law-
rence, 2013:22), amongst which the so-called “basic laws”, statutory laws which af-
fect the entire society (Chen, 2008:181). The National People’s Congress is assisted in 
its legislative function by the by the Commission for Legislative Affairs. Because of 
the sporadic occurrence of plenary meetings, a smaller group of 161 members that 
meets every two months, rounded up in the National People’s Congress Standing 
Committee, carries out a part of the legislative duties (Lawrence, 2013:18) and detains 
important prerogatives, like the power to give interpretation of the Constitution. The 
National People’s Congress, according to the Constitution, supervises four national-
level political bodies:  
- State Council: the highest organ of State administration 
- State Central Military Commission: the direction of the armed forces of the 
Country 
- The Supreme People’s Court: the highest judicial organ 
- The Supreme People’s Procuratorate: prosecutor’s office  
These bodies also share an important role in lawmaking. In particular, as stated by the 
Law on Legislation, adopted after several years of debate in 2000, the State Council 
detains a quasi-legislative power consisting in issuing regulations and administrative 
measures (PRC Constitution, Art.52 and 53), up to the extent to be pointed out by 
many scholars as “the de facto most powerful law-making institution in 
China” (Chen, 2008:183), despite the fact that his regulations are formally set at a 
 http://english.gov.cn/2005-08/05/content_20813.htm10
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lower hierarchical level respect to the laws issued by the National People’s Congress. 
According to the Law on Legislation, moreover, the next hierarchical level in law-
making is represented by the local regulations, which can be issued by the several 
sub-national administrative levels, like the 23 Provinces, the 5 Autonomous Regions 
and the 4 Municipalities. Finally, at the bottom of the hierarchy introduced by the Law 
on Legislation, there are the government rules, which are the most common type of 
regulation in China (Chen, 2008:190). A special mention should be dedicated to in-
ternational treaties and their position within the sources of law hierarchy. Although 
the majority of scholars agree in positioning them directly under the Constitution 
(Che, 2005; Guan, 2004; Wang, 1993; Wu, 2000), on the same level as other laws is-
sued by the corresponding legislative institutions, some scholars tend to think at them 
below the basic law level (Chen et al., 2000:97), due to the quasi-constitutional nature 
of the latter.  
   
Despite of such a description, the actual implementation of the political process in 
China is different from this scheme and it is deeply characterized by the substantial 
and overarching overlay of the State and the Communist Party, whose leadership is 
not mentioned in the Chapter 3, even though is mentioned in the Preamble of the Con-
stitution. 
The juridical basis of the Communist Party leadership is instead to be found in the 
Party’s own constitution, whereas it is stated that “the Party commands the overall 
situation and coordinates the efforts of all quarters, and the Party must play the role as 
the core of leadership among all other organizations at corresponding levels” . 11
In practice, the Party nominates the leaders of all four state-level organs and operates 
Party committees within each of them. The courts and prosecutors’ offices, the police, 
and some ministries account directly to Party Central Committee commissions and 
departments. Party committees are embedded in the State Council and its ministries, 
the courts, prosecutors’ offices, state-owned enterprises, and all other public institu-
tions, such as education institutions and hospitals, as well as in most private compa-
 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/18/c_131982575.htm11
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nies and many NGOs (Lawrence, 2013). For this reason, the National People’s Con-
gress is often argued to be no much more than a “rubber stamp” which ratifies any-
thing the Communist Party proposes , despite of any attempt made over years in or12 -
der to separate the Communist Party and the legislative process (Chen, 2008:192), to 
the extent that even the prevalence of the Constitution as the primary source of law is 
often argued by many scholars, who criticize it as a “mere façade with many unen-
forced and decorative norms” (Zhang, 2010).  
3.2 Administrative levels and border management 
The understanding of China’s institutional system, its structure and functioning  can-
not pass through the implications brought by the huge extension of its territory, with 
its big variety of different levels of economic and infrastructural development, the 
presence of 56 different ethnic groups and the historical background in which such 
processes and social interactions took place.  
 
China, as its autonym suggests (, literally “central kingdom”), has always been 
existing (or, at least, perceiving itself) as the centre of a concentric system of territo-
ries, in which the concept of “centre” did not only served the scope of delimiting the 
inner world from the outer world, but also the dominant Han ethnicity with respect to 
other non-Han minorities, who lived within the boundaries of the empire and were 
considered at the same time culturally inferior and military powerful and dangerous. 
For this reason, the management of periphery has always been set as a priority by the 
Chinese state and has been carried out essentially by means of military control and 
acculturation of non-Han ethnicities (Potter, 2011). 
With the emersion of a modern westphalian-like system of states in Eastern Asia, 
which arose as a result of the interaction with the western imperialism and passed 
through the progressive disintegration of the Chinese empire, the problem of periph-
ery has been redefined under the point of view of the (re)construction of the nation 
state, which culminated with the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 
 http://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2012/03/national-peoples-congress12
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1949, as well as in the light of the construction of a socialist society (Arrighi, 2008).  
It is possible to make the distinction within two kinds of periphery: an “inner periph-
ery”, which is formed of those non-Han majority areas (Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner 
Mongolia), and an “outer periphery”, made by those Han majority areas which for 
several reasons felt out of the Chinese world and got integrated within the in-
ternational system (Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan). Both of these kinds of periph-
eries, although different in their characteristics and in their management by the central 
power, have always been conceived as both the border of the Chinese world and a 
shelter for its interaction with the outside world (Potter, 2011), just like highlighted by 
the role that Hong Kong has being playing as a financial and export platform for the 
integration of the “Chinese factory” within the world economy, and by the role that 
western provinces are assigned to play in the “One belt, one road” strategy for the 
years to come.      
Under the light of such a background, it is possible to better explain the current ad-
ministrative subdivision of China, its institutional layout, its regional policies and the 
challenges that institutional system is facing in coping with the new stage of reform.  
China is subdivided into 33 territorial units (34 including the contented province of 
Taiwan): 22 Provinces (23 including Taiwan), 4 Municipalities, 5 autonomous Prov-
inces and 2 Special Administration Regions (SARs). As the five autonomous Prov-
inces and the 2 SARs coincide respectively with the inner and the outer periphery, 
they are very important in the general understanding of the China’s institutional sys-
tem.  
The five autonomous Provinces are Guanxi, Xinjiang, Tibet, Ningxia and Inner Mon-
golia, which are areas with major presence of ethnic minorities and are placed along 
the land border which separates China from its neighbours. As they are also amongst 
the poorest areas of the country, the ethnical and developmental issues are often over-
laid. Since early 2000s, due to growing economic gap between the coastal and the in-
ner areas, China launched a massive programme aimed at the economical and infra-
structural development of western areas, commonly called “Western Development 
Programme” (").  
Priorities of the Western Development Programme (WDP) include the attraction of 
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inward foreign investment, the implementation of financial reforms, tax incentives, 
market-based and policy lending to support capital projects, securities investments, 
expanded insurance provisions and development of natural resources (Lai, 2002).  
According to the former Chinese premier Zhu Rongji, the WDP can be summarized in 
the following points:  
 (a)  infrastructure investment; particularly transportation, resource development, 
telecommunications 
 (b)  environmental protection and construction, emphasizing investment in forestry, 
land, and other unused environmental resources  
 (c)  harmonization of local development in China’s western regions with national 
economic and development conditions, and  
 (d)  expanding reliance on technology and human capital as the basic condition  
for economic development (Zhu, 2000).  
The WDP highlights the tensions that often arise between the central government 
priorities and local development needs, in particular in autonomous regions. Accor-
ding to the Constitution, local People's Congresses are appointed to an implementa-
tion role of national provisions, with small -if any- discretionary and supervision po-
wer (Art. 115-118).  
This approach is strengthen by the Nationality Region Autonomy Law (NRAL), whi-
ch confers the central government the power of setting the priorities, while leaving 
implementation up to the local governments (Art. 25).    
Such an approach, while trying to ensure the harmonization of development and eco-
nomical conditions to the whole country, is likely to give rise to tensions between the 
centre and the periphery: in fact, interpretation and application of WDP priorities re-
veal policy choices that tend to overlook local conditions, such as local cultural sy-
stems rooted in nomadic pastoralism and small-scale economies, which might be th-
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reatened by the policy orientation of the WDP (Ni, 1998).  
The outer periphery situation is disciplined by the so-called “one country ,two sy-
stems approach”, which applies for Hong Kong and Macao and is at the core of the 
proposal for the reunification with Taiwan, and finds its juridical basis in the same 
constitutional previsions that apply for the inner periphery. Moreover, the article 31 of 
the Constitution provides that special administration zones can be created in the light 
of specific conditions.  
While there are no specific constitutional previsions for the degree of autonomy en-
joyed by the SARs, they find their basis in other sources of law, like the Sino-British 
treaty which regulated the reunification of the former British colony Hong Kong with 
mainland China.   
 
3.3 Chinese institutional reform challenge: establishing a rule of law re-
gime with Chinese characteristics  
Rule of law is a relatively new concept to China, as its introduction into the public 
debate can be substantially dated back to the dissolution of the Empire, in the begin-
ning of the 20th century (Wang, 2010). A thorough and precise definition is also con-
troversial, if considering the different historical, institutional and cultural background. 
The father of Chinese reform, Deng Xiaoping, with his usual pragmatism, defined it 
essentially in terms of supremacy of law, as the need to institutionalize the democracy 
into written law, “so as to make sure that  institutions and laws do not change whene-
ver the leadership changes, or whenever the leaders change their views or shift the 
focus of their attention” . Such an approach was finally institutionalized in 1999 into 13
the Constitution, with the amendment of Art. 5, par.1, which states as follows: “The 
People’s Republic of China practices ruling the country in accordance with the law 
and building a socialist country of law”. 
In the latter days the rule of law is a core concept in the public debate in China, as it is 
seen as one of the most qualifying points of the legal reform, in response to domestic 
 Deng’s speech from 13 December 1978, Chap. 2 par. 9.  13
available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol2/text/b1260.html  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and international challenges, set respectively by increased people expectations and by 
the external pressure by globalization, as the White Paper (2008) issued by the State 
Council recognizes. 
The same documents also releases the guidelines for the promotion of the rule of law, 
as follows: 
 
• adhering to the leadership of the CPC, the people as the masters and ruling the coun-
try by law, ensuring that the CPC always plays the role as the core of leadership in 
directing the overall situation and coordinating the efforts of all quarters in legal con-
struction, ensuring the people’s position as masters of the country according to pre-
scriptions of the Constitution and the law, and making sure that all work is carried on 
according to law;  
• persevering in focusing on both construction and the rule of law, continuously im-
proving the legal system in light of the objective needs of economic and social deve-
lopment, and making legal construction serve economic and social development as 
well as the construction of a harmonious society;  
• striving for rooting the legal construction in the reality of Chinese society, drawing 
on valuable foreign experience for reference while basing our efforts on China’s ac-
tual conditions without copying indiscriminately other countries’ legal systems or po-
litical mechanisms;  
• and persisting in basing legal construction on institutional building and enhancing 
the public’s awareness of the rule of law, and unremittingly enhancing the level of le-
gal civilization of the whole society .  14
The rule of law is then framed essentially in line with the above mentioned Deng’s 
definition and the subsequent Constitutional approach, as the supremacy of law, fina-
lized at building the right environment for social and economic development, taking 
 http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2008-02/29/content_11116239.htm14
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though into consideration the social and institutional reality of China, whereas any 
contribution from foreign models should not be uncritically imitated. Such a view of 
the rule of law can appear as somewhat limited, if compared to the theoretical approa-
ches and praxis in western countries, where the rule of law theoretical premises and 
practices have emerged as the result of the struggle for individual rights which ac-
companied the transition to modernity, a historical phenomenon which has no relevant 
comparison in the Chinese history (Blasek, 2015).  
While facets like the supremacy of law seems to be assumed as a grassroots of mo-
dern China legal system, despite the fact that in classical Chinese legal thinking was 
dominated by the Confucian bias for moral standards and social behaviour as the su-
preme regulatory institutions (Mo, 2010), other important aspects of the concept of 
rule of law, as it unfolded in Western countries, like the separation of powers and the 
protection of human rights, are far from being accepted and included into the agenda 
of legal reform in China, at least not in the same terms and to the same extent as such 
ideas are defined and pursued in the West. 
The separation of power, in fact, is a cornerstone in the western definition of the rule 
of law, tracing back to Locke and Montesquieu thought, in the belief that separation of 
power between a legislative, an executive and a judiciary bodies can prevent its misu-
se and abuse over the inalienable individual rights of the citizens. In China, the con-
centration of power refers to the Confucian view of an harmonic society, where a be-
nevolent -and absolute- authority receives the mandate from the Heaven (/) for 
ruling and caring the people, which owes its respect to it. Such a view has been trans-
ferred, in modern China, into the idea of “socialist harmony”, which ranks the interest 
of the whole society as a much higher value than individual rights, and which is clai-
med to be achievable only under the guidance of the Communist Party . The esta15 -
blishment of a rule of law regime, even though confined to the purpose of promoting 
the supremacy of the law, it thus challenged by the presence of a Party whose posi-
tion, by claiming a monopolistic supervising role, as Zhang (2003) puts it, is essential-
 http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2011-10/27/content_23738843.htm15
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ly above the law itself.   
4. CHINA’S ECONOMY 
4.1 Macroeconomic facts: China towards the New Normal course or a 
middle-income trap? 
China enjoyed substantial growth over the last 15 years, with yearly growth rate often 
above the 10%.  
Exhibit 2. China GDP growth rates from 2000 to 2015 
 
Source: China Statistics Bureau 
Since 2010, however, the growth rate is inexorably decreasing, tending to stabilizing 
towards lower and lower value, which are now under the 7% (Exhibit 2). Such a phe-
nomenon is commonly called in development economy as the middle-income trap, in 
particular in referring to the experience by Asian NICs in failing the catch up with ad-
vanced economies (Ohno, 2009; Masina 2011). Since the starting of the Reform and 
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Opening-up era, China’s economy relied on a investment intensive and export-led de-
velopment model (IMF, 2004).   
Exhibit 3. Contribution to GDP growth by Exports, Investment and Consumption 
Source: China Statistics Bureau 
As we can see in the Exhibit 3, the contribution by Export of goods and services to the 
GDP growth rate has fallen down in occasion of the global crisis, turning into a nega-
tive factor, while the Gross capital formation, aside from the anti-cyclical measures 
taken in 2009 and 2013, have being constantly decreasing. The Final Consumption 
Expenditure has been instead increasing its contribution share, overcoming the Gross 
Capital Formation as the main driver of growth since 2014. While the investment 
share is being eroded by manufacture sector overcapacity (IMF, 2012), the final con-
sumption is still braked by several factors affecting the propensity to consume, like 
low disposable income by a large part of the population -which is highly influenced 
by factors such as inequality, high uncertainty due to insufficient social welfare sup-
port, household registration system (1#) restrictions. 
Despite of GDP growth over the last four decades, the economic development did not 
benefit all the population strata: according to the Investigation Center of Chinese So-
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cial Sciences (2014), in 2008 and 2009, the income Gini index reached 0,49. Even 
though it decreased from this peak down to 0,47 on 2014, it is still above the “alert 
line”, which is commonly set at 0.4. The wealth Gini index is still higher, 0,73 in 
2012, with the 1% of households detaining the 33% of the national wealth against the 
1% detained by the bottom 25% of households. Amongst the main reasons for in-
equality are high levels of corruption (Wu, 2006) and the household registration sys-
tem (or Hukou institution), which essentially discriminates urban and rural citizen in 
benefiting of social welfare resources. According to Chen et al. (2010), if Hukou re-
strictions were removed, internal migrants consumption would raise by 20.8%. Low 
disposable income negative effect on consumption is then exacerbated by the absence 
of a satisfying social welfare supply, with most of the unemployment risk, health and 
education costs directly sustained by the households, partly explaining their high 
propensity to save (Luo, 2004).     
From the matter of fact of the economic slowdown, the Chinese government intro-
duced the narration of the New Normal ($3), which can be simply considered as 
the acknowledgment that the double-digit growth age is come to its end and that the 
country’s development model should shift towards a new macroeconomic stability, 
finding new sources of growth and preventing thus the country to fall into a middle-
income trap. The first time that such a concept has been publicly mentioned, was in 
occasion of the RPC President Xi Jinping visit to Henan Province on May 2014 . At 16
the core of the New Normal development model there is the shift from a quantity to a 
quality approach to growth, which articulates itself in the following pillars :  17
• internal consumption should substitute investment and export as the main driver for 
growth, with the redistribution of wealth and the extension of social welfare as sup-
porting strategies. More reliance on internal consumption will also stabilize growth 
and prices, making the whole economy less dependent to international markets fluc-
tuations.  
 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-05/10/c_126484869.htm16
 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2014-10/10/content_18716671.htm17
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• boosting technology innovation and service industry is the priority for sustaining job 
creation and rising the internal income, throughout the production of more value 
added, with higher creative and leading potential, and decreasing reliance on a capi-
tal-intensive economic growth model, which needs to be more socially and envi-
ronmentally sustainable. 
4.2 Macro-control with Chinese characteristics: a developmental state 
model 
The transition of China from a central planned economy to a socialist-market econo-
my has passed through the gradual acknowledgement of the role of the market (whose 
recognized status has evolved from “regulatory” to “decisive” in the latter three 
decades) with the withdrawn of the state from an all-pervading to a macro-control 
role. The most important task of macro-control has been firstly described in 1995 by 
the Fifth Plenary Session of the 14th National Congress of the CPC as dealing with 
the relation amongst the reform, development and stability, with “reform as the 
means, development as the purpose and stability as the premises”.  
The stress on the developmental purpose of macro-control function links to the tradi-
tional idea of the Developmental State in East Asia industrialization and the vast liter-
ature that documents how market-distorting state intervention played a decisive role 
in the industrial development of many areal economies (see Par. 1), while the focus on 
stability refers to the long-termed orientation that macro-control assumes in China, 
like the RPC President Xi Jinping pointed out at the symposium of economic experts 
hold on 8th July 2014, when he restated that macro-control has to “accurately hold the 
balance point of reform, development and stability, accurately hold the balance point 
of short-term target and long-term development”.  
Such a nature of macro-control in the Chinese market-socialist economy has been 
essentially confirmed and explained in details by the Decision of the CPC Central 
Committee on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Re-
form, approved at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th National Congress of the CPC 
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in 2012, which declared that “the main task of macro-control is to keep the economic 
aggregate in balance, promote the coordination of the major economic structure and 
the optimization of productivity arrangement, reduce the impact of economic periodi-
cal fluctuation, keep watch for regional and systemic risks, stabilize market expecta-
tion and realize a sustainable and healthy development of economy”.  
As Zhang and Chang (2015) puts it, the transition to a market economy in China has 
not been simply limited to the dismantle of the central planned economy with its re-
placement by market mechanisms, but was targeted to the ultimate integration of the 
first into the macro-control system, where the state plays its function in a market-ori-
ented environment, by intervening in strategic planning, fiscal and financial control, 
by means of a set of tools which includes industrial policy, trade policy, exchange rate 
policy, regulatory policy, capital control, financial supervision (Zhang et al., 2010). 
The main leverages by which the state implements its macro-control task are the 
strategic planning institutions and the SOEs (state-owned enterprises), whose respec-
tive roles, in spite of the reform process that has been continuously reshaping both, 
appear as fundamental, rather than as a residual of an incomplete but ineluctable tran-
sition towards a pure market-economy.  
The strategic planning is headed by the Central Leading Group on Financial and Eco-
nomic Affairs and the State Council and finds in the National Development and Re-
form Commission (NDRC) the leading executor of a “three carriages” implementing 
structure, which includes also the Bank of China and the Ministry of Finance, whose 
ability to design and implement fiscal and monetary policies is then strictly subordi-
nated to the national strategic planning, guaranteed by NDRC (Zhang and Chang, ibi-
dem).     
On the other side, even though SOEs diminished in number, they still account for up 
of 50% of the non-agricultural GDP, often shielded from competition, and are the tool 
used by the state to keep the control of key industrial sectors (such as petroleum and 
mining, telecommunications, utilities, transportation, etc.), acquire foreign technology 
and assets (by means of overseas investment), and supervise the stock market 
(through the domination of the listing on national stock index) (Morrison, 2014).  
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4.3 Policies and plans for the New Normal Phase  
The current transformation of the Chinese economical, institutional and social land-
scape under the new normal is led by a set of policies, which set a number of mid and 
long termed targets, both at a general and at a sectorial level.  
The main long-termed targets fall under the denomination of “two 100-year plans”, by 
which the CPC assumes two symbolic dates (2021 and 2049, respectively one hun-
dred years from the foundation of the CPC and one hundred years from the birth of 
the RPC) as two macro-historical turning points.  This two plans respectively aim at 
transforming China into a “moderately prosperous society”, eliminating any extreme 
poverty by 2021 , and to transform China into a fully developed country by 2049 18
(CESIF, 2016:52).  
On the mid-term, these general goals are addressed by general and sectorial plans. The 
most important and comprehensive one is the five-year plan, come to its 13th edition 
in 2016 (2016-2020).  
The plan cover many issues, setting general targets for areas which range from the 
economy, infrastructure, environmental protection and social development .  19
Its main pillars are: 
 
1- Economy growth. Keep the yearly growth rate around the average of 6,5%  
2- Economy structure. Increase the service sector’s weigh within the national econo-
my from 50,5% to 56%  
3- Energy consumption. Keep the energy consumption within the limit of the equiva-
lent of 5 billion tons coal in 2020 (compared with 4,3 billion tons in 2015).  
4- Energy efficiency. Reduce by 2020 the energy consumption and the CO2 emission 
per each GDP point respectively by 15% and 18% with respect to levels in 2015.  
5- Air quality. Obtain at least a classification as “good” for the at least the 80% of the 
days in urban area (compared with the 76,7% rate in 2015).  
6- Nuclear Energy. Increase the installed capacity from 28,3 GW to 58 GW by the end 
 http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-china-poverty-idUKKCN0S60K62015101218
 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/photo/2015-11/04/c_134783513.htm19
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of the five year period.  
7- Infrastructure. Extend the high-speed rail track network from 19.000 Km to 30.000 
Km and increase the number of civil airport by 50 units.  
8- Per capita GDP. Increase the per capita GDP by at least the 6,5% on a yearly base.  
9- Employment. Creation of at least 50 million jobs in urban areas.  
10- Urbanization. Increase the urban population share from 56,1% to 60%. Provide at 
least the 45% of population with a urban Hukou. 
 
Beside the five year plan, many sectorial and specific plans set the guidelines for spe-
cific industries or social facets. As the New Normal Course aims at boosting the inno-
vation of industry as one of its main cornerstone, two plans deserve our attention here. 
The first is the Made in China 2025 plan, launched on 2015 and pointing out that 
China should turn into a “manufacturing power” by 2025. By “manufacturing power” 
it is meant that China should improve not under the facet of the quantity of its produc-
tion (which is already characterized by a substantial overcapacity), but rather under 
the facet of the value-added and the environmental sustainability of its industrial sec-
tor. The guidelines of this plan are:  
 
1- Developing an innovation driven industry.  
2- Focus on quality rather than quantity.  
3- Focus on environmental sustainability.  
4- Rationalize the national industrial layout as a whole.  
5- Improve the human capital.        
 
On this basis, the principal aim is to improve the local content of the national industry 
from 40% to 70% by 2025, prioritizing the following industries: IT, automatization, 
aerospace, navigation technologies and logistics, railways, clean energy transporta-
tions, agricultural machineries, new materials and biopharma.  
Within these industrial sectors, IT is one of the most important because of its cross-
cutting position within the modern industry. For this reason, the government has 
launched a specific plan, called Internet plus, which aims at developing and integrat-
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ing technologies such as mobile devices, cloud computing, big data and the “internet 
of things” with the modern manufacturing, e-tailing, internet banking and services.  
In order to support the development of the domestic economy and its key sectors, 
China considers its further integration within the world economy as an important part 
of its strategy. Since early 2000’s there was an increase of the number of outward for-
eign investment, which led China to reach in few years the eleventh place in the list of 
countries having stock of foreign direct investment abroad . This is seen partly as the 20
result of the so-called “Go Out Policy” (
&A), initiated in 1999, by which the 
Chinese government has actively encouraged its national enterprises to invest over-
seas . 21
The most massive example of how China actively supports overseas investment is the 
“One Belt One Road” () Strategy, representing the effort to build a terres-
trial new silk road opening China westward and linking it to Europe by means of mas-
sive infrastructure investment in both west China and neighbors country, while on the 
other hand strengthening a maritime silk road, by improving its trade relations with 
South-east Asia and gradually expand towards South Asia and Africa, finally recon-
necting the maritime and terrestrial tracks in the mediterranean sea (Zhang and Zhang, 
2015).  
5. CONCLUSIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR BUSINESSES 
 
Last four decades history of China’s transition towards a market economy, with stun-
ning economic growth, has shown us as it has been (and being) a reform process 
deeply involving economical, technological, institutional and social aspects, whose 
trajectory nonetheless is not simply pointing towards an inexorable and substantial 
convergence to a western-like model but, more complexly, is designing, by means of 
an empirical approach, a quite original model, which tends to combine and integrate, 
 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2199rank.html20
 http://www.gov.cn/node_11140/2006-03/15/content_227686.htm21
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even though with several contradictions and difficulties, selected internationally wide-
spread arrangements with traditional and Chinese specific patterns, with a certain de-
gree of innovation and novelty, like the macro-control system above described shows 
us. 
On the global arena, China’s claimed but not recognized market-economy status is 
just the political side of this issue, whereas the reluctance by major trade partner USA, 
EU and Japan -beyond any possible mercantilistic use of tactics- reveals how the tran-
sition towards a market economy by China is probably not only considered as “unsat-
isfactory” under a quantitative point of view, in its extent, but probably also in its na-
ture itself. Such a contradiction, however, is not likely to stem China’s integration into 
the world economy, certified and by its active role as overseas investor and its grow-
ing international influence. This fact has been confirmed by the 19th Congress of the 
PCC, held in October 2017, where the claim for increased international integration is 
paired by the task to not giving up the research of a “Chinese way” to new develop-
mental patterns, which embrace “economical modernization” and “ecological civiliza-
tion”, keeping the track of the “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” 
and pursuing the development of “socialist democracy” . This project looks far be22 -
yond the national boundaries, whereas it commits in “following a path of peaceful de-
velopment and working to build a community with a shared future for mankind” on 
the one hand, while on the other hand increasing global power is pursued by “building 
strong armed forces and fully advancing the modernization of National Defense and 
the Military”.          
In other words, it can be also said that China’s integration within the international 
economy, while is pushing the country on the track of reforms, is retroacting on the 
international system itself, posing several challenges and opportunities which are 
needed to be tackled by the rest of the world, in its turn involved in a deep reconsider-
ation of itself, because of the global crisis which started in 2007.  
 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/19/c_136691759.htm22
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For China, the New Normal Course is the decisive challenge for its ultimate transfor-
mation into a middle-high income country. The high priority given to the development 
of a strong internal market and to the improving of the innovation capacity of its na-
tional manufacture landscape is an important occasion also for western companies, 
whose know-how, technologies and high quality product could meet the growing de-
mand in China for both.     
However, because of such an epochal transformation, entering China might mean en-
tering a fast changing world, where a deep degree of understanding of the local insti-
tutional and cultural environment is a crucial discriminant of success. Assuming that 
the current transition phase will have as its final and natural outcome the convergence 
towards a western-like business can be highly misleading, at least in the short and mid 
term. Empirical and incremental approach in institutional reform, as described in the 
past paragraphs, implies a high level of unpredictability of the process, which can of-
ten lead to contradictory and unexpected outcomes. So, for example, economic disclo-
sure of certain industrial sectors and markets could co-exist with increased protection-
ism in strategical sectors, while market-friendly reforms could go along with strength-
ened role of SOEs and/or increased direct and indirect government support for local 
enterprises.  
On the institutional side, reform of political process and public administration, even 
though pursued by introducing many elements sourced from the international best 
practices, which will probably have the effect of reducing the gap between China and 
the rest of the world, is expected to keep moving forward with a certain degree of path 
dependence inertia, with relevant influence on important business-related aspects, 
such as judicial practices, individual right protection, state-society relations.  
The growing importance by China on the international scenario, with the huge amount 
of foreign direct investment which every year is flowing outward, is of course likely 
to have big implications even for those companies who are not considering to directly 
entering China: on the one hand, China’s emerging multinationals are likely to be im-
portant future competitors even in the highest technology sectors, on the other hand 
China outward investment can be an important financial source and a privileged 
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channel for entering China for many European SMEs which have a competitive ad-
vantage in key strategic sectors, such as green technologies, healthcare, constructions, 
infrastructures, automation.  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ABSTRACT 
• Purpose: the purpose of this paper is to assess the overarching current opportuni-
ties and obstacles framework for EU-China bilateral investment in the healthcare 
sector.  
• Design: literature, industry, trade and regulation analysis within a multidisciplinary 
approach 
• Findings: the study highlights opportunities provided by China’s healthcare reform 
to bilateral investment and related obstacles 
• Research limitation/implication: this research contributes to explain how China’s 
healthcare reform and sector policies can impact the strategic horizon of business 
players, both in Europe and in China. The study addresses the issue on a country 
(EU and China) and sector (healthcare) level, with smaller scale and sub-sector 
insights which are essentially finalized to integrate the analysis and express the 
growing complexity of the described patterns as long as the focus goes in-depth, 
highlighting then opportunities for further research.   
• Practical implications: this paper is helpful for firm strategic management, policy 
makers and scholars in getting a thorough and general overview of the business 
 This Paper was written during the mobility to Beijing Normal University (China, 2015-2016) within 23
the framework of the CHETCH Programme, whose purpose was -amongst the others- contributing to 
the  updating of the data reported in the Paper by Spigarelli and Wei (2014). The paragraph 3.1 of this 
paper extensively rely in its structure on the above mentioned work.
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opportunities and relating obstacles brought by China’s healthcare reform process 
to EU-China bilateral business cooperation. 
• Keywords: healthcare reform, China, Foreign Direct Investment, international bu-
siness cooperation 
1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In our analysis of bilateral investment opportunities between China and EU, we will 
manly refer to the literature on FDI location choice determinants, as the most comple-
te framework for explicate the strategy behaviour of both Chinese and European firms 
on the international scenario. 
Such theoretical framework is highly diverse in its approaches; as international trade 
and foreign direct investment became a more and more relevant phenomena within 
the international scenario, many scholars felt the need to find a theoretical approach 
that would explain the motivations behind international expansion.  
Some of the first contributions were brought by McDougall (1960) and Kemp (1960), 
explained Foreign Direct Investment as a response to the opportunity to find new 
markets characterized by higher profitability, thanks to high growth rates, lower la-
bour costs and lower exchange risk. 
Similar considerations were integrated by Vernon (1966) with the theory of product 
life cycle: mature stage of product life cycle will decrease profitability so that the only 
way to extend the life cycle would be the reduction of operative costs. Besides these 
motivations, Vernon’s model highlights how the introduction in a new market of a 
product/technology whose life cycle has already been exhausted in the home market 
will have the chance to enjoy a new life cycle. 
Authors such as Hymer (1974) and Kindleberger (1969) stressed the importance of 
ownership advantage (like know-how, patents, technologies) in multinational firms’ 
decision in investing abroad, while the theory by Buckley and Casson (1976) underli-
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ned the specific weight of transaction costs (like negotiation and information costs, 
market risks), framing up the international expansion as an internalisation of those 
processes (like production and sourcing) that due to high transaction costs would be 
more expensive if externalized.     
The first holistic approach to FDI, which absorbed trade, ownership and internalisa-
tion theories, was introduced by Dunning (2002), with his OLI paradigm: There are 
four types of FDI derived from OLI theory of Dunning. These are market seeking 
FDI, resource seeking FDI, efficiency seeking FDI and strategic asset seeking FDI.   
The market-seeking FDI aims at penetrating the local markets of host countries in or-
der to exploit its potential. The resource-seeking FDI is intended to seek natural re-
sources, physical infrastructure and the access to technologies and know-how. The 
efficiency-seeking FDI is motivated by creating new sources of competitiveness for 
firms and it goes where the costs of production are lower. Lastly, strategic asset see-
king FDI aims advancing company’s global or regional strategy into foreign networks 
of created assets like technology, organizational abilities and markets. 
This quick review of the main literature milestones on FDI motivation cannot avoid 
including the contribution brought by the Institutional theory which suggests that 
firms operate in a complex environment and so their decisions are largely determined 
by institutions, which set the “rules of the game” (Peng, 2009), such as regulations 
and incentives (Francis et al., 2009). 
Under the light of such a diverse theoretical framework, it is thus worth to take into 
account geographical and sector facets, that is to say the provenience of firms –with 
their organizational, cultural, institutional background- and the destination markets –
with all their structural vertical and horizontal characteristics. 
Fuming et al. (2001) offered a comprehensive explanation for western FDI to China in 
the pharmaceutical sector: market-seeking motivations, such as huge market potential, 
are predominant, while resource-seeking motivation are decreasing their importance, 
along with labour costs incessant rising. Sector incentives and regulations offered by 
the Chinese government have few or none relevance, according to this study.    
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Under the geographical point of view, beside the above mentioned literature on FDI 
location choice, it is worth consider the growing corpus of literature specializing on 
the study of emerging market multinationals international expansion, as a peculiar de-
clination of the overall FDI phenomena. In describing China Outward Foreign Direct 
Investments (OFDI) determinants, it is useful to make the distinction between push 
and pull factors, represented respectively by specific home and host country advanta-
ges/disadvantages in going abroad (Lv and Spigarelli, 2016). 
Push factors can include the policies enacted by the Chinese Government aimed at 
supporting local firms in going outward (Peng et al., 2008) as well as the need by lo-
cal firms to overcome domestic institutional and market constraints (Luo and Tung, 
2007). This scheme is possible to be translated on a sub-national level, as different 
regional and local institutional and market environment can influence the intensity of 
outward internationalization strategies (Liu et al., 2014; Sun et al., 2015). 
Pull factors, as they refer to host country specific advantages, besides the level of 
economic development, as defined by parameters like market size, strategic assets, 
natural resources, cheap operational costs (Buckley et al., 2007; Cheng & Ma, 2008; 
Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; Stoian, 2013), when related to China OFDI, should incorporate 
institutional and political dimension (Child & Marinova, 2014). Nevertheless, there is 
no unanimity on how and to what extent all of these factors impact Chinese OFDI lo-
cation choice. A large body of evidences confirms that the most of Chinese outward 
investments are driven by market and market-seeking factors (Alon et al. 2014; Ami-
ghini et al. 2013; Buckley et al, 2007; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; Deng, 2009). Further 
studies explore the asset-seeking motivation behind Chinese OFDI (Amighini et al., 
2011; Spigarelli et al. 2013), where Chinese firms go abroad pushed and pulled by the 
need to get access to advanced technologies and human capital. Anyway, both market-
seeking and asset-seeking motivation appears as related to the industrial sector of re-
ference (Amighini et al. 2011; Lu et al., 2011).   
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In relation to Chinese OFDI, there are still few studies that investigate the sectorial 
dimension, with industry-level of analysis (Wang et al., 2012; Lv and Spigarelli, 
2016). Specific industrial policies can significantly promote the outward expansion of 
local firms, especially in “sensitive” and “strategic” industries (Lv and Spigarelli, 
2016). Moreover, technology-intensive sectors can be more likely to be driven by as-
set-seeking purposes (Aminghini et al., 2011; Spigarelli et al., 2013). For this reason, 
sector specificity should be considered as related to both pull and push factors (Spiga-
relli, 2016).      
2. BACKGROUND CONTEXT AND ITS OPPORTUNITIES: A POLICY 
PERSPECTIVE 
Inflow and outflow FDI in relation to the Chinese healthcare sector cannot be analy-
zed without an insight of the socio-economic background context and of the policies 
that have been implementing by the government in the latter years. Four decades of 
unceasing economic growth and of one-child policy –recently substituted by the two 
children policy- has dramatically impacted the socio-economic scenery of China, with 
a fast emerging middle-class and a progressively ageing population. Such a context is 
having a great influence in determining the side of demand for healthcare products 
and service, contributing to pushing the authorities in designing and implementing a 
deep reform of healthcare, which has been undergoing for several years, reshaping the 
sector landscape and affecting opening important room for business international coo-
peration (Spigarelli, 2016). 
1.2 The healthcare reform and policies  
The reform took place on 2009 and has been implemented according to three phases.  
• Phase I (2009-2011) focused in expanding the basic medical insurance covera-
ge up to reach the 90% of the population, revise the reimbursable essential 
drugs list (EDL) and start the pilot reform of public hospitals.  
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• The Phase II (2012-2016) strengthened the targets of the first phase, by aiming 
to expand the basic medical insurance coverage up to the 98% of the popula-
tion, further enlarge the EDL, strengthen the Informative System infrastructu-
re, strengthen both fixed (hospitals, beds) and human (specialized resources 
and their efficiency) assets of national healthcare.  
• The phase III (2017-2020) will aim to stabilizing the achievements of latter 
phases and to reduce regional and generational differences, with more attention 
on the demand coming from ageing population.  24
The Healthcare reform can be seen as a part of the New Normal Course, the new 
country strategy introduced by the Chinese government aiming at transforming the 
economical, industrial and social landscape from the previous high growth rate, ex-
port-oriented development pattern towards a more sustainable model, characterized by 
higher value-added production, market-friendly environment, internal consumption as 
engine of growth, in line with the vision for a socialist inspired harmonious society, as 
described by the 12th five year plan (2011-2015) (Tung, 2011; Deloitte, 2011; WHO, 
2012; Wong et al., 2012), which paid great attention to the Healthcare sector enhan-
cement, with many objectives ranging from industry reinforcement and concentration, 
improved managerial and professional standards, enhancement of international ventu-
res and export as an leverage of competitiveness (CCCMPHIE, 2012). 
This orientation has been stressed by the new sector plan, named “Essential points of 
the national plan for the health system and healthcare (2015-2020)”, which aims to 
extending to the whole population the basic healthcare service coverage and tackle the 
emerging issues that will be likely to put under pressure the healthcare system in the 
future, such as the ageing population, the rapid growing urbanization, by means of the 
enhancement of the informative system and managerial capability (Lv and Spigarelli, 
2016). 
 For reference please see the EU SME Centre Webinar “China's Healthcare Reform: Features, High24 -
lights and Business Opportunities”, http://www.eusmecentre.org.cn/event/2016-04-26/china-healthcare-
reform-features-highlights-and-business-opportunities
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The same plan pays a great attention to the peculiar role played by Traditional Chine-
se Medicine (TCM) within the Healthcare sector landscape: even though Chinese 
people are more and more oriented to address their health problems using Western 
medicine, the majority of them are still using TCM as their first choice (WHO, 2011, 
p.69). TCM is considered as an important part of Chinese culture and tradition, to be 
protected and even actively promoted abroad. The above mentioned sector five year 
plan stresses the importance to improve the legislation, information and standards, 
increase research innovation in the TCM, in the light of strengthening the  integration 
with western medicine within the national structures and expanding the export pro-
pensity (Spigarelli and Wei, 2014).      
The 13th five year plan (2016-2020), is substantially on the same wave of the previous 
one. The 60th Chapter of the plan is the one who illustrates the main targets: deepen 
the reform, with particular attention to the rural and urban disparity. Under this facet, 
it is very important to note that the five year plan aims at enhancing the reform of the 
household registration system (hukou), in order to extend the urban welfare system to 
all residents .  25
2.2 The role of EU-China relations in healthcare reform  
The opening towards foreign markets is likely to be an important piece of the Coun-
try’s policy as testified by the “negative list approach” to inflow foreign investment, 
with further opening trials for key sectors within the pilot free trade zones, as we will 
see in the next chapters. Such an approach should be contextualized within the overall 
strategy on the side of trade international relations, with China proactively seeking to 
enhance the cooperation on bilateral investment with US and Europe (Shan & Wang, 
2014).   
In particular, negotiations for a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with the EU have 
been running since 2012 and once closed and ratified, the same BIT will replace the 
current bilateral agreement in force between China and each EU member states (Shan 
 For a general summary of 13th five year plan see: http://www.apcoworldwide.com/docs/default-25
source/default-document-library/Thought-Leadership/13-five-year-plan-think-piece.pdf
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& Wang, 2014) which, before the ratification of the China-EU BIT, will continue to 
be the only referring legal frameworks for bilateral investments. 
As for the healthcare sector, the most interesting framework for cooperation can be 
found on the intergovernmental level, both on the national one, like in the case of the 
3 year action plan signed between China and Italy Healthcare ministers on January 
2016  or in the case of the hospital alliance signed by China and 5 EU member states 26
on June 2016 , both on the decentralized one, like in the case of the agreement signed 27
between the Jiangsu Province and the Capital Region of Denmark on 2015 . 28
These intergovernmental programmes act as a framework for the involvement of seve-
ral stakeholders, on the institutional, academic and on the business level and represent 
a very important occasion to facilitate the establishing and development of bilateral 
relations within the sector (Cesif, 2016, p. 198).  
3. INDUSTRY PATTERNS IN THE HEALTHCARE SECTOR IN CHINA 
Healthcare reform, while affecting consumptions, habits, and behaviours of Chinese 
people are having a significant impact on the industry. Industry growth and develop-
ment can be act as a push and pull factor for investment, whereas its growth in value 
and profitability attracts new players and its technological development increases the 
demand for technology.  
3.1 Pharmaceutical industry trends and patterns  
The pharmaceutical industry, despite its size, appears as still a highly fragmented in-
dustry (Yuanjia, Ung et al., 2007), characterized by strong rivalry. The three major 
The  http://www.nhfpc.gov.cn/zhuzhan/gjjl/201601/7fb9d89cc276437388da234b4c96ecfd.shtml26
 http://en.nhfpc.gov.cn/2016-06/21/c_70029.htm27
 https://www.regionh.dk/english/businesses/china/healthcare%20cooperation/Pages/Hospital-cooper28 -
ation.aspx
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firms share only the 8.4% of the market , slightly less than the 10% registered on 29
2010 (Datamonitor, 2010, p. 2). Amongst the top 20 firms in sales, 11 are Chinese 
firms, 9 are foreign. 
Distribution is consequently highly fragmented to same extent and it is often criticized 
for its inefficiency and lack of transparency. China’s top three distributors - Sino-
pharm Group, Shanghai Pharmaceutical, and Guangdong Jiuzhoutong Pharmaceutical 
- detained in total less than 20% of overall market share in 2009. Anyway, on the side 
of distribution, the trend is of a slight progressive concentration, whereas the same 
three leaders were accounting for 22%, one year later, in 2010 (PWC, 2012). The ove-
rall distribution structure continues, however, to show a high fragmentation, if compa-
red to other advanced markets: in the US, for instance, the top three pharmaceutical 
commerce companies controlled the 96% market share (Deloitte, 2011).  
Aside from this general picture, in recent years, Chinese pharmaceutical market has 
increased its scale. In 2011, the gross output of Chinese pharmaceutical market was 
$24,061 billion: $32,5 billion more, if compared to 2005 performance. The industrial 
added value was $15,280 billion on 2013, with an annual growth rate of 15.35%, whi-
ch is larger than the GDP and national industrial average growth rate. Total profit in-
creased as well, at a rate higher than that of production value . Furthermore, from 30
2000 to 2010, the number of pharmaceutical enterprises above the “designated size”  31
increased from 3,301 to 7,039 (then slightly decreasing again, for the reasons we are 
going to discuss further). From 2000 to 2013, revenues from principal business in-
creased from $21.43 billion to $331.08 billion (see Exhibit 1). 
 http://www.en-cphi.cn/news/show-30008.html29
 See Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the People’s Republic of China, 12th five-30
year plan of Chinese pharmacy market, http://news.pharmnet.com.cn/news/2012/01/20/352022.html.
 As stated by the National Bureau of Statistics of China, the relevant size is reached when revenue 31
from principal business is more than 5 million yuan. 5 million yuan were equal to around $0.8051 mil-
lion in 2015. 
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Exhibit 1. Manufacture firms in the pharmaceutical industry, above designated size 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, several years. 
     
The number of firms has more than doubled from 2000 to 2010, increasing also in 
their scale. After 2010, however, their number has slightly decreased, while scale con-
tinued to grow. State-owned enterprises (SOEs), foreign enterprises and private enter-
prises are all competing in the market (see Exhibit 2). Even though the number of pri-
vate firms has more than doubled in only six years, their average size is averagely 
much lower than the State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and foreign firms. SOEs, on 
their side, underwent a period of reorganization: their number decreased from 1,500 to 
419 in 2011, but their average scale and gross domestic output grew.  
Year
n. of enterpri-
ses 
Gross indu-
strial output 
value 
($100 millions)
Total 
assets 
($100 mil-
lions)
Revenue 
from prin-
cipal busi-
ness  
($100 millions)
Total 
profits  
($100 mil-
lions)
Value Ad-
ded Tax 
Payable 
($100 millions)
Annual ave-
rage n. of 
employees 
(10,000 persons)
2000 3301 234,57 368,56 214,30 17,99 15,20 90,48
2001 3488 268,79 432,13 253,45 22,13 17,47 89,39
2002 3681 313,25 486,46 300,28 26,52 19,77 89,39
2003 4063 380,62 568,49 362,27 34,20 22,18 125,80
2004 4397 n/a 631,93 423,17 36,82 24,43 129,19
2005 4971 565,62 738,53 534,94 45,01 29,18 134,56
2006 5368 686,32 839,13 645,28 50,94 33,44 142,02
2007 5748 912,03 991,55 855,45 83,33 44,12 149,71
2008 6524 1236,06 1237,16 1161,86 124,46 62,51 164,33
2009 6807 1506,98 1490,70 1450,12 158,62 72,37 174,94
2010 7039 1890,72 1790,09 1838,55 214,35 88,10 188,77
2011 5926 2406,11 2128,89 2332,42 258,62 107,93 194,69
2012 6387 n/a 2539,20 2791,88 300,47 132,46 n/a
2013 6525 n/a 2991,92 3316,08 333,60 152,80 n/a
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Exhibit 2. The number and average size of pharmaceutical firms 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, several years. 
Market growth, technical progress, increasing investment and industrial reorganiza-
tion led some large-scale enterprises to establish themselves as leaders in basic drugs 
supply. On 2005, there was only one pharmaceutical firm with more than 10 billion 
yuan ($1.22 billion) sales turnover, while in 2010 they were ten. Similarly, pharma-
ceutical enterprises with more than 5 billion yuan ($0.61 billion) sales were 17 in 
2010, while in 2005 they were three .  32
 
year
Foreign Pharmaceutical 
Enterprises
State-owned Pharmaceu-
tical Enterprises
Private Pharmaceuti-
cal Enterprises
Other Kind of 
Enterprises
n. 
units 
(a)
Gross 
industrial 
output 
value 
($100 mil) 
(b)
 Average 
Size 
($100 mil) 
(b/a)
n. 
nits 
(a)
Gross 
indu-
strial 
output 
Value 
($100 
mil) 
(b)
Average 
Size 
($100 
mil) 
(b/a)
n. 
units 
(a)
Gross 
Indu-
strial 
Output 
Value 
($100 
mil) 
(b)
Aver
age 
Size 
($10
0 
mil) 
(b/a)
n. 
units 
(a)
Gross 
Industrial 
Output 
Value 
($100 mil) 
(b/a)
Ave-
rage 
Size 
($100 
mil) 
(b/a)
2000 542 53,20 0,10 1496 116,40 0,08 - - - - - -
2001 568 59,66 0,11 1341 120,38 0,09 - - - - - -
2002 604 69,15 0,11 1180 127,23 0,11 - - - - - -
2003 701 83,76 0,12 1001 140,00 0,14 - - - - - -
2004 743 109,45 0,15 939 263,02 0,28 - - - - - -
2005 890 139,46 0,16 676 135,47 0,20 157
3
89,16 0,06 183
2
201,65 0,11
2006 955 173,81 0,18 590 136,20 0,23 194
0
132,92 0,07 188
3
243,38 0,13
2007 103
5
233,39 0,23 559 163,86 0,29 219
8
187,23 0,09 195
6
327,50 0,17
2008 1144 334,79 0,29 527 190,87 0,36 266
9
284,57 0,11 218
4
425,76 0,19
2009 1144 420,98 0,37 508 191,18 0,38 2911 364,97 0,13 224
4
529,80 0,24
2010 1140 510,63 0,45 507 243,16 0,48 3118 490,34 0,16 227
4
646,42 0,28
2011 951 596,20 0,63 419 284,65 0,68 243
6
631,88 0,26 212
0
893,38 0,42
 Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the People’s Republic of China, 12th five-year 32
plan of Chinese pharmacy market, http://news.pharmnet.com.cn/news/2012/01/20/352022.html. 
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Enterprises listed in Exhibit 3 were the top 20 firms in Chinese pharmacy market in 
2014. Guangzhou Pharmaceutical Corporation was the first as for prime operating re-
venue, while China Resources Pharmaceutical Group had most gross assets and raked 
first on total profit.  
Exhibit 3. Financial and economic data: ranking the top 20 firms in 2014 
Ran-
king Prime operating revenue Gross assets Total profit
1 Guangzhou Pharmaceutical Corpo-
ration
China Resources Pharmaceutical Group China Resources Pharmaceutical Group 
2 Xiuzheng Pharmaceutical Group China National Pharmaceutical Group 
Corporation
Yangtze River Pharmaceutical 
Group
3 Yangtze River Pharmaceutical 
Group
Guangzhou Pharmaceutical Corpora-
tion
Yunnan Baiyao Group Company 
Limited
4 Weigao Group Tianjin Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd Weigao Group
5 Shijiazhuang Pharmaceutical Group North China Pharmaceutical Group 
Corporation
Xiuzheng Pharmaceutical Group 
6 North China Pharmaceutical Group 
Corporation
Weigao Group Qilu Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd
7 China National Pharmaceutical 
Group Corporation
Sichuan Kelun Pharmaceutical Limited China National Pharmaceutical Group Corporation
8 China Resources Pharmaceutical 
Group Limited
Shijiazhuang Pharmaceutical Group Pfizer Incorporation
9 Harbin Pharmaceutical Group Yangtze River Pharmaceutical Group 
Ltd
Shanghai Fosun Pharmaceutical 
Group
10 Tianjin Pharmaceutical Holdings 
Ltd
Qilu Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd 
Guangxi Wuzhou Zhongheng 
Group   
11 Bayer Group Harbin Pharmaceutical Group Zhengda Tianqing Group
12 Qilu Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd Zhejiang Hisun Pharmaceutical Co., 
Ltd
Shandong Buchang Pharmaceutical 
Co., Ltd
13 Pfizer Incorporation Tasly Group Jiangsu Hengrui Pharmaceutical Ltd
14 Jiangxi Jiminkexin Group Xiuzheng Pharmaceutical Group Guangzhou Pharmaceutical Corpo-ration
15 China Yuanda Group Yunnan Baiyao Group Company Limi-
ted
Beijing Sihuan Pharmaceutical Co. 
Ltd
16 Shandong Buchang Pharmaceutical 
Co., Ltd
Jilin Aodong medicine Group Jiangsu Haosen Pharmaceutical Group
17 Hangzhou Huadong Medicine 
Group Co.
Xinhecheng Group Tasly Group
18 Shanghai Fosun Pharmaceutical 
Group
Chongqing Huapont Pharm. Co. China Yuanda Group
 55
Source: Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the People’s Republic of 
China, The rank of manufacture firms in the pharmaceutical industry in 2014  33
The number and the size of foreign enterprises in China in the pharmaceutical indu-
stry has been increasing since 2000. From the Exhibit 4, it is possible to see that the 
number of  enterprises in 2000 was 542, while in 2010 picked at 1,140 units. After 
2010, however their number slightly decreased, settling at 951 in 2013. Notwithstan-
ding, the total assets they hold continuously grew, from $6.9 billion to $71.58 in 2013. 
In 2013, revenues from principal business reached 73.29 billion (about fifteen times 
of that in 2000), while total profit was about 8 billion in 2013 (almost 20 times of that 
in 2000).  
Exhibit 4. Main Indicators of foreign firms in the Chinese pharmaceutical market 
19 Shanghai Roche Pharmaceutical Ltd China Yuanda Group Jilin Aodong medicine Group
20 Zhengda Tianqing Group Shanghai Fosun Pharmaceutical Group Green Investment Group
Year n. 
unit
Gross indu-
strial output 
value  
($100 million)
Total 
assets 
($100 
million)
Revenue from 
principal busi-
ness ($100 mil-
lion)
Total 
profits 
($100 
million)
Value added tax paya-
ble  
($100 million)
Annual average 
number of em-
ployees  
(10,000 persons)
2000 542 53,16 69,77 48,17 4,33 3,97 n/a
2001 568 59,69 76,43 55,65 5,11 4,55 n/a
2002 604 69,12 85,77 65,21 6,08 5,36 n/a
2003 701 83,76 101,75 75,95 9,12 5,77 16,92
2004 743 n/a 109,39 83,89 9,99 6,00 16,63
2005 890 139,45 158,13 128,69 13,74 9,02 22,62
2006 955 173,81 184,96 162,25 16,11 10,41 25,29
2007 1035 233,40 238,59 216,28 27,05 14,03 27,4
2008 1144 334,87 330,33 313,28 40,82 20,40 31,77
2009 1144 421,03 409,16 406,27 52,66 24,20 34,77
2010 1140 510,68 483,36 488,08 66,22 29,13 38,21
2011 951 596,13 554,00 571,86 66,43 35,06 39,35
2012 946 n/a 646,82 653,08 75,87 37,66 n/a
 http://xfps.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11295176/n11298973/14522230.html  33
http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146285/n1146352/n3054355/n3057601/n3057603/c3524486/content.html
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook, several years. 
In 2010, foreign firms produced 27.01% of gross industrial output value, 26.55% of 
prime operating revenue, 30.89% of total profit, and 27.1% of total assets (Exhibit 5). 
That was the turnaround of a trend showing a growing importance by foreign opera-
tors within the national landscape since earliest 2000s: starting from 2011, the posi-
tion of foreign companies appeared to be reshaped towards a smaller scale. On 2011 
their gross output value turned back to 2005 levels (24.78%), total asset share decrea-
sed to 23,93%, prime operating revenue to 22,10%, and total profit to 24,21% (Exhi-
bit 5). Anyhow, despite the persisting importance of foreign companies, their share in 
the market has never seemed to be overtaking national firms that are keeping their 
role and competitive position.  
Competition among foreign firms and Chinese companies is going to be strongly af-
fected by the dynamics in proprietary technology. At the moment, foreign firms hold 
the monopoly in many proprietary technologies. This situation is going to change ra-
pidly. In fact, more than ten of the world’s best-selling drugs lost patent protection in 
2011. Generic drugs are the most of China’s pharmaceutical industry, and are likely to 
remain so for a long time (Deloitte, 2011). In this regard, foreign enterprises are ex-
pected to play a more and more important role in Chinese non-Generic drugs market, 
while Chinese state-owned firms and private companies could have a relevant market 
share in the generic drug market. 
Exhibit 5. The role of foreign enterprises in the pharmaceutical market (% of total 
market)     
2013 951 n/a 715,79 732,87 80,76 41,49 n/a
Year Number of Enterprises Gross industrial output 
value
Total assets Prime operating reve-
nue
Total pro-
fit
2000 16.42 22.66 18.93 22.48 24.06
2001 16.28 22.21 17.69 21.96 23.08
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook, several years. 
3.2 Medical devices industry trends and patterns  
As for the Medical Devices industry, it appears as more concentrated than the phar-
maceutical industry. The share held by the top four players was set to be around the 
47.8% on 2011 (IBISWorld, 2011). 
The gross output of the industry was 212 billion CNY , approximately 32 billion US 34
on 2014. The average profit margin within this industry is rather high; on 2011 it was 
about 12.1%, after having risen from 9% on 2006, and 11% on 2007, despite of in-
creasing competition (as we will see in a while) and structural trends of raw materials 
and wages appreciation. As this industry cost structure heavily relies on raw material 
and wages (accounting for a 71.9% of the total), the rising of profit margin can be at-
tributed to increased technology content and value added (IBISWorld, 2011), whose 
role within the industry competitive landscape can be hardly overestimated.  
2002 16.41 22.07 17.63 21.71 22.92
2003 17.25 22.01 17.90 20.97 26.69
2004 16.90  n/a 17.31 19.82 27.13
2005 17.90 24.65 21.41 24.06 30.52
2006 17.79 25.32 22.04 25.15 31.62
2007 18.01 25.59 24.06 25.28 32.46
2008 17.54 27.09 26.70 26.96 32.80
2009 16.81 27.94 27.45 28.02 33.20
2010 16.20 27.01 27.00 26.55 30.89
2011 16.05 24.78 26.03 24.52 25.69
2012 14.81 n/a 25.48 23.39 25.25
2013 14.57 n/a 23.93 22.10 24.21
 Chinese Medical Equipment Industry Development Blue Book 2014  34
http://www.askci.com/news/chanye/2015/01/31/111749rsn6_all.shtml
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Exhibit 6. Medical Device Manufacturers Number (2007-2013)  
 
Source: Chinese Medical Equipment Industry Development Blue Book 2014  
As shown by the Exhibit 6, in 2013 the total number of manufacturers was 15,698, 
with an average 3.7% increase on yearly base over the preceding 7 year period. This 
phenomena interested in particular the Class I manufactures, with a 29% increase over 
the whole period and Class III, with a 26% increase. Despite of a relatively high con-
centration, then, with the top 4 players controlling the market, there is a growing 
number of firms entering the market, increasing the competition and extending the 
long tail of the industry concentration pattern. 
Exhibit 7. Main Medical Device Manufacturers in China (2011) 
Source: IBISWorld 2011 
Year Class I Class II Class III Total
2007 3245 7233 2123 12601
2008 3368 7533 2240 13141
2009 3696 7869 2311 13876
2010 4015 7906 2416 14337
2011 4051 8174 2405 14630
2012 4095 8247 2586 14928
2013 4218 8804 2676 15698
Player Market Share
GE Healthcare 19%
Siemens Ltd Medical Solutions 14%
Shenzhen Mindray Bio-Medical Electronics Co., Ltd 11,3%
Shinva Medical Instrument Co., Ltd 3,5%
Beijing Wandong Medical Equipment Co., Ltd 2,0%
Others 50,2%
 59
Exhibit 7 highlights how foreign players have been positioning in a leading position 
within the market, with the top three enterprises having, on a whole, a major partici-
pation by foreign capitals . More recent estimates reckon the revenue coming from 35
foreign enterprises to be up to 74% (Cesif, 2016).  
4. BILATERAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN THE HEALTHCARE 
SECTOR  
The analysis of trade and investment data in the healthcare sector can give us the idea 
of the current relevance of business interaction, both quantitatively and qualitatively, 
by assessing the potential and the grade of integration within the two systems. The 
analyzed data will offer a sub-sector and geographical insight.     
4.1 EU-China Trade data analysis  
In assessing the state of the art of bilateral business relations between China and 
EU-27, it can be useful observing through the analysis of trade data in which areas the 
national productions integrate each other and how the commercial bilateral pattern has 
been evolving over time. 
Exhibit 8. EU-China Import and Export performance in the healthcare sector 
2009-2013 
 2009-2013 Variation
Total trade (100 milion 
US$) Export-on-total trade
COMMODITIES EXPORT IMPORT 2009 2013 2009 2013
Total 81% 176% 129,71 296,06 50% 40%
TCM 125% 174% 2,79 6,65 73% 69%
Health  products 511% 25% 0,33 0,85 27% 65%
 GE includes 4 joint-ventures (JV) and 1 whole fully owned enterprise (WFOE), Siemens Medical 35
Solutions started as a JV on 1992, then becoming a WFOE on 2005, Shenzhen Mindray is a Sino-US 
Joint-Venture (IBISWorld 2011).
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Source: data elaborated from the China Chamber of Commerce for Import&Export of 
Medicines and Health products, 2009-2013  
Total trade between China and EU-27 has more than doubled, from 130 billion of 
USD on 2009 to 296 billion on 2013. The main contribution to this increase has been 
brought by Chinese side import performance, whose value has increased by 176%. 
The result is that the total trade surplus is now slightly negative, with import from 
EU-27 major than export towards the same area, while on 2009 the balance was null 
(export on total trade share has moved from 50%, to 40%).  
Generally speaking, China, in relation to Europe, is a net exporter for upstream pro-
cess commodities, traditionally characterized by low to medium value-added output, 
such as plant extracts and raw materials for TCM, accessories and rehabilitation mate-
rials and APIs.  
On the contrary, China is a net importer for downstream high value-added process 
commodities, like formulations, both TCM and pharmaceutical. This pattern is evi-
dent in the medical devices subsector: medical diagnostic equipments account for the 
72.5% of country’s total import of medical devices on 2015, with a yearly growth rate 
of 6.6% . The mid-high-end medical devices segment accounts for the 40% of the 36
Plant  Extracts 122% 105% 1,58 3,47 88% 89%
TCM  Formulations 9% 236% 0,39 1,06 28% 11%
Raw  materials for TCM 89% 1200% 0,49 1,26 94% 69%
Medical  devices &   Equipment 93% 200% 39,75 95,4 56% 45%
Accessories 160% 163% 3,13 8,14 91% 91%
Disposables 83% 318% 4,68 11,87 70% 50%
Hospital  Diagnostic  Equipmen 115% 172% 23,84 59,67 38% 33%
Rehabilitation Equipment 37% 535% 7,15 12,21 93% 75%
Dental materials 120% 463% 0,95 3,5 57% 34%
Pharmaceuticals 72% 167% 87,17 194,02 47% 36%
APIs 74% 68% 50,52 87,01 67% 68%
Formulations 323% 182% 27,51 78,99 4% 5%
Bio-chemical  drugs 14% 527% 9,15 28,01 63% 23%
 http://124.205.32.134:8067/Web/Content.aspx?ContentID=217&ClassID=53&PClassID=4936
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market and it is dominated by foreign brands: diagnostic, ultrasound, magnetic reso-
nance, electrocardiogram and high-grade recording equipment markets are dominated 
by foreign brands, whose share ranges from 80 to 90% .  37
There are some areas in which the trade surplus has been inverted: on 2009 China was 
net exporter for bio-chemical drugs and dental materials, while on 2013 has turned to 
net importer, probably because of increasing demand for high quality products and 
inputs. On the contrary, on 2013 China turned its position from net importer to net 
export for TCM health products, as a result of increased export performance for this 
category (+511% from 2009 to 2013). The promotion of TCM export is one of health-
care sector key targets for the Chinese government, as we have seen in the previous 
paragraph and testified by government’s activism in bilateral cooperation agenda . 38
This expanding pattern has been continuing; according to CCCMHPIE China overall 
export value of TCM has increased by 14.5% on 2014, pulled by an extremely positi-
ve performance by Plant Extracts category, grown by 25.5% . 39
4.2 EU-China bilateral investment data analysis  
As for OFDIs, based on Rhodium group database, Exhibit 9 shows investments from 
2000-2011. China invested in Eu-27 for more than 300 million USD in pharmaceuti-
cal, 93 million USD in healthcare and medical devices and 34 millions in biotechno-
logy sectors, for a total amount of 2% of total national outflow FDI. 
Exhibit 9. China-EU OFDI Projects 2000-2011 
Value (USD million) Number of projects
Sectors Greenfield M&A Total Greenfield M&A Total
 http://health.huanqiu.com/healthindustry/2014-08/5109000.html37
 A good example of Chinese Government proactive promotion of TCM export is the joint commu38 -
niqué, released on 20 Jan 2016 by Healthcare Ministers of China and Czech Republic in supporting 
TCM in the Czech Republic.  
http://en.nhfpc.gov.cn/2016-01/20/c_69186.htm 
 http://124.205.32.134:8067/Web/Content.aspx?ContentID=269&ClassID=65&PClassID=4939
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Source: Hanemann & Rosen (2012) 
Great part of investments was related to M&A, which have been concentrated in the 
Netherlands, Finland, France and Sweden. On the other hand, Denmark, United King-
dom, Hungary, Romania, Czech Republic, Germany, Italy and Spain only received 
greenfield investments. The most relevant M&A in Europe are reported in Exhibit 10. 
Exhibit 10. Main China-EU OFDI M&A operations, 2007-2014 
Source: Hanemann & Rosen (2012) 
Greenfield projects were bigger in number but less important in terms of value. 
Amongst the most important projects in the period, the following are worth mentio-
ning. Shanghai ChemPartner, one of the world’s biggest pre-clinical research centres 
invested in Denmark on 2009, for its European Headquarter. Tianshi, a TCM produ-
Pharmaceutical 21 280 301 4 3 7
Healthcare and medical 
devices 30 63 93 9 2 11
Biotechnology 24 10 34 6 2 8
Investor Target com-pany
Amount 
(million €) Year Sector Country Core business
SinoChen DSM 45 (for 50% stock) 2011
Pharmaceu-
tical Netherlands
EJV on anti-infective 
production and distribu-
tion
Lepu Medical 
Tech Comed B.V.
5 (for 70% 
stock) 2012
Medical 
Devices Netherlands
Production of stents and 
catheters for cardiovascu-
lar applications
Shanghai Dong-
bao biopharma-
ceutical
Ferring Phar-
maceutical (around 10) 2007
Pharmaceu-
tical Sweden
Manufacturing facilities 
acquisition
Inner Mongolia 
Free Han Echosens 20 2011
Medical 
Devices France
Tecnology and manufac-
turing facilities acquisi-
tion
Naton Medical 
Group Inion Oy 26 2010
Medical 
Devices Finland
Manufacturing facilities 
fo surgery implants ac-
quisition
Sirton Pharmaceu-
ticals Spa S3Bio Inc. N.A. 2014
Pharmaceu-
tical Italy
Injectable pharmaceutical 
products
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cer, and Midea, in the equipment sector, invested in UK in 2002 and 2005 respective-
ly, for starting their distribution in the country. Jiangsu Hengrui invested in Sweden 
for R&D subsidiary, in 2009. 
Shifting our focus on inward investment to China, we can assess that European in-
vestment accounted for around 21% of the total on 2014 (see Exhibit 2015).   
Exhibit 11. China Inflowing Direct Investment on 2014 
!  
Source: The World Investment Report, Unctad (2015) 
The European member states from which the biggest share of investment originated 
were Germany (40%), France and Netherlands (around 15% each).   
As for the Healthcare sector, according to Li et al. (2017), in 2016 the only pharma-
ceutical sector accounted for $2,1 billion of FDI. 
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Exhibit 12. China FDI in pharmaceutical industry. Geographical distribution of total 
assets in 2013 
Source: Li, Angelino, Yin, Spigarelli (2017) 
 
Under the facet of geographical distribution, Exhibit 12 shows that the eastern area of 
the country tend to account for the most of FDI in pharmaceutical sector. Anyhow, the 
FDI tends to concentrate in districts which locate also in inner areas. The pharmaceu-
tical FDI localization is positively influenced by factors such as GDP level  and policy 
incentives, while are negatively affected by others, such as competition and environ-
mental regulations and control (Li et al., ibidem). 
5. OBSTACLES AFFECTING BILATERAL INVESTMENT IN HEAL-
THCARE SECTOR 
In assessing the obstacles affecting the bilateral investments between China and Eu-
rope, it is useful make a distinction between Europe-to-China and China-to-Europe 
barriers, due to the different nature of barriers affecting bilateral business opportuni-
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ties in either direction. Aside from such barriers, there is a further category of cross-
cutting barriers that are likely to affect international strategies with no regard to their 
geographical provenience. 
5.1 Europe-to-China barriers 
The most obvious barrier affecting the strategy of European firms willing to invest in 
China’s healthcare sector is the protectionism intent that may lay behind some of Chi-
na’s government provisions. Generally speaking, inflowing foreign investment disci-
pline in China is divided into four categories by the Catalogue of Industries for Gui-
ding Foreign Investments , a document issued by China's National Development and 40
Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) which ru-
les foreign investment in Chinese industries. The categories are: permitted category 
(the standard, with no particular restrictive or favourable treatment), encouraged cate-
gory (investment in activities in this area is subject to less strict administrative requi-
rements and may enjoy certain tax and other benefits), restricted category (investmen-
ts in activities in this field are subject to higher levels of scrutiny and stricter admini-
strative requirements, and may be denied  at the discretion of the approval 
authorities), prohibited category (foreign investment are not permitted). 
Even though a general trend can be observed into the progressive liberalization of fo-
reign investment, evidently marked by the reduction in number of prohibited and re-
stricted initiatives, many activities are likely to change their status, according to go-
vernment’s strategies for that sector. The overall trend towards liberalization has been 
contrasting with a protectionist mood by the government in recent years (Cesif, 2016). 
Within the healthcare sector, there are many important changes: one is the transition 
of medical institutions from “permitted” to “restricted” (it is now mandatory the pre-
sence of a Chinese partner), while investing in old age homes is now “encouraged”.  
There are any way partial exceptions to these restrictions: in the Shanghai FTZ, from 
2013, it was possible to establish a 100% foreign owned medical institution.  
 The first Catalog was issued in 1995, after that, it has seen a various amendments, to be precise in 40
1997, 2002, 2004, 2007, 2011 and 2013. The last updating occurred in 2015.
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Moreover, the MOFCOM and NHFPC joint “Circular on Launching the Pilot Scheme 
of the Establishing Wholly Foreign-Owned Medical Institutions (Guo Wei Yi Han 
[2014] No. 24)” extended the same possibility to Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin muni-
cipalities as well as in Fujian, Guangdong, Hunan and Jiangsu provinces, witnessing a 
general openness by the Chinese Government to gradually open this sector to foreign 
investment, in order to meet the growing national demand for high quality services. 
Aside from direct barriers, a vast number of regulatory barriers can have great impact 
on European firms’ strategy towards China: the most relevant of them is represented 
by the long and costly process for the approval of medicines and medical devices. The 
Chinese standards for the approval and registration of medicines and medical devices 
are not consistent with the European ones, so that the European firms willing to im-
port their products need to undergo a process that is relatively costly in time and fi-
nancial resources. 
The document issued by the China State Council on 9 August 2015, titled “Opinions 
on the Reform of the Review & Approval System for Drugs and Medical Devices (n. 
44)”, is the ultimate set of provisions about the approval of medicines and devices in 
China. 
The registration process for both medicines and medical devices is governed by the 
China Drug and Food Administration (CDFA) . 41
The first step for both the registration processes is to appoint an agent, which should 
be a Chinese legal entity, no matter if it is a branch company either a third party.  
Then the new product should undergo a series of clinical trials. Three clinical trials for 
medicines are conducted by the Center for Drug Evaluation (CDE) over a growing 
number of individuals. A fourth post-marketing study is conducted over 2000 indivi-
duals (EU SME Centre Guidelines, 2014). 
The process for Medical Devices is similar. Medical devices are divided into 3 clas-
ses, according to a risk management rational. The main criteria for classification in-
clude the purpose of use, structural features, whether the device comes into direct 
 For further and thorough information about the registration process for drug, refer to:  41
http://eng.sfda.gov.cn/WS03/CL0768/61645.html  
while for information related to registration process for medical devices, refer to:  
http://eng.sfda.gov.cn/WS03/CL0768/144282.html
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contact with the body, methods and status of use.While Class I medical devices are 
exempted for clinical trial, only need to undergo a filing procedure with a municipal 
regulator, most Class II and Class III must undergo a series of clinical trials. There is a 
list of exemptions that excludes some of Class II and Class III items from clinical 
trials .    42
The registration process appears to be an indirect barrier for total needed time and 
costs, which have been reckoned by the China-Italy Chamber of Commerce to be re-
spectively up to 5 years (3 years on 2013) and 930 thousands euro for new drug regi-
strations and 3 years and 180 thousands euro for medical device registrations . 43
Such a barrier has been also criticized, especially for what that concerns the time 
(which have been extended from 3 years to 5 years), because it is likely to delay the 
introduction of important products into the market. For this reason, the CFDA has re-
leased on the 26th February 2016 a document titled “Opinions on Solving the Regi-
stration of Medicines Overstock to Conduct Priority Review Approval”, which esta-
blishes a fast track for urgent medicines, like those for treatment of critical diseases 
like AIDS, tuberculosis, viral hepatitis, cancer, etc (Cesif 2016, p. 205).    
5.2 China-to-Europe barriers 
While no protectionist measure prevents Chinese firms in entering the European mar-
ket, regulatory barriers are also relevant in the case of Chinese foreign direct invest-
ment to Europe in the healthcare sector. The most evident example is the regulations 
disciplining the commercialization of TCM in Europe. As we have seen before, Chi-
nese government is investing hard in the development of this subsector, which is con-
sidered as a cultural heritage to be preserved and combined with Western medicine 
solutions. Amongst the development measures implemented, we have seen that the 
promotion beyond the national borders plays a key role. However, despite the fact that 
the government has been striving since the 12th five year plan to improving industrial 
 http://www.sda.gov.cn/WS01/CL0087/105224.html  42
http://www.sda.gov.cn/WS01/CL0087/105225.html
 http://www.eusmecentre.org.cn/content/webinar-opportunities-eu-smes-chinas-healthcare-sector43
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standards, Chinese firms of this subsector are still facing problems when acting 
abroad. 
The main challenges are the compliancy to technical standards and registration (Jie, 
2012). TCM include proprietary Chinese medicines, raw material and ingredients, as 
well as herbal extracts. The registration process is disciplined by the Directive 
2004/24/EU, which introduces a simplified registration process for herbal 
medicines . Moreover, the provision allowed a 7 years transitional period to register 44
traditional herbal medicinal products that were on the market at the date of the entry 
to force of the provision. Anyway, very few TCM products were registered at the end 
of that period (Wu et al., 2015).   
The directive has been criticized by Chinese players, above all for it overall cost, that 
amounts up to 462 thousand dollars, according to Huang Jianyin, deputy secretary-
general of the World Federation of Chinese Medicine Societies .   45
5.3 Cross-cutting barriers  
Apart from geographical specific barriers, it is possible to identify a range of barriers 
that can transversally affect EU-China business relations. The very first and obvious 
of them is the language. Although at least 300 million Chinese are studying English 
language , the average proficiency is still relatively low, as China still ranks 47th over 46
70 countries, according to the EF index . The same can be said about European stu47 -
dying Chinese: according to Confucius institute, on 2011 there were at least 40 mil-
lion people worldwide studying Chinese, with an increase of 25% over the past deca-
de . Anyway, especially for what that concerns high-tech sector like Healthcare, in 48
which a mastery of technical language is necessary, few people are likely to master 
both the languages at a satisfying level. Beside the language, a very important indirect 
 http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/eudralex/vol-1/dir_2004_24/dir_2004_24_en.pdf44
 http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2011-05/06/content_12457438.htm45
 http://www.economist.com/blogs/johnson/2011/09/english-china46
 http://www.ef-italia.it/epi/regions/asia/china/47
 http://english.cntv.cn/20110128/114731.shtml48
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barrier can be represented by culture and in particular, by business culture: this is par-
ticularly true in the case of M&As, just like a vast literature testifies.  
A study by KPMG International dated back 1999 shows that 83% of M&A fail to 
create the intended value (KPMG, 1999). Mergers and acquisitions are intended to 
create value, by mean of the matching of companies’ respective competitive advanta-
ges, technologies and by eliminating competition. Nevertheless, many companies un-
derestimate the problems that can come from an acquisition process, resulting in a 
“2+2=3” effect, whereas the initial plan was rather aimed to obtain a “2+2=5” effect 
(Appelbaum et al, 2000; Cartwright and Cooper, 1993; Hovers, 1971). 
In any acquisition there is the risk of a cultural conflict between the two existing or-
ganizations, as largely discussed in the literature, whereas two different corporate cul-
tures are induced to fuse (Stahl and Voigt, 2008). In the case of cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions, these problems can be even doubled, because of the double-layered 
nature of the process of acculturation (Barkema et al, 1996) as beyond different cor-
porate culture, many generic barriers can intervene within the process, such as cultural 
barriers, language problems, different legal systems (Shimizu et al, 2004). 
Corporate business culture, which is not necessarily related to the geographical pro-
venience, can be stressed by deeply rooted cultural differences, like the one we can 
find whenever comparing the Chinese and European culture.  
Chinese culture is famous for being an example of relationship-focused culture and it 
is collocates itself as opposite to deal-focused cultures, like the one which characteri-
zes, amongst others, Northern European countries. Chinese culture, in fact, in busi-
ness affairs uses to place the trust the individual, rather than in the Institution/Corpo-
ration which he/her represents. The consequence is that the interpersonal relations 
network (the so-called guanxi, 关系) is highly important in the conduct of business. 
Just as an example, reciprocal knowledge can be a high time consuming process and 
often go through a long series of formal and informal occasions that may appear to 
some of the Western cultures something like a “waste of time”. In any case, some cha-
racters of this kind of culture are likely to not appear as exotic to some of the Eu-
ropean national cultures, like the South and Eastern European ones, which are often 
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categorized as a half-way class between the two extremes, under the label of modera-
tely deal focused cultures (Gesteland, 1999).           
CONCLUSIONS 
Healthcare sector, as we have seen, is a very interesting sector for bilateral investmen-
ts. Pulled by drivers like economic growth, which is at the base of the rise of a new 
middle class, with ever growing demand for high quality healthcare products and ser-
vices, demographic transition and the overarching reform carried out by the Chinese 
government since 2009, the industry is growing at a high pace both in quantity, both 
in value-added. This is a great perspective for European market-seeking investments, 
which wish to have access to the potentially widest market in the world. At the same 
time, industrial upgrade by local firms is pushing strategic asset-seeking investment 
from China, with a growing number of Chinese firms investing abroad and, of course, 
in Europe. Europe is also interesting for market-seeking investment for Chinese firms, 
especially in the TCM sub-sector. On the backdrop, the Chinese government action, 
with the overarching reform of healthcare and the support provided to local firms in 
international expansion, is crucial, so that it is really hard to underestimate the rele-
vance of the institutional facet in analyzing either directions of China FDI in the sec-
tor.  
Generally speaking, we can state that the main opportunity for bilateral investment 
and business cooperation within the healthcare sector is represented by a substantial 
high complementarity between the two systems, with Europe embodying the pole for 
technology and high-value added processes and China representing the pole for mar-
ket growth potential, financial resources and low to medium value added processes.  
Nevertheless, obstacles are also remarkable. First of all, on the general level, the ab-
sence of a bilateral investment treaty still fragments the interlocution between China 
and EU as whole. Of course, such a situation is likely to advantage China’s huge spe-
cific weight in negotiating with each single EU member state. It is our opinion that 
such a situation could represent a brake for a smooth and balanced development of 
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reciprocally benefiting cooperation, which would probably enjoy from a more equili-
brated balance of power, as well as from having in the EU a single partner. 
Secondly, the lack of harmonization of technical standards, which sometimes can be 
interpreted also as a result of a vaguely protectionist aptitude by each side, is at the 
base of many of the regulatory barriers, which have a clearly reckonable –often in-
surmountable- financial weight for business players who want to expand in either di-
rections. It would be desirable that governments and institution pay the due effort to 
overcome as much as possible any asymmetry in technical standards, for smoother, 
faster and less expensive market entry procedures for both side players.  
Regulatory barriers can be deepened by cultural differences: linguistic and cultural 
features are likely to impact business development strategies and exacerbate institu-
tional gaps. Here, the support by institution is crucial in preparing the ground for bu-
siness players, by providing them with needed information and relation network.  
Business players, for their part, should not underestimate the importance of barriers 
and concentrate as much as possible their efforts in gathering all the information 
about the market, relating regulations and cultural habits. Choosing the right (local) 
partner can be a good solution for filling the cultural gap (even though to evaluate 
who is a good partner can be difficult for the same reason a partner is needed) as well 
as the financial gap: Chinese OFDI growing trend is in fact a great opportunity for 
those firms who aim to enter the Chinese market but do not have the right financial 
scale, as they represent a big financial source as well as a privileged way to access the 
market. The above mentioned complementarity between China and EU is the perfect 
outline for such a model. 
This study provided a general overview of opportunities and obstacles to bilateral in-
vestment, further research can address more focused analysis.  
On the geographical level, even though our analysis has provided some insights of the 
sub-national level, more research can be done in exploring the peculiarities of national 
level (as for EU) and provincial level (as for China). Some of the opportunities/obsta-
cle pattern can dramatically vary if the same analysis is approached on a stricter scale. 
The same can be said as for the industrial sub-sectors. Healthcare includes a very 
wide range of products and services and, even though this study has tried to give an 
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insight of each of them, more focused research can be done on sub-sectors and com-
modity/service categories. 
Finally, one of the natural prosecutions of such a path of research is the empirical ve-
rification of the premises at the firm-level, from which to shed light on the effective 
impact by the economical, industrial, political and institutional levels on business or-
ganization and strategy management as well as on the daily business practice.       
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ABSTRACT 
• Purpose: The paper aims at giving an overview about the reform of food safety 
law in China, and the related opportunities and barriers for foreign companies wi-
shing to enter the market, with a closer eye towards European small and medium 
enterprises.    
• Design: the study is conducted in a multi-disciplinary approach, where institutio-
nal, juridical and economical analysis are conducted with reference to the relevant 
historical background.  
• Findings: the evolution of the Chinese Food Safety Law is a process which traces 
the emergence of a stronger attention by both institutions and the public towards 
food safety and food quality issues in China. This might represent a market oppor-
tunity for good quality food European producers and exporters, but at the same 
time the growing and fast changing regulatory environment can act as an entry bar-
rier. The study particularly focus on Organic certification and e-commerce regula-
tion, as two of the most relevant examples of the coexistence of big opportunities 
and barriers, that foreign food companies might face when deciding to operate and 
distribute their products in China.        
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• Research limitation/implication: due to its multidisciplinary approach and limited 
space, the study may lack of a thorough insight of specific and technical issues, as 
well as of a product category focussed analysis, so that further and more in-depth 
research is needed.    
• Practical implications: the study implies that a correct and in-depth understanding 
of the juridical, institutional and market environment of China’s food sector is a 
crucial premise for enterprises wishing to draft their entry plan to China and the 
subsequent business development strategy.    
• Keywords: China, food safety law, institutions, food market, business development 
 
The New Normal, as described in Paper 1, has brought a major attention to the quali-
tative rather than the quantitative facets of growth in China. As a consequence, a hi-
gher quality of life for the whole population is set as one the foundations of the new 
strategy for Chinese socio-economic development. 
Improved purchasing power by an increasingly larger share of the population, along 
with the scandals on food safety, has increased both the demand for a better food safe-
ty environment, both closer attention by authorities towards food safety regulations 
and standards. In the meanwhile, China’s integration within the international econo-
my, which entered in an irreversible stage with its accession to WTO in 2001, requires 
the Country’s authorities to improve their food safety management and technical ca-
pabilities. This has been leading China to extensively develop its food safety regula-
tions, with important implications for foreign business, which are more and more at-
tracted by the increasing demand for quality food from Chinese customers, but at the 
same time facing growing challenges in relation with a fast changing regulatory envi-
ronment, where the efforts by lawmakers are ambiguously on the one hand addressed 
to improving the transparency in fulfillment with WTO commitments, on the other 
hand tempted by a protectionist opportunism.    
In the first paragraph, the emergence of a China food safety law will be reviewed, in 
its historical dynamics. The second paragraph will focus on the country's food safety 
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management systems and its evolutions throughout the many stages of reform. The 
third paragraph will analyse the issue of national technical standards and their harmo-
nization with the international standards, with close focus on WTO TBT and TBS 
agreements. The fourth paragraph, will take into account the opportunities and the 
barriers that foreign operators meet when approaching the Chinese market, with a 
more in-depth insight on Organic food certification and E-commerce regulations.            
1. THE EMERGENCE OF A CHINA’S FOOD SAFETY LAW  
1.1 Earliest stage (1949-1995) 
After the foundation of the PRC in 1949 China adopted a centrally planned economy 
on the base of the USSR experience. The food industry thus, just like others, was di-
rectly managed by the state through direct control over the SOEs. Since the poor con-
ditions of the most of population, the government priority on food industry was to en-
sure the food supply under a quantitative perspective, rather than others. At that time, 
the main problem on food safety arose on the consumption side, so that it can be said 
that food safety was mainly conceptualized as an hygiene issue (Zhou and Jin, 2013). 
The first comprehensive regulation was issued in 1965 by the government was the 
Administrative Regulations of Food Hygiene Management for Trial Implementation , 49
which was the result of the joint effort by the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Com-
merce, Ministry of Light Industry, Central Administration for the Industry and Com-
merce and the All China Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives (ACF-
SMC). 
The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) paralyzed the country and any law-making acti-
vity in a decade of chaos and disorders, which came to an end only with the death of 
Mao Ze Dong, in 1976, and the beginning of a new age of Reforms under the leader-
ship of Deng Xiaoping, which led the country’s economy to the gradual dismantle of 
the centrally planned economy and its replacement by a socialist market economy. 
 http://www.lawxp.com/statute/s1062814.html49
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The Reform started in the countryside, with the progressive liberalization of agricultu-
ral and commercial activities, with a deep impact on the food sector. Such a great 
change was firstly addressed with the promulgation of the Administrative Regulations 
of the People’s Republic of China on Food Hygiene in 1979 by the Health Ministry, 
which revised the aforementioned regulations .  50
With the liberalization of the economic activity across the food supply chain, food 
safety accident began to occur also in different stages of the supply chain, with fre-
quent episodes of food contaminations and shortcomings on the enforcement side (Wu 
and Zhu, 2014).  
For this reason, in 1982, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 
enacted the Food Hygiene Law of the People’s Republic of China (For Trial Imple-
mentation), which entered into force in 1983 .       51
1.2 The Food Hygiene law (1995-2009) 
In 1992 China officially embraced a market economy model, after more than 10 years 
of reform. During such a period and almost a decade since the trial implementation of 
the Food Hygiene Law, the food industry underwent a dramatical quantitative and 
structural change, with the number of food enterprises increased from 51,734 to 
75,362 units and the number of employees more than doubled, from 2.132 to 4.846 
millions, while the economic growth and liberalization let a relevant product differen-
tiation within the industry (Wu and Zhu, Ibidem).   
Because of the new situation , in 1995 a new law on Food Hygiene has been adopted 52
in occasion of the 16th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National 
People’s Congress . As per its Art.1, the law had as it main purpose to “ensure food 53
hygiene and prevent […] food contamination and harmful substances from causing 
 http://www.lawxp.com/Statute/s978710.html50
 http://www.lawxp.com/Statute/s900784.html51
 The analysis here developed will extensively rely on the reconstruction offered by Snyder (2015) 52
 1995 Food Hygiene Law  53
http://www.lawxp.com/Statute/s435408.html
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injury to human health in order to safeguard the health of the people and improve 
their physical fitness”.  
The law defined Food as “any finished product or raw material intended for people to 
eat or drink, as well as any product that has traditionally served as both food and me-
dicine, with the exception of products used solely for medical purposes” . 54
Nonetheless, as its name itself underlines, the law was still mainly focussed on the 
hygiene issue of food safety, with not thorough concern to the upstream processes of 
the value chain, such as the agricultural production stage, like highlighted by the Art. 
4: “all foods and food additives, […] containers, packaging, utensils and equipment 
used for food, detergents and disinfectants […] the premises, facilities and environ-
ment associated with food production or marketing”.  
Supervision and enforcement was demanded to health authorities at the county level 
or above  even though their supervision function was mainly concerned about the ex-55
post inspections , while the Art. 37 entitled the same authorities of the faculty (which 56
is other than an obligation) to carry out precautionary and provisional measures to-
wards a food producer of trader “responsible for food poisoning accident which has 
already occurred or for which there is evidence of the possibility of occurring”. Art. 
39 provided the sanctions for anyone responsible of food poisoning, which could be 
investigated for criminal responsibility and could have his hygiene license revoked, 
with fines ranging from one to five times the gains illegally obtained .  57
The Provisions on the Administration of Food Recall gave the AQSIQ (see the next 
paragraph) the responsibility of organizing and coordinating the recall nationwide . 58
The Provisions established three types of recall, according to the seriousness of the 
 1995 Food Hygiene Law, Art. 5454
 Ibidem, Art. 3455
 Ibidem, Art. 3356
 Ibidem, Art. 4357
 Provisions on the Administration of Food Recall, Art. 558
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hazard : in the first two cases it was a “voluntary” recall, the third case was a “com59 -
pulsory” recall, ordered by AQSIQ. Different recall urgency levels were related to dif-
ferent legal implications for the producer, whereas the voluntary recall did not exempt 
him from its liabilities but could result in a mitigation of punishment .       60
 
1.3 The Food Safety Law (2009-2015) 
A new draft for a national law that would replace the Food Hygiene Law was already 
on the table of the NPC in 2003 (Bath and Ip, 2011).  
In August 2007 the State Council issued a White Paper on Food Safety . However it 61
was probably after the crisis of melamine  in 2008 that both public and authorities 62
paid more attention to food safety, so that a new law was ready in early 2009, when 
the Standing Committee of NPC adopted the first comprehensive Food Safety Law of 
the history of the PRC, which abrogated the former Food Hygiene Law . The first, 63
major, innovation brought by the new law was that the whole value chain, in all its 
segments and related risks, was included into the scope of the law, except for the qua-
lity and safety management of edible agricultural products, which were explicitly left 
to the jurisdiction of the Law on the Quality and Safety of Agricultural Products . 64
From a normative point of view, the Food Safety law left unaltered the previous gene-
ral fragmentation of institutional prerogatives: taking the above mentioned case of 
agricultural edible products as an instance, the new law disciplined the formulation of 
standards, while the Law on the Quality and Safety of Agricultural Products discipli-
ned the quality safety and management, transferring this distinction on the institutio-
nal ground, where responsibility were divided between the Ministry of Health (mainly 
 Ibidem, Art. 23259
 Ibidem, Art. 3460
 http://www.china.org.cn/english/news/221274.htm 61
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7720404.stm62
 Food Safety Law, Art. 104  63
http://www.lawxp.com/Statute/s1060912.html
  Ibidem, Art. 564
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responsible for the Food Safety Law) and the Ministry of Agriculture (mainly respon-
sible for the Law on Quality and Safety of Agricultural Products), with high risk of 
overlaps and confusion. A similar pattern of fragmentation was also visible in other 
important issues .  65
In order to strengthen the guarantee of food quality, the new Food Safety Law intro-
duced a licensing system for food production and distribution .  66
While the Hygiene Food Law had an ex-post approach to the risk management, as ex-
plicated by the “Recall” provisions previously discussed, the new Food Safety Law 
introduced a national surveillance system for monitoring food safety, with the Mini-
stry of Health, at all its levels, responsible for the formulation, the implementation and 
the coordination of a national surveillance plan .   67
A new framework for food safety standards had been established, with all producers 
and distributors required to comply to food safety standards  and banned to produce 68
food with non-food raw material, as well as any substance possibly hazardous to hu-
man health, included recycled food . 69
Moreover, the 2009 Food Safety Law established for the first time an overarching sy-
stem of traceability, with producers required to check the license of all suppliers and 
keep the records for all incoming raw materials . Similar requirements applied for 70
distributors . Differently from the previous law, the 2009 law addressed, in the Chap71 -
ter VI,  the import and export of food. Imported food, food additives and food-related 
products were required to comply with national food safety standards. Where this was 
not possible, the importer must submit an application to the Ministry of Health, which 
 This important implication of the 2009 Food Safety Law will be further discussed in the next Chapter of this 65
work.
 Food Safety Law (2009), Art. 29 (1)66
 Ibidem, Art. 1167
 Ibidem, Art. 2768
 Ibidem, Art. 2869
 Ibidem, Art. 3670
 Ibidem, Art. 36 and 3771
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was responsible to decide on it and then develop a new standard . Exported food was 72
to be supervised and inspected randomly . 73
Finally, the 2009 Food Safety Law innovate the rules on legal liability. Food produ-
cers or distributors engaging in their activities without a license risked the confisca-
tion of earnings and the material used, with pecuniary fines depending on the total 
volume of the illicit activity . Under certain circumstances, like the usage of hazar74 -
dous or illicit raw materials, or the usage of potentially hazardous raw material above 
the safety standards, the business license might be revoked .  The article 89 extends 75
this provisions to importers and exporters who do not comply with the Food Safety 
Law requirements.      
 
1.4 The New Food Safety Law (2015) 
In October 2015 a new Food Safety Law, issued by the Standing Committee of the 
NPC, replaced the 2009 law . Many new features have been introduced by the new 76
regulation, which is an attempt to fine-tune the shortcomings of the 2009 Food Safety 
Law after more than 5 years of implementation.  
Aside from the institutional reorganization, whereas the China Food and Drug Admi-
nistration (CFDA) was established, centralising many functions that were spread 
across many institutional bodies , one of the main innovations is the improved Food 77
Safety Risk Assessment framework, with new requirements applicable to food-related 
products, which are subject to biological, chemical and physical risk evaluation by the 
authorities, for whom subsists the obligation to proceed in this sense . 78
 Ibidem, Art. 6372
 Ibidem, Art. 68 (1)73
 Ibidem, Art. 8274
 Ibidem, Art. 85 (1) (2)75
 http://www.lawxp.com/Statute/s1759970.html76
 Management issues will be analysed in the next Chapter77
 2015 Food Safety Law, Art. 17, 18, 21, 2278
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Traceability, introduced by the 2009 Law is improved by establishing a liability insu-
rance system for producers and distributors .  Particularly important, as a consequen79 -
ce of the boom of e-commerce sales, the 2015 Law introduces the requirement for 
third-party e-commerce platforms to examine the license of their distributors .  80
All the Genetically Modified Foods will have to be labeled by producers and resellers 
according to the current legal framework , which is represented by the Administrative 81
Regulations of Agricultural Genetically Modified Organisms Safety, issued in 2005 by 
the Agriculture Ministry and the State Council . With respect to the 2009 Law, the 82
2015 Law introduces higher safety requirements for “special foods”, a category which 
includes health foods, special medical purposes food and infant formula .          83
 
2. CHINA’S FOOD SAFETY REGULATORY BODIES AND POLICIES 
The emergence of a food safety law has determined and was accompanied by the evo-
lution of the institutional infrastructure devoted its management and implementation, 
according to the specific regulatory purposes of each stage. Over all the historical 
process which led to the current food safety regulatory framework, priorities and ap-
proaches were different, as well as the institutional, socio-economical and political 
context in which such process took place. In this paragraph we will thus take into ac-
count how policies and regulatory bodies have addressed and impacted food safety 
issues.    
 Ibidem, Art. 42, 6379
 Ibidem, Art. 6280
 Ibidem, Art. 6981
 http://www.gov.cn/english////////2005-08/24/content_179502.htm82
 2015 Food Safety Law, Chapter IV83
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2.1 Historical approaches to food safety and regulatory bodies 
2.1.1 During the planned economy period (1949-1978) 
After the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Food safety ma-
nagement was essentially aimed at supervising the hygiene standard of edible produc-
ts, in a directive planned economy, whereas the management responsibility was held 
by the competent administrative departments which had direct control over food pro-
ducing state owned enterprises, with the support by health administrative bodies (Chi-
na Food News, 1983). State-owned enterprises, whose activity was not targeted at the 
pursuing of independent interests and commercial goals, were overwhelmed by admi-
nistrative goals, so that food safety risks were mainly related to nonmarket factors, 
which led to hygiene risks by cross-contamination, prolonged storage period and food 
spoilage (Chen, 1990).  
During the planned economy period, food management and supervision was achieved 
by administrative internal measures such as appointment, dismissal, persuasion rather 
than legal and professional means (Wu and Zhu, Ibidem).  
2.1.2 During the Reform phase (1978-1992) 
After economic reforms and opening up, an hybrid management system arose along 
with the progressive replacement of the centralized planned economy by a market 
economy. Food industry developed at a high pace, becoming the third biggest industry 
of the Country in 1987, reaching a total output of 113,4 billion yuan (Yang and Xu, 
1988). State owned enterprises where increasingly accompanied by other kinds of 
ownership, so that the previous management system of food safety required to be up-
dated according to this new situation.  
The Food Hygiene Law for Trial Implementation in 1983 gave more importance to 
the Health department as the main enforcer, without however abolishing other de-
partments rights on food safety management, giving supervision power to some non-
health departments in selected areas, decentralizing the food hygiene management: 
industry and commerce department was in charge of the food hygiene of urban and 
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rural markets, the animal husbandry department was in charge of livestock and veteri-
nary health inspections, and so on (Xu, 1992).  
Along with such a transformation, food hygiene remained the main concern on food 
safety, while the health hazard gradually shifted from the consumption stage towards 
the production phases.    
 
2.1.3 During the socialist market economy phase (1992-2013) 
In 1992 China declared its aim to develop a socialist market economy, this implied the 
separation by government departments from state owned enterprises and the conse-
quent transformation of food safety management system into a third-party regulatory 
system.  
Such an arrangement clearly emerged with the implementation of the Food Hygiene 
Law (1995). In 1998 the State Council established the State Bureau of Quality and 
Technical Supervision (SBQTS), in charge of the approval and release of national 
food hygiene standards and the absorption of the responsibilities previously held re-
spectively by the State Administration of Grain and the Ministry of Health in the field 
of grain and oil detection systems, methods and quality standards (Wu and Zhu, Ibi-
dem).  
The industry and commerce department replaced the quality and technical supervision 
department in the supervision and management of food circulation, while the depart-
ment of agriculture kept the quality and safety supervision and management in the 
primary agricultural production stage. In 2003 the previous State Drug Administration 
turned into the State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA), which assumed the 
comprehensive supervision and coordination of food safety (Yang, 2009).  
This framework was officially established by the State Council in 2004 , with the 84
department of agriculture responsible for the the agricultural production, the quality 
control department for the supervision of food processing, the industry and service 
department for the supervision of food circulation, the health department for the su-
 http://www.sda.gov.cn/WS01/CL0056/10755.html84
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pervision of catering and consumption, while the SFDA was confirmed into the role 
of coordination and general supervision.  
The Sanlu melamine crisis in 2007 brought the government to seriously pay attention 
to food safety. The result of this commitment was the Food Safety law in 2009 and the 
subsequent establishment of the Food Safety Commission under the State Council in 
2010 as a high-level agency for the central government to coordinate food safety is-
sues. 
 Exhibit 1. Food Safety Management System in China before 2013 
Source: Wu and Zhu, 2014 
In 2011 the same commission acquired more responsibilities, previously held by the 
Ministry of Health, such as coordination on food safety, investigation of major food 
safety incidents and disclosure of important food safety information.  
The Exhibit 1 highlights the management system which arose along with the above 
described transformations: a multi-departmental system under the comprehensive co-
ordination by the Food and Safety commission.  
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2.1.4 Present situation (from 2013) 
Despite of the great focus on food safety by the Chinese government and the deep 
transformation which the management system has undergone along its history, the 
food safety system as reformed after the implementation of the Food Safety Law in 
2009 has revealed many drawbacks.  
As Dong and Chu (2013) put it, the involvement by many departments implied the 
risk of responsibility overlaps and regulatory resources dispersion, with low law en-
forcement efficacy and low efficiency. For this reason, in February 2013, the Institu-
tional Reform and Functional Transformation Plan of State Council, approved by the 
First Session of the 12th NPC, along with the Notice on Organizational Structure is-
sued by the State Council, reshaped the food safety management system, by integrat-
ing the responsibilities of the Food Safety Commission of the State Council, the State 
Food and Drug Administration, the General Administration of Quality, Supervision, 
Inspection and Quarantine and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce 
within a new organ, named China Food and Drug Administration (CFDA), set up di-
rectly under the control of the State Council (General Office of the Chinese State 
Council 2013a).  
Supervision, management of food and drug safety, the improvement of the efficacy in 
production, circulation and consumption were then brought under the sole responsibil-
ity of CFDA. The assessment of food and drug safety risk was attributed to the newly 
established National  Health and Family Planning Commission (NHFPC), while the 
supervision of the agricultural supply chain was given in charge to the Ministry of 
Agriculture.  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 Exhibit 2. Food Safety Management System in China after 2013 
Source: Wu and Zhu, 2014 
 
 
The CFDA, which formally took over the former Food Safety Commission Office, 
was formally established on 22nd March 2013 and defined as the core of the new 
Chinese food safety management system by the State Council’s regulation on Key Re-
sponsibilities, Internal Structure and Staffing of the China Food and Drug Adminis-
tration, issued on 31st March 2013 (Exhibit 2).    
2.2 Food Safety issues and trends in China: an overview 
Notwithstanding the reform efforts over the years and, to a certain extent, as an infer-
ential evidence of such an unceasing strive by the authorities to tackle the issue, food 
safety is still a widely discussed matter in China.  
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However, it could be worth to ask, what is the current situation? How better (or less) 
is it in comparison to previous stages of the evolution of the legal framework and the 
relating management system? 
 
As Chen (2017) argues, it could be difficult to compare different stages, because of a 
diachronic analysis can be jeopardized by different data collection standards and 
methods, implemented by different institutions over time, probably, with different 
grades of reliability. Nonetheless, the Chinese government has been collecting data on 
food compliancy since 1980, so that a temporal overview is possible, although with 
all the above described limitations and reserves.     
 Exhibit 3. Food compliance rate in China (1985-2015) 
Source: Chen, 2017 
Exhibit 3 highlights a growing trend of the food compliance rate increased in the past 
30 years from the 71% to the 97% in 2015, along with a growing amount of the tested 
sample (Million of tons, in brackets).    
Exhibit 4 shows a breakdown of the compliancy rate per category, revealing that 
against the current low variance of the compliance rate for each category, the situation 
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in the past years was much more variegated, with soy sauce, milk & diary and meat & 
poultry  products lagging far behind the other categories. 
Exhibit 4. Food compliance rate in China per category (1985-2015) 
Source: Chen, 2017  
* refers to soy sauce compliance rate 
 
According to Chen (Ibidem), the causes harming the food safety have to be found in 
the institutional infrastructure and technical capability, whose shortcomings on food 
supply chain worsen the risk of food-borne diseases.  
Moreover, a big part of the hazard resides in the agricultural production stage, where 
illegal use of chemical agents and environmental pollution harm the quality of the 
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food since the beginning of the supply chain, while the small-scale of many operators, 
makes the surveillance and regulation enforcement hard to be pursued . 85
Another major risk source for food safety comes from the food adulteration. Said that 
adulteration does not necessarily imply a fraud, whereas adulteration is a normal pro-
cessing phase for many licit food products, the Chinese government has taken a 
proactive regulatory action in order to prevent the use of chemical and illegal addi-
tives . The NHFPC has issued in 2013 a blacklist “non-food substances that should 86
not be added to food”, then  updated in 2014 .  87
This implies also a psychological facet of food safety, whereas people limited under-
standing of technical instructions on food safety can generate hysteric and irrational 
reactions and behaviours, in front of untrue believes spread by the media and social 
networks on the one hand, and skepticism on authorities and expert suggestions 
(Chen, Ibidem). The consequences of such a phenomena on the consumer behaviour 
and confidence can be self-evident.     
2.3 Recent policies on food safety 
As food safety is a crucial matter, extremely meaningful for the people’s quality of 
life and consumers confidence, the government has traced important policies aimed at 
ensuring the progress towards a better food safety environment.  
The basic reference for food safety related policy is the 13th five year plan 
(2016-2020) and in particular its 18th and 60th chapters .  88
18th Chapter, titled “Strengthen capacity for ensuring safety of agricultural products” 
focusses on the upstream processes in the food supply chain, at the agricultural stage. 
 http://www.xinhuanet.com/edu/xhhkt/20150228a/ index.htm  85
 as widely described in the previous paragraphs86
 http://resources.selerant.com/food-regulatory-news/blog/nhfpc-published-list-of-non-food-material-which-may-87
be-illegally-added-to-food
 http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201612/P020161207645765233498.pdf88
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It addresses six areas in which to intervene in order to improve the quality and safety 
level of agricultural production:  
 
1) Safeguards for grain production: building of farmland irrigation systems and water 
conservancy infrastructure, restoration and reconversion of lands to agricultural use, 
establishing functional zones and protected areas for the production of major agricul-
tural products and grain crops.   
2) Agricultural structural adjustments: actively guiding the adjustments to the produc-
tion mix of agricultural products for the optimization of the supply chain and the qua-
lity control of each stage.  
3) Integrated development in the rural areas: promote a well balanced and sustainable 
integrated development model for rural areas, with the integration of primary, secon-
dary and tertiary industries.  
4) Strengthening of Product quality and safety: improve and implement agricultural 
standards along the whole value chain.   
5) Sustainable Agricultural Development: pursuing the “zero growth” in the use of 
chemical fertilizers and pesticides. Implement a demonstration project for circular 
agricultural through integrated planting and breeding. Fight the agricultural pollution 
for non-point sources, in particular soil pollution.  
6) International cooperation: promoting the international trade for stabilizing the de-
mand and supply of quality food. Actively pursue the agricultural cooperation aimed 
at establishing large-scale internationally competitive offshore centres for farm pro-
duct production, processing, storage, transportation. Promote the bilateral and multila-
teral agricultural cooperation in technology transfer.  
 
Food safety is also mentioned as an important target by the 60th Chapter, titled “Pr-
mote a Healthy China”, specifically in its Section 8, “Food and Medicine Safety”. 
This section introduces a food safety strategy, which will pass through the following 
points:  
 
- Improvement of safety laws and regulations, standards, focussing at the source.  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- Food enterprises will be called to assume responsibility for food safety, exercise 
grid-based oversight, increase the frequency of inspections, carry out sample-based 
monitoring and achieve product traceability.   
- Development of model food safety cities.  
This strategy has been strengthen by a sector specific plan of food safety released in 
2017, titled “13th National Food Safety Plan”. The plan establishes as its main objec-
tives the following points : 89
1. Arranging of a national unified sampling-based inspection model, to be carried out 
by each Province.  
2. Agricultural source of pollution to be managed in order to reach at least the 97% of 
test compliancy rate for agricultural products quality.  
3. Strengthening of on-site inspections by means of professional inspectors and the 
standardization of enforcement procedures.  
4. Improvement of national standards.  
5. Food safety supervision and technical support capability improved and import and 
export food inspection to be harmonized with international standards.  
 
3. CHINA’S FOOD SAFETY STANDARDS AND THE INTERNATIO-
NAL LAW 
 
Up to now, we have analyzed the way in which a China food safety regulatory fra-
mework has emerged, under the perspective of the provisions and the policies that the 
national authorities have enacted at each stage of the history of the People’s Republic 
of China. Nonetheless, the evolution of a national regulatory framework cannot be 
fully explained and understood without considering the process of opening-up and 
harmonization with the international system that characterized the developmental path 
of the country since late ‘70s. The evolution of China food safety regulatory fra-
 http://www.sda.gov.cn/WS01/CL0852/169745.html89
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mework should be thus framed within the perspective of the emergence of a global 
governance for food safety, arisen along with the increasing interdependence of the 
world economy, a process that China officially joined on 2001 with the accession to 
WTO, after more than twenty years of reform and gradual convergence. Notwithstan-
ding, the relation between China and the international governance is not only charac-
terized by a mere convergence pattern, whereas a general trend towards harmoniza-
tion is counterbalanced by a certain degree of national discretional characterization.   
3.1 The global governance of food safety  
This paragraph aims at offering an overview about the major international institutions 
concerned with food regulation and their interrelationship, in order to map the global 
governance of food safety, as the overarching context where the specific case of China 
has place. 
The food safety global governance can be summarized into a three main pillars sy-
stem, which interact themselves and with a dense network of international bodies, 
which mainly originate from them. The three pillars are Food and Agricultural Orga-
nisation (FAO), the World Health Organisation (WHO), the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO); amongst the other bodies, we will take into account are the Codex Alimenta-
rius Commission (CAC), the International Food Safety Authorities Network (INFO-
SAN), the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), the International Plant Pro-
tection Convention (IPPC) and the International Organisation for Standardisation 
(ISO) .   90
The FAO is a UN Agency founded in Rome in 1945, accounting for 145 member sta-
tes, amongst which China . Although food safety was one of the most important tasks 91
of FAO, it was overcome by food security, which can be considered as the institutio-
nal main mission (McCalla & Cesar, 2001). Anyway, food safety remains a critical 
priority, as revealed by the Commitment Two of the Plan of Action released in occa-
sion of the 1996 World Food Summit, whereas it is stated that the organisation aims at 
 For a more in-depth analysis of the key international institutions concerned with food safety, see Lin (2011).  90
 http://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/en/91
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implementing policies for assuring the access by all to “nutritionally adequate and 
safe food” . 92
While food security is the main task of FAO, food safety is one of the core purposes 
of WHO. The WHO is a UN Agency based in Geneva, accounting for 194, including 
China. The institutional “primary role is to direct and coordinate international health 
within the United Nations’ system” , “setting norms and standards and promoting 93
and monitoring their implementation” . The WHO has its Constitution, that was 94
adopted in 1946 and came into force in 1948 . According to it, WHO’s objective is 95
“the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health” , which is pur96 -
sued by “proposing conventions, agreements and regulations, and making recommen-
dations” about “international standards with respect to food” and other products . 97
The WHA, which is the main WHO organ , can adopt conventions or agreements 98
within the institutional competence, which will come into force upon the acceptance 
by each member state, according to its own constitutional process . The WHA can 99
also adopt regulations about “standards with respect to safety, purity and potency of 
biological, pharmaceutical and similar products moving in international 
commerce” : albeit food is not expressly mentioned, under the light of the above 100
mentioned Article 2, it can be assumed that food can be included into the list as a “si-
 http://www.fao.org/wfs/index_en.htm92
 http://www.who.int/about/en/93
 http://www.who.int/about/what-we-do/en/94
 http://www.who.int/governance/eb/who_constitution_en.pdf95
 Who Constitution, Art.196
 Ibidem, Art. 2, respectively (h) and (u) 97
 Ibidem, Art. 898
 Ibidem, Art. 19 99
 Ibidem, Art. 21100
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milar product”. Such regulations come into force upon notification by the WHA to 
members, unless the members do not “opt-out” of the regulation .  101
The WTO, which China accessed in 2001, is the third pillar of the global food gover-
nance. Mainly concerned with commercial facets of the relationship amongst its 
members, it plays a major role in international food safety regulation, mainly by 
means of the Agreement on Technical Barriers and Trade (TBT) and the Agreement 
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS). The TBT Agreement is particularly 
important to our analysis as it bind WTO members to not use non-tariff barriers, such 
as standards, as protectionist measures , inviting the member states to converge to102 -
wards international standards as much as they can . 103
More importantly, the SPS Agreement is aimed at establishing a “multilateral fra-
mework of rules and disciplines for the development, adoption and enforcement of 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures in order to minimise their negative effect on tra-
de” . 104
Members have the right to take sanitary and phytosanitary prevention measures only 
in case the measures are not against the agreement itself  to the extent necessary to 105
protect human, animal or plant life or health  , basing their decision on scientific cri106 -
teria  and their measures on international standards, where available.  107
Said about the three pillars concerned -to many extents- with food safety and their di-
vision of labour, the governance dimension arises from their mutual interaction, which 
gives birth and involves a large number of actors. 
 Ibidem, Art. 22101
 TBT Agreements, Art. 2 (5)  102
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt_e.htm
 Ibidem, Art. 2 (6)103
 SPS Agreements, Chapter 4, note 4, Preamble 4th recital  104
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15-sps.pdf
 Ibidem, Art. 2 (1)105
 Ibidem, Art. 2 (2)106
 Ibidem, Art. 3 (1)107
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With no presumption of exhaustivity, we will now focus on the most important rela-
tionships between the three pillars and international bodies.  
One of the most important example is the INFOSAN, which was created in 2004 as a 
joint initiative by WHO and FAO . INFOSAN is an international network that pro108 -
motes rapid exchange of information about food safety issues between Member Sta-
tes. 181 Member States food safety authorities take part into the network, with their 
designated Contact Point. As far as China is concerned, the Contact Point is located in 
the Ministry of Health. 
A less recent joint activity by WHO and FAO, dated back in 1963, is the CAC (Codex 
Alimentarius), an important intergovernmental body devoted in protecting the health 
of consumers, promote the coordination of food standards, drafting and amending 
them where necessary .  It accounts for 187 Member States, 1 Member Organisation 109
(EU), 219 Observers, amongst which many Intergovernmental Organisations (like 
WTO), NGOs and UN Bodies. The main organs of CAC are the Commission, the 
Executive Committee and standard-setting committees. Standards are proposed by 
member states to the Commission (or its Executive Committee), which decide whe-
ther the proposed standard should be developed and then circulates the proposal to 
Member States for consideration and comments. The proposal (and related comments) 
is then reviewed by the relevant standard setting committee, which prepares a draft to 
the Commission. The Commission then decides whether to adopt the draft and send it 
back many times to Member States, in a step process, in order to build the largest con-
sensus. Once terminated this process, the standard is added to the Codex Alimenta-
rius .   110
Other important bodies which take part to international food safety governance are the 
former Office International des Epizooties, renamed World Organisation for Animal 
Health (still OIE), intergovernmental body whose main task is to inform and monitor 
 http://www.who.int/foodsafety/areas_work/infosan/en/108
 Codex Procedural Manual, Statutes of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, Art. 1  109
http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/i1400e/i1400e.pdf
 Codex Procedural Manual, Section II, Elaboration of Codex Standards and Related Texts110
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animal diseases, the International Plant Protectionn Convention (IPPC), an internatio-
nal treaty on plant protection, established with its own secretariat in 1992 and the In-
ternational Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), a non-governmental body made by 
165 member national standards bodies.         
 
3.2 China standards evolution, internationalization and challenges 
In joining the above described food safety global governance and -more generally- the 
world economy, one of the biggest challenge for China is to increase its capability to 
comply with international standards. In this paragraph we will take into account the 
development of the standards regulatory framework in China, which reveals a general 
path towards harmonization with the international system, with two main milestones, 
represented by the Standardization Law in 1988 and the accession to WTO in 2001. 
The first China’s Standard Law dates back to 1946 and it can be assumed as the first 
regulatory comprehensive measure introducing a normative framework for standardi-
zation.  
After the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Standard Bureau 
of the State Commission of Science and Technology was established following the 
Soviet model in 1957, to which followed the “Administration Statute of Technical 
Standards for Product of Industry, Agriculture and for Project Reconstruction” issued 
by the State Council in 1962, as an initial attempt to delineate the national nomencla-
ture into three types of standards: national, ministry and enterprise. The Cultural Re-
volution (1966-1976) suspended this regulatory framework, that was finally replaced 
by a new one, with the implementation of a series of measures: the “Administration 
Statute for National Standardization” (1979), the “(Trial) Administration Statute for 
Adopting International Standard” (1982, finally confirmed in 1984). 
An important turning point of China’s standards evolution was in 1988, when the cur-
rent Standardization Law was adopted, and come into force in 1989.  
It introduced a four layered hierarchical system of standards, coded as follows: “GB” 
for national standards, “DB” for local government standards, “O” for enterprises 
 102
standards and “GB/Z” for National Standardization Guiding Technical Documents, in 
relation to fast developing technologies . 111
According to the Chinese concept of standard, the same is not always legally binding: 
it may refer to a recommendation as well as a compulsory measures. In order to dissi-
pate any doubt, the Article 7 states that not-legally binding standards should be coded 
with the letter “T” in addition to the standard code (i.e. GB/T). As far as our analysis 
is concerned, it is important to remind that for the same Article, all food related stan-
dards are compulsory. The Standardization Law revealed a clear first move towards 
international harmonization, whereas it encouraged the active adoption of internatio-
nal standard .  112
The Standardization Law capacity was then furthered by its Implementation Regula-
tions, issued by the State Council in 1990. The pattern remained the same, but greater 
attention was paid towards non-compliance sanctions , administrative division of 113
labour  and the relation between national and international standards . 114 115
Important progresses towards the harmonization of Chinese with international stan-
dards were made in occasion of the entrance of China in the WTO (2001). As of the 
WTO accession procedure, China and the US signed a bilateral agreement in 1999, 
which stipulated that China would respect WTO provisions about non-tariff barriers 
(such as standards). A similar agreement has been signed in 2000 between China and 
the EU, with focus on SPS provisions. On the basis of these two bilateral agreements 
and the accession to WTO, the AQSIQ issued on the 12th April 2001 Measures for the 
Administration of Adoption on International Standards, with the scope to clearly defi-
ne the relation between national and international standards. It is important the defini-
tion that the Article 2 of the Measures gives to the term “adoption”, meaning “tran-
 Standardization Law, Art. 6111
 Ibidem, Art. 4112
 Ibidem, Art. 32, 33, 34113
 Ibidem, Art. 3114
 Ibidem, Art. 4115
 103
sforming, identically or after modification, the international standards into the stan-
dards of China […] after analysis, testing and verification, examining and approving, 
and promulgating the standards according to the procedure of examination and appro-
val, and promulgation of the standards of China”.  
As Sneyder (2015) puts it, such a broad interpretation of “adoption” leaves a certain 
margin of discretion in the translation of international standards into the Chinese legal 
system, giving them “Chinese characteristics”, while keeping on the track of harmo-
nization.  
Since the accession to WTO, and in particular after the Food Safety law in 2009, Chi-
na has been developing a huge number of food safety standards, announcing over 700 
measures between 2009 and 2014, and playing a more and more important role in SPS 
Notifications, ranking amongst the top three countries in the world (Arita, 2017).  
Moreover, the Administrative Measures for National Food Safety Standards expressly 
provide that safety standards will fulfill the obligation of notification to WTO, provi-
ding a legal basis to WTO/SPS notification of Chinese food safety standards. Never-
theless, despite of such an evident attempt to further the transparency in fulfilling the 
SPS Agreements, China still lacks in expertise and technical capacity in dealing with 
specific trade concerns by its international partners, with limited capability to study 
on technical standards of other members and to assess the health, economic and social 
impacts on China itself of the technical measures notified by other WTO members, 
making of standard harmonization a result yet to be achieved (Arita, Ibidem).         
4. CHINA’S FOOD MARKET: FOREIGN FIRMS PERSPECTIVE  
The transition towards an internal consume-based development model (see Paper 1) 
along with the growing attention paid by the public towards food safety and food qua-
lity issues are likely to benefit foreign producers, increasing the potential for safe and 
good quality products. Nevertheless, improving regulatory measures enacted by law-
makers can act as a barrier for exporters, as well as targeting a market characterized 
by a deeply peculiar culture like China, with long and diverse alimentary traditions 
and habits, represents a challenge that can be hardly overestimated.  
 104
In this section we are going to talk about the opportunities and the barriers that forei-
gn company are likely to encounter when approaching China and its food market.  
4.1 Market opportunities and barriers: an overview 
Four decades of unprecedented economic growth led China to rank as a middle-inco-
me country, with a fast growing middle class. According to a McKinsey&Company 
report issued on 2013 ,  the upper-middle class which accounted for the 20% of total 116
households in 2012 is projected to reach the 56% of households in 2022, with the 
most wealthy segment of the population moving from 11% to 25% during the same 
timeframe. Such a strong and widespread growth of the incomes is likely to boost the 
consumptions, above all for what that concerns luxury and imported goods.  
As for the Food&Beverage sector, this trend is evident. An EUSME Centre Report 
dated 2015 , highlights how F&B service sector ranked as the world second biggest 117
as early as in 2013, with a growing trend.  
Along with growing income, the same report indicates urbanisation and infrastructural 
development as the main drivers for F&B sector, with the urban population projected 
to reach one billion by 2030 . 118
Higher purchasing power and major attention to food safety and quality are likely to 
boost the import of quality food.  
Exhibit 4 shows us as the import of food to China had been generally increasing over 
the period 2012 to 2016, with a peak in 2014 and lower levels in 2015 and 2016. 
 http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/retail/our-insights/mapping-chinas-middle-class116
 http://eusmecentre.org.cn/report/food-beverage-market-china117
 http://www.csstoday.net/xueshuzixun/guoneixinwen/84137.html. 118
 105
Exhibit 4. Food import to China, billon US dollars (2012-2016) 
Source: AQSIQ, 2016      
EU-28 is the top exporting area (Exhibit 5), followed by ASEAN countries and USA. 
While EU-labeled food is recognized by Chinese customers as the most quality one, 
due to stricter food safety standards, ASEAN area enjoys a proximity advantage, whi-
le, USA food has in price competitiveness its major advantage (EUSME Center, 
2015).   
 
Exhibit 5. Major food exporters to China, billon US dollars (2016) 
Source: AQSIQ, 2016       
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The Exhibit 6 offers an insight of the major import food categories, with meat, aquatic 
products, oil and diary accounting for more than 65% of total imports. 
Exhibit 6. Food import to China per kind, billon US dollars (2016) 
Source: AQSIQ, 2016    
When we talk about China, we have always to consider the continental extension of 
its market, characterized by uneven levels of economic and infrastructural develop-
ment. More than a single national market, China is better described as a system of 
many local markets. The Exhibit 7 shows that the province of Guangdong and the 
municipality of Shanghai are the privileged spots of entry for imported food products, 
with a cumulated share of 45%, followed by the northern-east areas represented by the 
municipality of Tianjin and the province of Shandong.  
Lower volumes are accounted to other coastal provinces such as Liaoning, Jiangsu, 
Fujian an Zhejiang. This pattern traces both the absolute importance of Shanghai and 
Guangdong as entry ports, both the major economic development of eastern and 
southern areas. Ports in second tier cities offer a growing range of services, such as 
bonded storage with temperature-controlled services, inventory tracking, processing 
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and reprocessing bonded areas and similar. However the situation dramatical changes 
when moving inward, with inner areas not always covered by efficient services, which 
make the transportation of food (markedly of food requiring the cold-chain transporta-
tion) difficult to be carried out (EUSME Centre, 2015).   
Exhibit 7. Main spots of entry for food products to China, billon US dollars (2016) 
Source: AQSIQ, 2016    
Since China entered the WTO in 2001 many tariff barrier have been lifted, while bu-
reaucratic obstacles continue to be the main concerns for the foreign exporter. Regis-
tration, labelling, certifications are the most time and money consuming procedures 
that affect the foreign companies wishing to enter the Chinese market.  
Since 2012, all the foreign exporters have to register to AQSIQ. Although guidance is 
offered in English, the information must be mandatory filled in Chinese.  
Labelling standards impose exporters to show a white label on their products, with 
relevant information in Chinese, such as product, manufacturer and distributor infor-
mation. The label must be previously approved by the Chinese Inspection and Quar-
antine Service (CIQS), whose requirements are often not clear-cut and difficult to in-
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terpret. At the custom clearance a sanitary certificate issued by the CIQS should be 
attached to the required documentation. 
Other certification can be required according to the product peculiar nature, such as in 
the case of Organic Food (see the next paragraph).  
Aside from regulatory and bureaucratic barriers, one of the hardest barriers to over-
come is distribution. China’s imported food distribution, in fact, is highly fragmented, 
with few distributors with more than 1000 product references in their catalogue (EU-
SME Center, Ibidem). 
Aside to traditional distribution, E-commerce is emerging as a more and more impor-
tant alternative, with many retail stores suffering the increasing preference of online 
shopping by Chinese customers (USDA, 2014).  
According to Ebrun, a Chinese e-commerce portal, however, e-commerce is charac-
terized by several issues that the foreign company should pay attention to : 119
 
- Distribution costs  
- Promotion costs  
- Warehousing and logistic requirements  
- Potential configs amongst e-commerce and other distribution channels  
 
In addition to marketing and operational issues, e-commerce environment present also 
many regulatory barriers, as we will analyse in depth in the last paragraph of this 
chapter.  
4.2 Regulatory barriers. The case of organic food certification 
Despite the general trend towards harmonization that the regulatory efforts by Chine-
se lawmakers have been following in the last decades, as described in the previous 
paragraphs, complying to the growing in number and ever more demanding standards 
 http://www.ebrun.com/tc/trade/shipin.shtml#moshi119
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can be not easy for the foreign enterprises that wish to enter the market.  
In this paragraph we will focus our analysis on the regulatory environment which di-
sciplines the distribution of organic food in China, as it developed since its first stage 
in eighties up to today, with a closer eye to European exporters.  
The normative framework that regulates the Organic food production and distribution 
in China has arisen from eighties and is the result of a gradual harmonization of na-
tional regulations with international standard. Notwithstanding, China has its own Or-
ganic food national standard, with no mutual recognition with USA, EU and Japan 
standards. That implies the need for foreign exporters to undergo a certification pro-
cess before being allowed to trade their product as “organic” in China. 
The beginning of methods and regulation on organic food production can be dated 
back to 1984, with the foundation of the Section of Rural Ecology (SRE) to the uni-
versity of Nanjing, whose scope was the definition, application and promotion of su-
stainable and organic agricultural methods. The same SRE has been admitted to the 
IFOAM (International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements) in 1989, thus 
receiving a first important international acknowledgement. Three years later, in 1992, 
the China Green Food Development Center (CGFDC) was instituted under the juri-
sdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture, with the aim to be recognized as the reference 
certification centre for Chinese export organic food (Liu, 1999). 
However, the so-called Chinese “Green Food” (?-) was only partly compara-
ble to the so-called Western “organic food”. As reported by Casalin (2005), Green 
Food definition explicitly allows the use of synthetic substances, as long as their pa-
rameters are under control and compliant to the law, while one of the most important 
pillars of organic food production is the absolute ban of such products.  
Such a deep difference between the Chinese “green standard” and the western “orga-
nic standard” limited the export of Green Products, leading the CGFDC to introduce 
an important change in 1995. The Green Food certification was divided into two clas-
ses, the A and the AA classes. The second one was more restrictive and totally banned 
any synthetic substance in the production process, converging towards the internatio-
nal standard for organic products.  
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The reaction of the internal market was positive, and the Green Food movement deve-
loped fast in the following years over the whole supply chain, with many producers, 
distributors/retailers, foreign certification bodies joining the sector . 120
However, such a fast development also led to confusion, with uneven certification 
standards, fake green and organic products, products using misleading information, 
and the like .  121
In order to find a solution to this situation, the Certification and Accreditation Admi-
nistration of the People’s Republic of China (CNCA), which is the national admini-
strative body overseeing all types of certification and accreditation within China, in 
2005 enacted the first comprehensive regulation for Organic Food certification (
2*9.4 , Implementation rules for the Certification of Organic Products), 
determining univocal certification standards for “Organic Food” (-) and ban-
ning the use of any misleading label  by producers (like “no pollution food”, “natural 
food”, and similar ones).   
According to such regulations, as the Chinese organic regulatory system does not yet 
recognize other systems, inspection and certification at all operational stages, must 
comply with Chinese standards GB/T 19630-2005, even if such operations have al-
ready been certified as organic abroad. 
The administrative body who takes charge of implementation of certification works 
(like site checking, lab test on soil, water and product qualities) is the China Quality 
Certification Center (CQC), which is an agency of AQSIQ. As there is no mutual re-
cognition amongst China and foreign certification bodies yet, inspection works have 
to be carried out exclusively by Chinese authorities, increasing the certification costs 
for foreign exporters (Intracen, 2011) . 122
 http://www.gxny.gov.cn/news/sannong/mtksn/200509/t20050917_52792.html120
 Mu Ziyi, “Consumer swallow organic food claims”, China Daily, 15 March 2005. 121
 http://www.intracen.org/uploadedFiles/intracenorg/Content/Publications/Organic-food-products-in-China-mar122 -
ket-overview.pdf
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4.3 Distribution and regulations. The case of e-commerce 
China is since 2013 the biggest world e-commerce market, with an overall sales tur-
nover amounting to 600 billion euro in 2015, accounting for the 15% of the whole re-
tail sales. The growth forecast for this sector, is even more astonishing: pulled by in-
creasing purchase power by a growing middle-class and by the progressive penetra-
tion of internet accessibility, with still no more than the 50% of the population cove-
red in 2015, previsions set at the 20% the yearly growth rate for the years to come, up 
to 2020. The 36% of the whole online retail sales is made by B2C transactions (CE-
Sif, 2016). E-commerce probably is the most interesting distribution channel for im-
ported fresh food products, just like fresh food is one of the most interesting segment 
within the e-commerce industry. According to the China National Statistic Bureau, e-
commerce retail sales growth rate has slowdown to 26,5% in 2016. Notwithstanding, 
fresh food online sales increased by +68% in the same period, and are expected to in-
crease by a similar rate in 2017.  
 
Exhibit 8. Fresh food online retail sales in China  in 2016 (100 million RMB) 
Source: CECRC, 2016   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The Exhibit 8, showing data from the China E-Commerce Research Center , high123 -
lights how the online retail sales reached 91,3 billion RMB in 2016, close to 14 billion 
USD, more than 20 times their value in 2012. 
Such a huge potential is nonetheless counterbalanced by important access barriers 
which are likely to heavily influence the strategy range adoptable by foreign enterpri-
ses. 
At its very earliest stage, e-commerce sector in China has developed in a somewhat 
disordered manner, within an environment characterized by a low degree of regula-
tion. While this has encouraged the development of the industry, on the other hand it 
brought many cases of intellectual property infringements and fraud. In order to fur-
ther develop the sector and increase the amount of confidence by both investors and 
consumers, the Chinese government since 2011 has enacted a series of measures ai-
med at enacting a comprehensive legislative framework and attracting the investment 
by foreign influential e-commerce enterprises (Zhang, 2013). 
The first set of regulations which substantially lifted the restrictions on foreign in-
vestment in the online retail sector, as a result of the country’s WTO commitment to 
realize an open market, is “Measures for Administration of Foreign Investment in the 
Commercial Sector”, issued by the MOFCOM in 2004. For the first time foreign bu-
siness were allowed to invest through a foreign-invested commercial enterprise 
(FICE), which can take the form of a wholly foreign enterprise owned or joint-ventu-
re, as prescribed by the China’s Company Law .  In 2010, the MOFCOM issued the 124
Circular on Several Issues Concerning the Approval and Administration of Foreign 
Investment in Online Sales and Automatic Vending Machines (Shangzizi [2010] No. 
272, “Online Sales Circular”), which clarified that on-line sales are to be intended as 
an extension of an enterprise’s sales activities, allowing thus any preexisting foreign 
manufacturing and commercial enterprise to engage in online sales, without previous 
approval by the MOFCOM, and devolving from the central to the provincial commer-
 http://b2b.toocle.com/detail--6397555.html123
 China’s Company Law has firstly been enacted in 1993 by the 5th session of the Standing Committee of the 124
8th National People’s Congress. It has been then revised in 1999, 2004, 2005 and 2013.
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ce department the approval of new foreign-invested enterprises exclusively devoted to 
e-commerce. 
Nevertheless, the same Circular, by considering the online sales as an extension of the 
enterprise sales activities, excludes the possibility for the FIE to provide network ser-
vices to other trading parties with its own online platform. Such a case is possible for 
a FIE only upon being granted of an Internet Content Provider (ICP) license from the 
Ministry of Industry and Technology (MIIT), as stated by the State Council Orders 
No. 291 and 292, promulgated the same day, on the 25th September 2000.  
Obtaining an ICP license implies many restrictions and special requirements, under 
the facets of minimum registered capital, operational experience, capital composition, 
as specified by the State Council Order No. 534 .  125
Anyhow, in the case that the FIE engages in online sales without opening to third-par-
ty vendors (which makes the case of a traditional foreign food producer/distributor), 
the ICP license is not required, although it needs to apply for an ICP filing number 
(Order No. 292). 
Aside from the above listed restrictions, there is an array of regulations that a foreign 
company must comply with when undertaking online sales in China. First of all, it is 
good to recall that the above mentioned Online Sales Circular, in defining the scope 
and the nature of online sales as an extension of an enterprise's traditional sales activi-
ties, requires the operators to abide be the Law on the Protection of Consumer Rights 
and the Law on Product Quality.   
Based on the Electronic Signature Law, released in 2004 by the Standing Committee 
of the NPC and come into force on the 1st April 2005, which establishes that an elec-
tronic document is as valid as a paper document, the China E-Commerce Association 
(CECA) released a Standard for Online Transaction Platform Services (“OTPS Stan-
dards”). The OTPS Standards essentially defines the nature of each possible online 
 According to the State Council Order No. 534, “Provisions on the Administration of Foreign-Invested 125
Telecommunication Enterprises”, providing online service to third parties constitutes a “value-added telecommuni-
cation service”. For this reason, the FIE must comply with the following requirements: 
- being a joint venture, with foreign participation in registered capital not exceeding the 50% 
- have good track record of operating value-added telecommunications services 
- minimum registered capital not beneath RMB 10 million (RMB 1 million, if the service is limited to one only 
Province) 
- meet any other relevant requirement as stated by any relevant law and administrative regulation.
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transaction, explicating that transaction rules set by the vendor should comply with 
the China Contract Law and the necessary supporting technology should be guaran-
teed.  
The OTPS Standards were integrated by the MOFCOM’s Announcement 21 (“Speci-
fications for E-commerce Model and Standards of Online Transaction services”, 
“OTS Standards”), come into force on 1st December 2009. The OTS Standards set 
responsibilities for payment platform providers on the safety and effectiveness of 
transactions and data management. Moreover, they require transaction parties to use 
their real identities and disclose authentication information, such as business licenses 
and tax registration certificates, physical address and contact information.  
Although the high degree of detail by which this code of conduct is set up by both the 
Standards, it is necessary to underline that no punitive measures are at present dispo-
sed for violations.  
An alternative to setting up a company own online sales platform is to set up a shop 
on an existing third party platform. China’s e-commerce landscape, in fact, is domina-
ted by few key third-party platforms. For instance, in 2014, TMall and JD, two of the 
main third-party platforms, accounted for the 80% of the whole online retail sales in 
China . In this case, ICP filing is no more required, while each platform’s access 126
minimum requirements can be stringent in terms of registered capital amount, opera-
tional track record, stock, annual rent, commissions and deposit. 
A last option which remains possible for foreign company unwilling to invest and deal 
with the complex e-commerce legislative framework in China is the so-called cross-
border e-commerce. In such an arrangement, a foreign exporter would sell its products 
to the Chinese final consumer directly from abroad, with no obligation to register as a 
FIE and to undergo any ICP license/filing procedure.  As Monti (2014) puts it, althou-
gh it is a licit solution, it brings a high level of risk and hardship for the foreign entre-
preneur. On the one hand, because of RMB inconvertibility, it is difficult to receive a 
payment from the majority of the Chinese customers, who do not have foreign curren-
 http://www.launchfactory88.com/selling-online-china-taobao-tmall-tmall-global/126
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cy means of payment , on the other hand -and most importantly- foreign website can 127
be arbitrarily fall into the trap of censorship, carried out by the MIIT. Such a circum-
stance can occur with no advance notice and apparently with no clear reasons, and 
thus without any actual way for the foreign operator to act against it.                 
    
     
CONCLUSIONS 
In this Paper the food safety regulatory framework has been reviewed, as the trace of 
a broader evolution of the whole market attention to food safety issues.  
Market potentialities, driven by the growing demand for quality and safe food, are 
counterbalanced by a more and more complex regulatory environment. Since its re-
form phase and in particular after its accession to WTO, China has been striving to 
align its food safety standards, management and technical capabilities to Western 
countries levels.  
Fast changing and more complex regulations, nonetheless, represent a potential bar-
rier to foreign exporters and investors, above all where procedures are not clearcut 
and straightforward, no matter if caused lacking of capabilities by the authorities or 
because of protectionist purposes.  
Similarly, the lifting of direct barriers to trade, as a result of the WTO accession-rela-
ted commitments, coexists with problematic regulatory provisions which act as a bar-
rier, de jure or de facto, for foreign business wishing to engage with the Chinese mar-
ket. Such a circumstance is well shown by the above described case of e-commerce 
and organic food certification, whose implications may be extended even beyond the 
peculiarity of the food and beverage market. 
                    
 
 as suggested by Monti (2014), such a problem might be overcome by opening an RMB bank account to one of 127
the oversea branches of Bank of China or the ICBC. 
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ABSTRACT 
• Purpose: this paper aims at providing an overview of the path that has being lea-
ding China to catch up with developed country’s environmental protection policies 
and regulations over the last decades, as the framework for the design of effective 
operations and business development strategies for foreign businesses.       
• Design: the study is conducted with a multi-disciplinary approach, where institu-
tional and juridical analysis are conducted with reference to the relevant historical 
and social background. 
• Findings: China’s environmental protection regulations and policies have not deve-
loped at the same pace as its astonishing economic growth over the last decades. 
This led to extensive environmental damages, with serious risks for human health. 
Nevertheless, China’s authorities have been tackling environmental protection is-
sues with growing attention and commitment over the last decades, with relevant 
implications for business strategies.  
• Research limitation/implication: due to its multidisciplinary approach and limited 
space, the study may lack of a thorough insight of specific facets and sub-sectorial 
implications for foreign businesses, whose analysis is limited to the scope of this 
work, so that further and more in-depth research is needed.    
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• Practical implications: the study implies that a correct and in-depth understanding 
of the juridical, institutional and political aspects of the environmental protection 
reform is crucial for long-term strategies both with regards to business develop-
ment in the green market, both on the operation management for business which 
manufacture and source in China.    
• Keywords: China, environmental law, institutions, green market, business develo-
pment 
1. THE EVOLUTION OF CHINA’S ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
1.1 China and the environmental protection: background and institutio-
nal challenges 
China’s economic growth since the launch of the Reform Age in late ‘70s was impres-
sive and unprecedented. However, massive industrial development severely impacted 
the environment, with inadequate response by the authorities, that were unable  (and 
to some extent, unwilling) to arrange a satisfactory prevention regulatory framework.  
According to Shapiro (2016), industrialization, population increase and urbanisation, 
were the main drivers that led to environmental deterioration.  
Industry is by all means the first actor of pollution, because of the way by which ma-
nufacturing-related processes impact the environment as a whole. A study by Zhu, 
Pickles and He (2017) lists nonferrous metal mining, electricity and heating produc-
tion and paper-making as the top-three pollution intensive industries in China. Accor-
ding to the same study, intensive pollution industries are located on the coastal regions 
of the Country, following the pattern of economic development.    
Nevertheless, the relation between industry and pollution is not that straightforward, 
because of the great influence that environmental regulations and their enforcement 
by authorities are likely to exert on the emission of pollutant and their impact on the 
environment. Since the age of Reform, China’s administration pattern has been gran-
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ting the local governments with a high degree of autonomy in the implementation of 
environmental and economic development policies (Jahiel, 1998), with both diachro-
nic and synchronic effects on the geography of pollution: on the one hand, during the 
first stages of economic reform, developmental purposes were often privileged over 
environmental protection, on the other hand, government of less developed areas are 
more likely to compromise on environmental regulations, for a similar logic (Zhu et 
al., Ibidem). 
The institutional point of view is then crucial for the understanding of China’s pollu-
tion issue, not only under the legislative aspect (which will be widely addressed in the 
following paragraph and through this work), but also under the perspective of the go-
vernance, which brings political and sociological matters into the analysis.  
McElwee (2011) highlights many institutional and cultural factors which affect the 
enforcement of environment regulations, jeopardizing the correct implementation at 
the local level of policies and regulations designed by the central government. The 
rule of law, in the terms by which it is defined in the western world, is a relatively ex-
traneous concept to both confucianism and socialism (see this work Chapter 1), which 
are the main ideologies shaping respectively the legal culture background and the sta-
te layout in China.  
Confucianism, in fact, ranks the law at a lower status within the sources of authority. 
This cultural background has not been disrupted by the socialist state, above all during 
the Maoist period, when the Ministry of Justice was shut down in 1959 and reopen 
only in 1979, three years after Mao’s death (Leng and Chiu, 1985). After the reform, 
the country kept its one party and authoritarian arrangement, even though decentrali-
zing many functions to local authorities and gradually opening new channels for more 
pluralistic state-society relations, taking the form of a “responsive 
authoritarianism” (Weller, 2012; Reilly, 2011; Cai, 2004), where private and civil so-
ciety stakeholders are increasingly tolerated -and sometimes encouraged- to take part 
into the public debate, on specific issues (Stockmann, 2012). 
According to van Rooij et al. (2016), three new actors have been playing a more and 
more important role in the environmental protection governance in the last few years: 
citizens, prosecutors and judges. Citizens, intended as individuals and civil society, 
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could play a crucial role by identifying and report cases of illegal behaviour. Howe-
ver, one the one hand, access to information by the public is not necessarily and au-
tomatically correlated to a reduction of pollution risk (van Rooji et al., 2012), on the 
other hand, access to information does not automatically convert into a correct risk 
perception.  
Even though Chinese citizens are more and more aware of pollution-related health 
hazards, the risk perception still lags far behind that of many high-income countries, 
like a study on the willingness-to-pay for smog mitigation suggests (Sun et al., 
2016) . 128
Said about the role of citizens, prosecutors and judges are likely to exert an equally 
important role, by supporting the enforcement efforts by environmental protection 
local authorities. In a confucian one-party state like China, however, the separation of 
powers is not clear-cut (see this work Chapter 1) and the judiciary system traditionally 
suffered a lack of autonomy from the executive power. It can be said, thus, that an in-
creased pluralism in the state governance will be likely to fill the shortcomings of the 
state authorities in fulfilling their role in environmental protection to the extent in 
which new actors will be empowered and accredited to take part into the political pro-
cess.  
1.2 China’s environmental law: historical evolution  
1.2.1 Earliest stages (1949-1977) 
After the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 and through all the 
maoist period, which terminated with the opening-up reforms by Deng Xiaoping in 
late 70s is hard to talk about a real legal system for environmental protection. Firstly, 
because the focus of the country policies was centered on reconstruction and develo-
pment, in the framework of a centrally planned economy; secondly, because the pe-
riod was characterized by an ideological emphasis on political, rather than legal, cate-
gories as the main government principles.  
 The study shows that the average willingness-to-pay for preventing chronic diseases from smog in 128
China is around the 1% of the income, 10 to 1000 times lower than US and Taiwan.   
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The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) was the peak of this situation, with the rule of 
law close to be non-existent at the dawn of Reforms (Feng and Liao, 2015).  
During this period, the few regulations which addressed environmental issues were 
sporadic and mainly originated by human health concerns (Bao, 2006), like the Plant 
Health and Safety Regulations (1956), which was a first attempt to regulate the plant 
wastes disposal, providing a safeguarding plant workers and nearby inhabitants, the 
Decision on Preventing Silica Dust in Mining Companies (1956) and the Drinking 
Water Health Regulations (1959). 
 
After the chaos brought by the Cultural Revolution, in the wake of the Stockholm 
Conference (1972), China issued in 1973 the Regulation on Environmental Protec-
tion, which was the the first comprehensive -although preliminary- environmental 
protection set of measures in the history of PRC (Bao, Ibidem).    
       
1.2.2 The Environmental Protection Law (1978-2014) 
In 1978, the National People’s Congress amended the Constitution and included, for 
the first time, environmental protection into it, with the amended art. 26 , which 129
stated that: “The State protects and improves the living and the ecological environ-
ment, prevents pollution and other damages. The State organizes and encourages and 
the protects forest trees” . 130
This article acted as the juridical basis for the country’s environmental protection le-
gal framework for the years to come. 
The first, fundamental, step was the approval of the Environmental Protection Law 
(for Trial Implementation), in 1979. The same law has then been confirmed in occa-
sion of its first amendment, in 1989. The Law provided the basic provisions for envi-
ronmental protection, which acted as the basis for other specific laws.  
The first act which followed the Environmental Protection Law was the Marine Pollu-
 PRC’s amended Constitution (1978). Available at http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2004/conten129 -
t_62714.htm
   Author’s translation from the original: “ࢵਹכಷ޾ද࠺ኞၚሾह޾ኞாሾह҅ᴠလ࿱ວ޾ٌ՜لਸ̶਼130
ࢵਹᕟᕢ޾Ἡ༙ۜ໅᭜຋҅כಷ຋๙”
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tion Law, in 1982 (revised in 1998), which addressed the protection of the marine en-
vironment and its resources from pollution and unsustainable exploitation.  
In 1984, the Water Pollution Law was enacted (further revisions occurred in 1996 and 
2008), with the aim of protecting the country’s hydric resources and their safety (Art. 
1 and Art. 2).  
The Air Pollution Law was issued in 1988 (revisions were brought in 1995 and 2000) 
and targeted the prevention and the protection of air from atmospheric pollution. After 
the amendment and the confirmation of the Environmental Protection Law, in 1989, a 
second round of legislation began. In 1996 the Solid Waste Law (revised in 2004) 
covered the protection of the environment by solid waste pollution (Art. 1) of dry 
land, with exception of the seas, falling in the jurisdiction of the Marine Pollution 
Law (Art. 2). Clean production Law was issued in 2002, with the objective of promot-
ing cleaner production practices, with lesser impact on the environment and the hu-
man health. The same year, the Environmental Impact Assessment Law has been en-
acted, with the purpose implement a pollution prevention framework, with conditional 
environmental appraisal to be carried out before the implementation of programmes 
and construction projects. In 2009, the Circular Economy Law, supporting the im-
provement of the circular economy and of resource usage efficiency, concluded the 
legal framework.  
In the same period, aside from these general provisions, a certain number of resource-
specific measures have been issued in the same period: the Forestry Law (1984, 
1998); the Grassland Law (1985, 2003); the Fishery Law (1986; 2000; 2004); the 
Land Administration Law (1986; 2000; 2004); the Mineral Resources Law (1986; 
1996); the Water Law (1988; 1998; 2004); the Wildlife Protection Law (1988; 1989); 
The Water and Soil Conservation Law (1991); The Desertification Law (2001); The 
Radioactive Pollution Law (2003).  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Exhibit 1. Laws on environmental protection after the enactment of the first Envi-
ronmental Protection Law in 1979 
Source: McElwee (Ibidem)  
      
The above listed provisions can be classified according to their function and scope 
within the Environmental Protection legal framework. The Water Pollution Law, Air 
Pollution Law, Solid Waste Law are focussed on a certain kind of pollution source. 
There are then resource-focussed instruments, like the Grassland Law, Forestry Law, 
Water Law, Fishery Law and the like, which are more focussed on resource manage-
ment. Finally, the Environmental Assessment Law and Circular Economy Law ad-
dress the environmental management and sustainable development issues on a com-
prehensive and cross-sectorial level.  
 
1.2.3 The New Environmental Protection Law (2015) 
After more than 25 years, on the 1st of January 2015, a new amendment of the Envi-
ronmental Protection Law (1979, 1989) came into force, providing the country with 
the most up-to-date and stringent provisions on environmental protection . 131
 http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2014-04/25/content_2666434.htm131
 125
The former law 47 articles were expanded to 70 articles , with important innova132 -
tions (Padoan, 2016): 
 
- Increased responsibilities and penalties for polluters  
- Increased responsibilities for public authorities and their officers  
- Increased information divulgation to the public  
- Major role to be played by NGOs  
- Protection for whistleblowers     
 
The 2015 Environmental Protection Law (2015 EPL) states that environmental pro-
tection is a fundamental national policy  which will be pursued giving priority to 133
protection, emphasis to prevention and to integrated governance, with major role to be 
played by the public, in particular by local governments, firms and citizens . 134
One of the most important innovation respect the previous version of law is the intro-
duction of a daily-based fine system, which replaces the one-off fine system disposed 
by the 1989 edition . Public bodies and related officers, for their part, will be evalu135 -
ated also for their commitment to environmental protection  and will be punished 136
with destitution and criminal prosecution for their illicit acts and behaviours . The 137
objective of a more integrated governance, with increased involvement of public ac-
tors, is pursued by improved measures on disclosure of monitoring data and environ-
mental quality parameters , the protection of whistleblowers , and a major role 138 139
 http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/china-environmental-protection-law-revised/132
 2015 EPL, Art. 4 133
 Ibidem, Art. 5 and Art. 6134
 Ibidem, Art. 59135
 Ibidem, Art. 26136
 Ibidem, Art. 68137
 Ibidem, art. 53, 54, 55138
 Ibidem, art. 57139
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recognized to registered and well established NGOs, which are allowed to bring legal 
actions against polluters . 140
The effects of the new law were positive during the first year of implementation, un-
der the point of view of both enforcement and results: according to the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection (MEP) data, reported by Zhang et al. (2016), MEP inspect-
ed 1.77 million enterprises, with 191,000 prosecuted firms, shutting down 20,000 of 
them, and inflicting fines for total 87,5 million USD. According to the same data, in 
the most important urban industrial districts the air quality sensibly improved, with a 
reduction of main pollutants by 5 to 28%.           
Despite the above described improvements, the current law has been claimed by some 
observers to still have many shortcomings.  
According to Zhang et al. (Ibidem), the 2015 EPL reveals four gaps:  
- the scope of the law is overlapped by other laws jurisdiction, like forestry, grassland 
and water laws, so that there would be conflicts arising amongst 2015 EPL and other 
provisions; 
-sSame way, the enforcement can be affected by the fragmentation amongst different 
structures that supervise natural resources, like the MEP, the Ministries of water, of 
land, of agriculture, etc.;   
- although citizens and NGOs are more involved into the integrated governance, they 
are not fully recognized in their right to environmental quality. This turns into the 
right for them to bring lawsuits against polluters but not against the public authorities 
responsible for environmental supervision;  
-  the local Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPB), which are the local units of the 
MEP, are financially and politically dependent from the local government, making 
difficult for the MEP to effectively exert its control on them. This can lead to enfor-
cement shortcomings and conflicts of interest.               
    
 Ibidem, art. 58140
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1.3 Plan and Policies  
 
Exhibit 2. Environmental Protection Plan 2016-2020 Targets 
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Source: 13th Environmental Protection Five Year Plan, MEP (translated into English 
by the author)  
Aside from the above examined law provisions, China’s Environmental Protection 
legal framework is complemented by a series of plans, policies and international 
agreements, which act as guidelines for further legal development and administrative 
regulations. The PRC most important and overarching planning provision is the Five-
Year Plan (FYP), came to its thirteenth edition in the period (2016-2020). Amongst 
other facets, the 13th FYP covers many issues relevant to environmental protection. 
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The main targets set by the FYP for enhancing the environmental protection are : 141
 
- most stringent policies for the protection of cultivated land and ensure grain safety  
- promotion of clean production and low-carbon industries, green finance and the 
establishment of a green development fund  
- inclusion of parameters related to natural resources protection in the appraisal of of-
ficial performance  
- promotion of new energy vehicles and electric cars  
- featuring of a nationwide real time online environment monitoring system, mapping 
all the emission spots  
- improving forest protection and reforestation, with the ban of commercial exploita-
tion of forests  
The general guidelines indicated by the FYP are then articulated in sectoral specifi 
cFive year plans. As for the case of environmental protection, the five year plan titled 
“13th Environmental Protection Five Year Plan” has been released on 24th November 
2016 . It is a 10 Chapters document, setting detailed environmental protection targe142 -
ts to be reached by 2020. The following table (Exhibit 2), extracted from the third sec-
tion of the second chapter summarizes the main targets and key performance indica-
tors.      
The planning action is carried out also at a sub-sectorial level, with the issuance of 
Action plans. The content of these plans will be analysed in the following paragraphs 
of this work, when sectorial regulations will be taken into account.  
  
 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/photo/2015-11/04/c_134783513.htm141
 http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-12/05/content_5143290.htm142
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2. CHINA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION SUB-SECTORIAL REG-
ULATIONS 
 
In this paragraph we will take into account the regulations on air, water and soil pro-
tection, as the main environmental domain affecting human lives. While air pollution 
is a largely acknowledged issue, due also to the attention that international media usu-
ally devotes to it, water and soil pollution is also extremely important, due to their in-
terconnections and their relevance with regards to other important facets, such as food 
safety (that we addressed in Paper 3).    
2.1 China’s air protection and control regulations 
2.1.1 Background 
China’s air pollution is one of the most visible consequences of the environmental de-
terioration, due also to its media exposure, that made of it the icon of China’s pollu-
tion to the eyes of the international audience. According to WHO (2005) guidelines, 
smog contains the following chemical elements, that are hazardous for human health: 
PM (particulate matter), SO2 (sulfur dioxide), NOx (Nitrogen Oxide), O3 (Ozone). 
These elements have been monitoring in China since December 2013, revealing fre-
quent failure in meeting the minimum standards for air quality : the Report on Envi143 -
ronmental Situation in 2016” issued by the MEP reveals that on a total of 338 cities, 
only 84 were able to not exceed the standards . The same report shows how the situ144 -
ation registered some improvements from 2015, with the rate of days defined as 
“good” increased by 2.1% and fine particulate (PM 2.5) decreased by 9.1%.  
The main drivers for air pollution are to be found in industrial activities and excessive 
reliance on coal for energy production, which makes the 66% of all energy matrix 
(Padoan, Ibidem).  
 The standards for air quality will be analysed in a latter stage of this Paragraph143
 http://www.zhb.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/qt/201706/t20170605_415442.htm144
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Tracing SO2 and NO2, that are good predictors also for PM, Rohde and Muller 
(2015) reckon that fossil fuel burning accounts for 30-50% of the air pollution, indus-
trial facilities for 25-35% and transportation fuels for the remaining 15-25%. No de-
finitive research has been done on the impact by air pollution on the economy. The 
“Action Plan for the prevention and control of air pollution”, about which we are go-
ing to discuss later, estimates more than 300 billion euro to be needed for its imple-
mentation (Padoan, Ibidem).  
Recent areal studies on the impact of air pollution on the economy take into account 
the effect on the human capital, with estimated impact on GDP ranging from 0,3% to 
2,3% in Beijing area and the Delta of Pearl River (Zhao et al, 2016; Lu et al., 2016). 
The varied situation across country’s areas and the unpredictability of air pollution 
effect on human health on the long term make more precise and nationwide estima-
tion difficult.   
2.1.2 Regulatory Framework for air pollution prevention and control  
As we have seen before, air pollution was the topic of one of the earliest environmen-
tal measures issued by the authorities of the PRC, with the Decision on Preventing 
Silica Dust in Mining Companies (1956).  
The regulations addressing air pollution were then spread across the general and spe-
cific legislative acts issued since late 70s. Amongst them, the most important is the 
Air Pollution Law, issued in 1988 and revised in 1995 and 2000 (Feng and Liao, 
2015). The Air Pollution Law, in its first edition, set a first comprehensive framework 
for the environmental protection of air, with Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPB) 
enabled to supervise and punish the firms that exceeded the allowed emission levels 
(Alford and Liebman, 2001).  
The 1995 amendment of the Law tried to adapt its provisions to a radically changing 
institutional and economic landscape, but it was the third amendment, in 2000, that 
made the legal framework and the enforcement capability (along with the necessary 
political willingness) register a relevant progress, even though not completely satis-
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factory (Feng and Liao, Ibidem): for the first time, the idea of sustainable develop-
ment was included. Moreover, vehicles emissions were regulated, by limiting the pro-
duction and distribution of non-compliant vehicles.     
In addition to laws, the legal framework is complemented by administrative rules is-
sued by government bodies, at both national and local levels.  
A not exhaustive review of the main administrative rules on air prevention and control 
is shown in the Exhibit 3.  
Exhibit 3. National administrative rules for air pollution prevention and control 
Source: Feng and Liao (2015)  
 
As we have seen before, planning provisions play a relevant role in complementing 
the legal framework. The above quoted “13th Environmental Protection Five Year 
Plan”, enacted by the MEP, addresses air quality issues in its Fourth Chapter, Section 
One. The sectorial plan, in line with the broader statements of the National 13th Five 
Year Plan, sets a number of priorities that provincial government must put in their 
agenda, such as the analysis of the air quality situation at the province level, promot-
ing joint and cross-areal coordination, the improvement of warning mechanisms and 
pre-planning systems, the control of  total coal consumption targeted to its reduction 
by 5-10% within the plan timeframe, the disposal of obsolete vehicles and agriculture 
machineries and their replacement by cleaner energy fueled vehicles, and the supervi-
sion of dust in construction areas. 
The same chapter refers to the “Action Plan for the prevention and control of atmos-
pheric pollution” issued on 2013 by the State Council, a ten-chapter document which 
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establish the following priorities:  
 
- Improve the supervision and reduce the emission of pollutants  
- Promote the reshaping of the Industry Landscape  
- Promoting the technology innovation, with particular reference to clean production 
and circular economy  
- Regulate the energy matrix, reducing the coal consumption reliance, benefiting the 
clean energy  
- Improve market-based mechanisms for environment management, with reference to 
fine system, tariffs and green finance  
- Improve the regulations and their enforcement  
- Improve the cross-areal coordination  
- Promote and encourage pluralism in environmental management  
  
2.1.3 Air Quality Standards  
Amongst the most important administrative rules quality standards ranks at the top for 
their importance. In relation to air quality standards, the most important are the 
GB3095-2012 (air quality standards) and the GB16279-1996 (comprehensive atmos-
pheric pollutant discharge standards).  
The first one is particularly important, as it sets, on the basis of the grid provided by 
WHO (2005), a classification of the air quality, although the threshold levels are less 
restrictive. It offers a weighted air quality indicator (AQI), which classifies the air 
quality into five classes: “excellent”, “good”, “lightly polluted”, “medium polluted”, 
“heavily polluted”, “hazardously polluted”.  The standard, issued in its last edition in 
2012, has been gradually applied on a national level, on a timeframe of five year (na-
tionwide application started in 2016).  
For each industrial sector, specific emission standards have been issued (Padoan, 
2016:57).     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2.2 China’s soil and water environmental protection regulations  
2.2.1 Background  
A national survey issued by the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Land 
and Resources in 2014  unrolled for the first time data concerning the environmental 145
condition of soils in China, collected between 2005 and 2013.  The survey found that 
16,1% of surveyed points exceeded limits, with the 19,4% arable surface, 10% of 
grazing lands and 10% of woods contaminated beyond any tolerable limit.  
The main pollutants are inorganic (83% of the total) and list the following contami-
nants: cadmium, mercury, arsenic, copper, lead, chromium, zinc, nickel. Organic con-
taminants rank second (16% of the total) and list BHC, DDT and PAHs.  The most 
polluted areas are in proximity of the most industrialized areas, like the North-east, 
the Yangtze River Delta and the Pearl River Delta. High levels of pollution have been 
found also next to the south-west and central-southern mining industries areas. 
In 2015, according to the China’s Statistical Yearbook (2016) , China’s surface and 146
underground hydric resources amounted respectively to 2690,1 and 779,7 billion mc.; 
the same Statistical Yearbook, indicates that 73,5 billion tons of pollutant where di-
scharged in waters during the same year .  147
The Report on the Environmental Conditions (:=@3,0, 2015)  issued by 148
the MEP, highlights that 35,1% surface waters suffer bad environmental conditions 
(with 8,8% of total surface water classified as extremely polluted), while the polluted 
groundwater amounts up to 66,2% of its total (with 23% of total groundwater classi-
fied as extremely polluted). As for surface waters, the most critical area is the Haihe 
river basin, located around Beijing, with more than 39% of waters classified as extre-
mely polluted. Nevertheless, due to other factors, like the flow rate of each rivers and 
 http://www.zhb.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/qt/201404/W020140417558995804588.pdf145
 http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/indexeh.htm146
 The monitored pollutants are listed as follows: COD, Ammonia Nitrogen, Nitrogen, Phosphorus, Pe147 -
troleum, Volatile Phenol, Lead, Mercury, Cadmium, Hexavalent Chromium, Chromium, Arsenic 
 http://www.zhb.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/qt/201606/W020160602411685220884.pdf148
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the diverse impact of water treatment procedures, the emission of pollutants to the sea 
describes a different pattern, with the East China Sea (in front of Shanghai and Zhe-
jiang province) suffering the highest rate of pollutant emissions, with more than 46% 
of discharged waters classified as extremely pollutant.       
2.2.2 Regulatory framework for soil and water environmental protection 
A comprehensive regulatory framework for soil environmental protection is still yet to 
be released, with a dedicated law (Soil Environmental Protection Law) and Provisio-
nal Rules for the Environmental Management of Contaminated Sites still pending for 
approval at the time this paper is being written. 
The current legal framework is at the moment represented by the measures on soil 
which are included into wider or other specific regulatory tools and planning provi-
sions.  
Aside for broader and constitutional provisions, the most specific regulatory act which 
addressed the soil environmental protection was the Circular on Prevention and Con-
trol of Environmental Pollution During Enterprise Relocation (Brombal et al., 2015), 
issued in 2004, which provided that: 1. environmental monitoring and assessment 
have to be carried out when changing land use; 2. on the basis of such an assessment, 
soil should be repaired where needed; 3. enterprises formerly occupying the land are 
accountable for soil contamination, even after its relocation (SEPA, 2004).  
While a Soil Environmental Protection Law has been drafted in 2014 but its content is 
still not disclosed to the public, in December 2009 the Ministry of Environmental Pro-
tection issued a draft document for discussion titled Provisional Rules for the Envi-
ronmental Management of Contaminated Sites . These provisions, which are still 149
being discussing amongst the authority stakeholders concerned with soil protection, 
and for that have a low enforcement capability, offer definitions and a framework for 
liability and management of polluted soil. More generally, it remarks a conceptual 
shift from a “reactive” to a “risk management” and prevention approach, with regards 
to contaminated soil management (Qin, 2014).  
 http://www.zhb.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bgth/200912/t20091223_183364.htm149
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Amongst the planning measures which affect the environmental protection of soils, 
the most important is by all means the “Action Plan for the prevention and the control 
of soil pollution”, issued in 2016 by the State Council with the aim to define the ad-
ministrative and strategical framework for the issue and priority actions to be carried 
out by 2020 (Padoan, 2016). Liabilities are defined in line with the general framework 
provided by the national legislation (polluters pay and public officers is responsible 
for ) and emphasis is given to both prevention and reparation. The plan has as its ma-
jor targets to achieve by 2020 the compliancy with national safety standards of the 
90% of agricultural lands and currently contaminated sites. The same targets are set to 
a threshold of 95% by 2030.  
Water pollution is specifically addressed by the Water Pollution Law (1984, revised in 
1996 and 2008) and the resource-based Water Law (1988, revised in 2002). Both the 
set regulations introduced for the first time in China some of the provisions which 
were then adopted by other pieces of legislation (IGES, 2009).  The Water Pollution 
Law introduced for the first time instruments like pollution levies, the environmental 
impact assessment, discharge reporting and inspections systems, which were then 
adopted also by the Air Pollution Law and, more generally, by the further revisions of 
the Environmental Protection Laws.  In 2002, the revision of the Water Law introdu-
ced for the first time the information disclosure, which has been developed and exten-
ded, on a broader basis, by subsequent acts, especially -as we have seen before- by the 
2015 Environmental Protection Law.    
As for the planning side, on 2nd April 2015, the State Council issued the Action Plan 
for the Prevention of Water Pollution. The plan sets a series of targets to be reached by 
2020, such as a strong reduction of waters classified as “extremely polluted” (key ri-
ver basins surface quality water will have to reach a total of 70%) and the implemen-
tation of a stricter control on the groundwater pollution and waste. The targets will be 
reached by means of more severe preventions and control provisions, proactive pro-
motion and support of technology, market regulatory mechanisms and enforcement 
capability enhancement (Padoan, 2016).  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2.2.3 Soil and water environmental quality standards 
The main standard on soil quality is the GB1518-1995, which is currently under revi-
sion (Brombal et al., Ibidem). The standard sets the limit for pollutants in soils, which 
are classified into three different classes: Class I (uncontaminated lands); Class II 
(agricultural lands); Class III (higher capacity adsorbing soils).  
Other standards includes soil related provisions. Amongst them we here recall GB/T 
28384-2002 (Soil quality - vocabulary), HJ24.1-2014 (Technical guidelines for envi-
ronmental site investigation), HJ24.2-2014 (Technical guidelines for environmental 
site monitoring), HJ24.3-2014 (Technical guidelines for risk assessment of contami-
nated soil), HJ24.4-2014 (Technical guidelines for site soil remediation) .  150
Amongst the main mater quality standards are divided into Surface Water Standards 
(GB3838-2002), Marine Waters Standards (GB3097-1997), Groundwater Standards 
(GB/T14848-93), which set water quality class levels and related pollutant thresholds. 
Further water standards are: emission limits for wastewater (GB 8978-1996 and 
GB18918-2002), emission limits for the leather and textile processing sector 
(GB30486-2013 and GB4287-2012).  
   
3. IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN BUSINESSES 
The evolution of the environmental protection regulatory framework presents enor-
mous implications for foreign business whereas it opens new market opportunities on 
the one hand and new restrictions to economic activity on the other hand. In this para-
graph we will analyze both these facets, underlining the opportunities for foreign bu-
sinesses approaching the green market in China, as well as the challenges that foreign 
businesses are likely to face on the side of their supply chain, as a consequence of the 
stricter environmental rules on the commodity market.  
 A complete list of standards is available at: http://kjs.mep.gov.cn/hjbhbz/bzwb/trhj/  150
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3.1 The Green Market 
Along with greater attention on environmental protection and developing regulatory 
framework, the green market in China is growing fast and big opportunities are attrac-
ting foreign companies, which can leverage their advanced know-how and technical 
capability as their competitive advantage.  
The Green Market, which of course is highly structured in diverse sub-sectors, can be 
segmented into two bigger segments. On the one hand, machineries and devices, on 
the other hand, plants and systems (CESIF, 2016).  
As for the first segment, the target customers are those industries that are now forced 
by the new regulations to monitor their emissions. The business model in this case is a 
traditional B2B model, where the foreign firm sells its product to the Chinese custo-
mer. The second segment, instead, is represented by public administrations, industry 
networks that share the common need to develop centralized monitoring and proces-
sing systems. Characterized by a more complex architecture, foreign firms can find 
their opportunities by joining public-private partnerships, by transferring their techno-
logy or know-how.        
The green market, since the 12th five year development plan (2012-2016), which fir-
stly placed environment protection at its core, is developing fast and its aggregate size 
is huge, with a forecast investment of 9,4 trillion CNY (1700 billion USD) for the im-
plementation of the sectorial action plans (with 61% devoted to soil protection, 21% 
to water protection and 18% to air pollution control) . Nevertheless, the green mar151 -
ket, as its start up is relatively recent, can hardly be said as mature. Industries and pu-
blic administrations are only recently acquiring the needed technical knowledge and 
understanding, with low problem solving capability (Padoan, 2016).    
Such situation is limiting the access to the market for SMEs, which are often highly 
specialized in a small range of products/services and lack of the financial capacity to 
bear the risk of a immature market, where the average customers are often not able to 
fully understand the technical contents of their proposals and where the time frame for 
technology transfer is not certain (CESIF, 2016). 
 http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-08/13/content_21589192.htm151
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In fact, while exporting machineries and devices needs to obtain local certifications, 
entering in public-private partnership needs the set up of local representative offices 
or of a commercial branch. Both of these barrier need for investment and costs to be 
overcome, with uncertain return, on an uncertain time frame.  
         
3.2 Public-Private Partnership (PPP) reform 
Due to local government public debt alarming levels, which reached the 37.5% of na-
tional GDP in 2014, averagely accounting for 300% local fiscal revenue . This situa152 -
tion is clearly unbearable in the long run, considering the economic growth rate slow-
down. In order to find a solution, the Chinese government is trying to organize the 
funding of infrastructure and utilities projects on a more market-oriented way, with 
increased involvement of private ventures. To this end, in 2015 the NRDC issued the 
Public Concessions Reform.  
The Reform brings relevant innovation to the relationship between public and private 
partners; the most important is that public government are no more allowed to guaran-
tee a fix return from the investment, with the entrepreneurial risk being transferred to 
the privates, who are granted with the permission to set their tariff scheme to the end 
user, in accordance with their business model (Padoan, 2016).  
The Reform applies to five sectors: energy, transportations, hydric resources, envi-
ronmental protection, urban public works. For the first time, the regulation defines the 
nature of the concession, which is granted by means of a written agreement to be si-
gned between the public administration and the concessionaire, with clear indications 
about the execution, performance assessment, modifications and resolution of the 
agreement: notably, the art. 18 highlights the mandatory clauses to be included into 
the agreement, while the art. 36 dispose that in case of any government regulatory 
measure or policy that would affect the business model with consequent loss to the 
forecast revenue the public administration is required to compensate the concessionai-
re.  
 http://gcfp.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Policy-Report-of-Chinese-Local-Government-Debt-152
final.pdf
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The 6th Chapter of the law describe the dispute settlement methods, with the possibi-
lity for the concessionaire to negotiate, mediate or proceed against the administration 
through an administrative controversy (<;D), which is a particular dispute set-
tlement method employed in China when the controversy involves a state organ. It is 
important, however, to note that no civil litigations are possible according to the pre-
sent framework (Padoan, 2016). This highlights, again, a persisting asymmetry bet-
ween the state and the private, in the line with the above described “responsive autho-
ritarianism” which characterizes the state-society relations in China.       
     
3.3 Operational Issues    
Increasing attention to environmental protection is opening enormous opportunities 
for foreign companies.  
As mentioned before, exporting environmental protection and monitoring devices and 
machineries requires local certification, so that an episodic approach to the market is 
quite uncommon. As for the chance to take part to PPP projects, the foreign company 
which wish to operate in China in such a framework is required first to register as a 
Wholly foreign owned enterprise (WFOE) or a Foreign Invested Commercial Enter-
prise (FICE), then obtain the relevant qualifications and certifications in relation to 
the scope.  
The art. 3 of the PPP Regulation allows foreign companies to join PPP projects. Mo-
reover, either the foreign company wishes to enter a PPP project or manufacture/di-
stributes its goods, it should be aware of the possible restrictions that the government 
might advance against the registration of foreign invested companies in selected sec-
tors. The Investment Catalogue, issued by the Ministry of Finance and Commerce 
(MOFCOM) and come to its newest edition in 2017, expressly identifies sectors in 
which foreign investment are restricted, limited, allowed and encouraged. Even thou-
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gh the historical trend is towards relaxation of restrictions, with the recent introduc-
tion of a “negative list approach” , many sectors are still restricted .  153 154
However, it should be noted that many difficulties could arise after the registration, in 
matters like land acquisition, machinery and devices importation, fiscal issues, ad so 
on. For this reason, it is always suggested to selected a local partner, in order to redu-
ce the risk and the operational costs that operating in a complex context like China 
might bring. In such a case, the right corporate profile would be a sino-foreign joint 
venture (JV). According to the Company Law of China (1993, last revision in 2014), 
JVs can be both contractual JV (CJV) and Equity JV (EJV); EJV are more common, 
as they are legal entity, while CJV do not enjoy this status. As far as the participation 
to PPP projects is concerned, as the concessionaire have to sign a written concessiona-
ry agreement with a public administration, it goes without saying that it cannot be a 
CJV. 
Aside from market opportunities opened by the new environmental regulatory fra-
mework, there are other wider and indirect implications for foreign companies opera-
ting in China. Stricter environmental surveillance is heavily impacting the country 
industrial landscape, markedly in the low-value added sectors.  
For instance, metalworking raw material prices have increased by an  average rate of 
115% from January 2016 to September 2017 . In plastics sector the situation is even 155
more serious, with companies claiming for critical raw material shortage .  156
The trend is not likely to come to an end, with the ministry of environment that is in-
tensifying the control over polluting firms, forcing them to comply with the new stan-
dards or close their business . Apart from sounding as a direct confirm of the com157 -
 the “negative list approach”, in contrast with the past “positive list approach”, implies that any sector 153
which is not pointed to be limited or restricted is allowed. 
 http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2017/07/11/china-releases-2017-foreign-investment-catalogue-154
opening-access-new-industries.html
 historical data extracted from custeel.com155
 http://www.zgswcn.com/xazx/18687150.html156
 https://news.smm.cn/news/100753994157
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mitment by the Chinese government in enforcing the new environmental measures, 
this trend, if will be confirmed in the future, is likely to reshape the whole industrial 
landscape in China, with serious implications for the supply chain management for 
firms manufacturing and sourcing in China, which can be then pushed to recalibrate 
their strategy or delocalize their low-value added activities elsewhere.          
 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Environmental protection is one of the key strategic points of the transition towards 
the New Normal for China. A better quality environment is seen as not only the pre-
mise, but also the result of the general shift towards a sustainable economic, institu-
tional and social development model. On the one hand, along with the economic gro-
wth by a larger share of the population, people are asking for better quality of life, 
with growing awareness about environmental issues, which reflects their increased -
although still limited- involvement into the governance as stakeholders. On the other 
hand, a more sustainable development model should move away from low-value ad-
ded, investment intensive and high pollutant industrial patterns, developing high-va-
lue added industries and service reliant economy, with lower impact on the environ-
ment. While the environmental situation of air, soil and water is alarming, the com-
mitment shown the government by means of legal development, regulatory reform 
and enforcement effort appears to be genuine and effective, even though there is a 
long way to run. In this challenge, foreign companies are called to play a major role, 
leveraging their advanced technologies, know-how and technical capabilities. The 
market opportunities are by all means enormous but barriers and obstacles are very 
challenging, above all with reference to small and medium enterprise, because of the 
high level of risk and complexity that entering an immature market like China im-
plies. Environmental protection reform, moreover, is likely to affect also those firms 
which do not directly operate in the green market, because of the cross-cutting and 
massive effects that stricter environmental measures can bring into their operations 
and supply chain management.         
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CONCLUSIONS 
The transition to New Normal, as a shift to a quality-based, socially balanced and su-
stainable development model, is not a simple and clear-cut convergence to western 
advanced economy models.  
As we have seen across the present work, China’s reform path was characterized by 
the effort to modernize the economical and institutional landscape, gleaning of course 
from international best practices, but always relying on a pragmatic approach. The 
commitment to comply with the international rules and standards -commitment that 
had in the accession to WTO its cornerstone- has always been counterbalanced by de-
velopmental purposes, in line with the “confucian” or “developmental state” tradition 
(see Paper 1).  
Harmonization and integration within the international system has always been com-
pensated and mitigated by the “sinisization” of the institutional and juridical arrange-
ments brought in from outside, just like the case of the standard harmonization hi-
ghlights (Paper 3).  
Juridical, institutional and political peculiarities that keep marking a difference with 
the “rest of the world” and that are often the object of dispute with the international 
community, like the case of the quarrel on the market economy status (see Paper 1), 
can be then seen simply as hard-to-dismantle vestigial legacies, sooner or later desti-
ned to be swept away by the modernization.  
They should be rather framed as dynamic elements revealing a path dependency pat-
tern in a transition that is more incremental and evolutive than transformative. The 
ancient debate between gradualism and shock-therapy is then passed, with reference 
to China, as China’s transition have being with any doubt “gradual” with outcomes 
that can at least empirically appraised after four decades of reform, redefining the 
question as follows: where is China’s transition at the stage of New Normal actually 
leading to? 
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China’s cultural background is too deeply entangled with its institutional and political 
system to hypothesize a break into the orthogenetic development pattern that charac-
terized its five thousands year history, while its growing economical and political 
weight is too relevant within the international system to not take into account the re-
troaction that China’s integration might bring to the international system itself, just 
like the huge and growing amount of state-led outward FDI clearly shows (Paper 2). 
China’s transition to New Normal more than the consecration of China in the age of 
globalization appears thus as the attempt by the Chinese government to find a way for 
a “globalization with Chinese characteristics”, where increased international interde-
pendence coexists with an internal-consumption based economy, a vigorous private 
sector develops along with the unquestioned leading role of the party-state and a more 
transparent and foreign-friendly business environment is counterbalanced by persi-
sting -and not residual- protectionist policies.   
The implications for foreign businesses operating in China are massive.  
The explicit aim of the transition to New Normal is the shift towards a quality growth 
development model, where sustainability and inclusiveness are both the premises and 
the objectives. The raising of a middle-class as the economic and social engine for 
growth is the most attractive promise for foreign businesses investing in China: it 
would mean a 600 million people middle class demanding for quality goods and ser-
vices.  
Fast legal development, while improving the business environment, implies the need 
for a deeper understanding of regulations, in a fast changing regulatory environment, 
which often lacks of transparency and suffers from bureaucratic arbitrariness, just like 
the case of stricter import regulations introduced by the new food safety reform shows 
(see Paper 3). Stricter environmental regulations, new public welfare, increased ave-
rage income, while opening new market opportunities for high-tech foreign enterpri-
ses (see Papers 2 and 3), will be likely to dismiss the “world factory” model, which 
had in low operational costs its competitive advantage.  
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This will of course impact the supply chain of foreign companies which manufacture 
and source in China.  
More generally, understanding the nature of China transition to New Normal as a 
China-peculiar process is a fundamental theoretical premise for businesses to draft 
development plans, whereas they are required to be long-termed and as much as pos-
sible finely tuned with the country development trajectory, as traced by the reforms 
and planning.  
Due to the extensive impact that China nowadays has on the international economy, 
such a need probably applies also to businesses which do not intend to directly opera-
te in the country in the near future. After all, the changes that are occurring in the 
country and the ways by which the government is trying to actively address them are 
probably destined to shape not only the “New Normal” of China, but -to some extent- 
of the World as a whole.
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